Recently, Modern War Institute Non-Resident Fellow ML Cavanaugh wrote an article for this site called “Fifty-One Strategic Debates Worth Having,” in which he lists 51 debate topics he felt were important to those that think about national security. These topics run the gambit from “Pushbutton, standoff warfare is cowardly” to “Iraq was worth it.” I agree wholeheartedly with Cavanaugh that we should have a lively discussion on many of the topics he proposes. With that in mind, I would like to start by weighing in on one of those topics, that “there will never be another need for a mass airborne drop.” Although such a premise will surely have doubters among airborne ranks, a quick look at the nature of the world in which we live and fight makes clear that it is true.* In the spirit of debate suggested by Cavanaugh’s list, I’m looking forward to hearing from those of you who wish to prove me wrong.
In the potential Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environments created by Russia, China or another near-peer competitor, and with the proliferation of accurate and effective air defense weapon systems, attempting a mass airborne operation today would result in a substantial loss of lives and aircraft, significantly reducing its tactical and strategic impact. This type of operation, which calls for a C-17 carrying approximately 100 paratroopers to fly low (planning altitude of about 800 ft. AGL) and slow (130 knots is ideal), plays right into the hand of an enemy that values air defense over air supremacy.
The Vulnerabilities of Airborne Operations
The Army’s manual on Airborne and Assault Operations, FM 3-99 lists the following vulnerabilities inherent to airborne operations:
- Attack by aircraft and air defense weapon systems during the movement and airborne assault phases.
- Attack by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons because of limited chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection and decontamination capability.
- Attack by ground, air, or artillery during the assault and landing phases.
- Air strikes if air superiority is not gained before the airborne assault.
- Electronic attack, to include jamming of communications and navigation systems, and disrupting aircraft survivability equipment.
- Small-arms fire that presents a large threat to the aircraft during the air movement, airborne assault and landing phases.
For this discussion let’s focus on the first vulnerability, attack by aircraft and air defense, because you can’t have an effective airborne operation if all your aircraft are shot down before the paratroopers can jump out. Not since the Vietnam War has the U.S. Air Force had to contend with an air defense system that was effective in shooting down aircraft. The Vietnamese were successful because they used an integrated air defense system created by the Soviet Union. Over 120 aircraft were lost during the Vietnam War to surface-to-air Missiles (SAM). Iraq, on the other hand, used an air defense system during the 2003 invasion that was comparatively older and less capable, and relied more heavily on guns. With that said, I can only find reference of one fixed-wing aircraft being shot down by a SAM during the recent war in Iraq.
The Russians, and others, learned from our experiences. They determined that while they probably can’t match our air-to-air capability they can compensate for it with an overwhelming integrated air defense system. Unlike U.S. forces, the Russians and other near-peer militaries incorporate air defense from the strategic down to the company-sized unit level.
For the purpose of this argument let’s focus on Russian forces. At the strategic level Russia has at their disposal the S-300 and its upgrade the S-400. As shown in the figure below this system has been deployed to create a bubble of defense along Russia’s border with NATO.
Credit: Institute for the Study of War. (Click to enlarge)
According to open sources the S-400 is equipped with multiple missile variants, which are capable of hitting aircraft or missiles at a range of between 40 and 400 km. It’s possible that if enough of the S-400’s associated radar systems are working in conjunction they could be capable of tracking stealth aircraft like the F-117, F-22, and F-35. With over 150 systems currently deployed they are slowly replacing the S-300, which is capable of tracking over 100 targets (compared to 300 for the S-400) at a range of up to 150–200 km.
At the operational and tactical level Russian forces have at their disposal several different systems, including the SA-17, which has a range of up to 30 km. These systems can be found at the corps and division levels of most orders of battle. They are typically tasked with defending higher-echelon headquarters and other high-value targets. Another system, the 2S6, can also be found at the division level, and possibly task-organized down to brigades. In addition to the 2S6, many brigade-level units will have older ZSU-23-4’s. These systems can range targets out to 10 km and engage targets out to 2.5 km.
The disadvantage to all of the above systems is our ability to conduct effective Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, known as SEAD, through either electronic or kinetic fire means. Most large, vehicle-based, air defense systems are vulnerable to SEAD operations. Successful SEAD gives a window of opportunity for airborne forces to pass through the enemy’s large air defense systems without completely destroying the integrated defense network.
There is, however, an air defense system that SEAD is ineffective against — man-portable air defense systems or MANPADS. One of the most well-known MANPADS is the Stinger missile. The Stinger gained notoriety as the weapon that helped beat the Soviets in Afghanistan after the CIA began supplying them to mujahedeen fighters to help protect them against Soviet helicopter gunships.
The Russians and other militaries today field a weapon similar to the Stinger in the SA-24, and Russia also fields the newer SA-25. Both of these systems fire a heat-seeking missile capable of hitting targets up to 5–6.5 km away. These systems are fielded down to the company and platoon level making this system, one that litters the battlefield, nearly impossible to conduct effective SEAD operations against.
This means that even if effective SEAD allowed an airborne force to make it through the strategic- and operational-level air defense systems, it would have to contend with dozens of MANPADS when its aircraft were at their most vulnerable, on its run over the drop zone. These MANPADS would not be locatable until they were fired, so overcoming the threat they pose would require aircraft to take evasive action, which is not possible while in their drop run, or rely on the heat-seeking countermeasures that are only semi-effective.
The problems for the airborne force don’t stop after it gets through the air defenses. Since many of the aircraft that were used for transporting paratroopers will also be used to send in resupplies, logistics plans will have to be adjusted to account for lost aircraft and personnel. The Little Groups of Paratroopers, or LGOPs, will have to find ways to consolidate, inevitably while under fire from significantly overmatched weapon systems. Without large weapon systems being brought in with resupply missions, these LGOPs will be outgunned and easily defeated.
