What does it mean when a state’s security sector undergoes what scholars call “elite capture”—a form of corruption in which military and defense resources are leveraged to benefit a small, powerful segment of society? What problems contribute to elite capture and is it possible to disentangle them? From a US policy perspective, what can be done to limit the risk of elite capture when engaging with countries vulnerable to it?
This episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast addresses all of these questions as Ambassador Anne Patterson, retired Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, and Dr. Louis-Alexandre Berg join host Julia McClenon. They bring their combined experience and expertise to a wide-ranging discussion on a deeply challenging policy issue. After first defining the nature of the problem of elite capture, they describe both the factors that contribute to it and those that make it so difficult to address. They also highlight lessons and conclusions from their recent report, “Elite Capture and Corruption of Security Sectors,” before introducing individual examples of states where elite capture is a risk, in particular comparing and contrasting trends in Afghanistan and Mexico.
You can listen to the full episode below. Be sure to subscribe to the Irregular Warfare Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app so you don’t miss an episode!
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Let's look at "elite capture of the security sector" from the perspective offered below. In this regard, let's consider the two quoted items provided below:
“Since the 1990s the focus of American international security policy has been focused on creating conditions for extending zones of security and prosperity to other states under the theory that ‘political as well as economic globalization would make the world safer — and more profitable — for the United States.’ Consequently, the United States saw expansion, rather than retraction, of American military presence around the world.”
(See the 2016 edition of the book “Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military” by U.S. Naval War College Professor Derek S. Reveron; therein, see the bottom of Page 2 of the Introduction chapter.)
"a. An IDAD (Internal Defense and Development) program integrates security force and civilian actions into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may, in turn, promote unrest in the society. The strategy, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.”
(See our own Joint Publication 3-22, "Foreign Internal Defense;" therein, see Chapter II, "Internal Defense and Development" and Paragraph 2, "Construct.")
As we can see from these two quoted items, what the U.S./the West wants other country leadership and/or elites to use (a) our security assistance and (b) their security sectors for, this is often to (c) "maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place." (I.E., "development" which the U.S./the West can — politically, economically, socially, strategically and/or value-wise, etc., — profit from.)
Thus, when the elites of other countries use U.S./Western security assistance and their security sectors for other purposes — for example, so as to ensure that these elites and their cronies stay in power and are, thereby, able to reap the vast majority of the nations' assets, resources and capabilities for themselves — then, obviously, this does not lend itself to reason why the U.S./Western offered security assistance to these nations in the first place. (This reason again being, for example, so as to "maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place" — political, economic, social and/or value, etc., "development" that the U.S./the West can — in some way, shape and/or form — then "profit" from.)
Question: Is this explanation helpful; this, in providing a "missing link" (re: U.S./Western interests in this case) which might help us to better understand why we are so concerned with such things as "elite capture of the security sector?"
Addendum to my initial comment above:
I should note that:
a. While political, economic, social and/or value, etc., "development" — which the U.S./the West can then profit from — is indeed what the U.S./the West wants "our" security assistance — and thus "their" security sectors — to used for,
b. We also we believe that this such "development" (in our eyes at least) is likely to make a better life for the people of these states and societies,
Thus, when "elite capture of the security sector" prevents and defeats our item "a" goal immediately above, it also tends to prevent and defeat our item "b" goal immediately above also?
As to my "development" thoughts above, consider the following from the “Torn Countries” section of Samuel P. Huntington’s famous “Clash of Civilizations” paper:
” … Mexican leaders are engaged in the great task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fundamental economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental political change. In 1991 a top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari described at length to me all the changes the Salinas government was making. When he finished, I remarked: ‘That’s most impressive. It seems to me that basically you want to change Mexico from a Latin American country into a North American country.’ He looked at me with surprise and exclaimed: ‘Exactly! That’s precisely what we are trying to do, but of course we could never say so publicly.'” As his remark indicates, in Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country’s identity. … ”
Question:
As we can see from the above-quoted item, we seem to depend exclusively (if there is no population "ground swell") on various country "elites" to achieve our "development" goals in other states and societies; "development" initiatives which the native populations (for example in Afghanistan and Mexico?) do not agree with (see "significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity" immediately above.).
This being the case, then who — in the alternative — can we go to — to achieve our such "development" goals?
(Thus, the cost of doing the "development" business, this comes down to allowing these elites to "capture the security sector" so as to provide them with what they see as their "pay" — this, for doing [a] our such "development" work [b] in their countries?)