Urban warfare is the hardest type of warfare that any nation can ask its military to conduct. It is more difficult, more complex than any other—not least because urban terrain is not neutral. But to understand why these are more than just platitudes requires a detailed examination of the many particular challenges presented by dense urban terrain. That’s the focus of this episode of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast.
John Spencer highlights these challenges and describes some of the innate difficulties that military forces will encounter when operating in cities. He shares insights based on years of research and historical analysis, as well as firsthand experience with both urban operations and the institutional features of the US Army that make preparing for urban warfare even more challenging. As he explains, militaries can get better and can become more prepared to meet the challenges. But first they must truly understand them.
Image credit: 1st Lt. Derrick Garner, New York National Guard
Without listening to the podcast, I think that Urban Warfare needs to be reassessed with the war in Ukraine. No other modern army has laid total waste to vast cities and a nation as Russia is doing in the Ukraine War.
Wait…how about Syria, Libya, Israel-Gaza, Iraq, etc.? Yes, those can be argued that they laid waste to them, but not with tank fire, airpower ordnance, MLRS, helicopters, cruise missiles, etc. The "slash and burn" of Russia firing MLRS rockets just to raze cities to the ground goes against modern tactics in not expending vast quantities of ordnance just to destroy buildings and infrastructure. The goal of MOUT is to eliminate the enemy, not to make cities a WW2 landscape of carpet bombing destruction so that they don't exist anymore. But that is what we're seeing and it's this WW2, Roman, and Viking mentality that is shocking NATO and other nations into understanding that Urban Warfare isn't so much warfare compared to Urban Destruction and Desecration. If forces can't enter into cities due to bombardment, should we fight in them?
Anti-Area/Anti-Access Denial in cities has a whole new meaning due to the war in Ukraine. And yet the Media and Ukraine soldiers reenter cities after Russia has laid waste to them….the objective complete to deny habitability to the populace. If the Urban Warfare goal is to "Protect people and property" as the usual tactical and strategic mission, only to learn that the enemy "Doesn't want the city mess," then what is the point of Urban Warfare if there is no fight for the city but a show of firepower unleashed from LRPFires to level the city? Mass PSY-OPS. If Urban Warfare is the "Loot and Destroy" on one side, then how can "Protect people and property" be viewed by the other side if MOUT becomes a game of "cops and robbers?" If ISR does or doesn't reveal that the enemy doesn't want to occupy the city, then would Urban Warfare commence beyond skirmish before LRPFs destroy the city? That is how the Vikings and Romans operated….raid and plunder…compared to the WW2 Germans that wanted to conquer and occupy cities to install their own government.
C4ISR needs to be revamped and reexamined in light of Ukraine. This isn't like Syria or Libya or Gaza where the objective is to eliminate the enemy in cities. The Russian objective in Ukraine, unfortunately, is to eliminate THE cities—and they plundered them too. Think bigger than MOUT. And interestingly, that is where West Point gets into conflict. A 2nd Lt. doesn't give the order to mass-fire LRPFs to destroy an entire city…that is colonel or general or presidential level. So what are the lieutenants, captains, majors, and NCOs supposed to do in A2/AD with cities…just stand on the sidelines and watch the entire city go up in flames by LRPFs, artillery, and missiles? And we haven't even discussed NBC warfare in cities yet, just typical infantry and armor MOUT battles. Reassess and review.