The glory days of D-Day and Market Garden-sized airborne operations are no more. The dramatic increase in accuracy in air defense weapon systems has significantly decreased the potential survivability of aircraft involved in this type of mission. This is particularly true during their runs over the drop zone, when they are required to fly low, slow, and steady. Simply put, the limited tactical advantages of large, modern-day airborne operations are overshadowed by their potential strategic loss. The Army should therefore shelve mass airborne operations, instead limiting them to small drops of special operation soldiers.
*To head this accusation off at the pass, I am airborne qualified and I have been on jump status. So we can get past the “he must be a dirty, nasty, leg” comments and on to a more lively debate.
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Jason Robertson, U.S. Air Force
Mass Airborne operations are a thing of the past….until they are not. I was an armor officer, dedicated to the premise that battles are won by the mounted combat arm of decision. Yet, in the fall of 2002 we were confronted with a problem. Our intent to attack Saddam from the north was stymied by the Turkish refusal to allow us to move through their country. Somehow we needed to get a division equivalent into Kurdistan…and it was going to have to be by air. Major King is right in one respect, aircraft lift is limited and at a premium with many demands. Yet, landing and offloading troops takes time and in areas with austere airfields ramp space is limited, which further slows throughput. The answer was to airdrop the 10th SF, then the 173d and then follow with an airlifted heavy task force. Although lighter than a heavy division it accomplished the purpose of fixing the northern Iraqi corps. Could we have simply landed the planes and had the Soldiers walk out the ramps…yes…but it would have taken much longer and slowed the arrival of the heavy TF and logistics. So, its been 13 years since the last mass tactical airdrop…but then 13 years isn’t very long in military history. I remember arguing vehemently in the 80s that mass airborne drops were a thing of the past…and then came JUST CAUSE. So in the 90s I argued mass airborne drops were a thing of the past…until OIF. So, rather than arguing against mass airborne operations planners ought to look for the opportunities to use this unique US capability. Maybe they don’t need to be used where the SAMs are…maybe they don’t need to be used as early entry, but rather as reinforcing to tip the scales after the SAMs/IADS has been disrupted. That said, I applaud Major King for inciting discussion. If any of you are in contact with him, please share my comments. JKG
I was in 10th SFG(A) and CJSOTF-North at that time. 10th Group never parachuted in, we landed. I personally landed in Irbil in an MC-130 at zero-dark-thirty. When 4th ID was blocked from using the overland route through Turkey, it was decided to bring in the 173rd because they had a HIRC and MIRC (M1A1 tanks and Bradleys) which is what we needed. I, and one other gentleman, briefed the 173rd staff to get them spunned up. What they couldn’t comprehend was that we had ~2700 US troops already on the ground. Their mentality was they were going to do a D-Day invasion event. We told them there was no need to parachute in, we had three airfields capable of supporting C-17s that were secure from IADS and small arms, but they wouldn’t listen. Plus, they wanted those mustered stains on their jump wings and claim the first mass combat jump since WWII. They picked the northern most airfield (on the Turkish border) that was more than 100 miles from the nearest Iraqi forces. Even after jumping over 900 personnel and air landing the rest with their heavy equipment, they stayed up near the border for over a week rather than come down to Irbil where we needed them. Their commander was very risk adverse. Bottom line is there was no need for a mass airdrop and there was no peer threat.
Check your history and knowledge there, Pereira… the last mass tac wasnt in WW2, it was Vietnam, also made by the 173rd. And I have no idea what you are talking about with the 17rd being chosen to come in because they had tanks and Bradleys…. that is absolutely false. The 17rd barely had trucks!
Also, as for just sitting on the Bashur airfield for a week, sortof false. I personally took my squad and company commander further south than Irbil and also as far as Kirkuk and did eastern route thru the mountains recon and thru two towns. It was my call and my COs that the Armor unit in Germany couldnt land due to the route conditions and tank mines all over the sides of the narrow roads.
But I will agree with you on the BDE commander being cautious. Even when we started moving into Kirkuk, the SF guys were requesting we come on and he was holding us back I assembly areas overnight north and we were all advising we should move. My BN CO said screw it and we moved out early. But then it was all a mess when my squad was sent onto the airfield to recon it and we just rolled up to the SF possessed building that the BN took as thier HQ. We were like, oh you guys are here, lol.
In the present given the Russo-ukranian war context I wanted find out why Russia haven’t done such large scale tactical air drop and in 2023 after more than a decade according to your info I have my answer
“The answer was to airdrop the 10th SF, then the 173d and then follow with an airlifted heavy task force. Although lighter than a heavy division it accomplished the purpose of fixing the northern Iraqi corps”
–Bwahhahahahaa!!
Old article, but I’ll make a comment. As a former paratrooper, I’ll simply say that having the capability for a potential near peer fight is much better than not having it. Mass airborne aren’t a thing of the past. We simply didn’t need to do them against a much weaker opponent. Airborne forces are rapid response forces to get troops on the ground anywhere in the world quickly. There are various ways to lower the AA threat and to even advance the technique of dropping troops into enemy held territory. A fight against a near peer will definitely require troops with the capability to grab strategic areas to bolster combat power. Relying on helicopters and ground vehicles to do the job won’t be nearly as effective.
While I will admit that the cost-benefit analysis of a large-scale, mass-tac combat drop of a division of paratroopers is probably not worth the effort – and in all likelihood would prove disastrous in the non-permissive environment for which they were originally designed – I have begun to look at our “specialty” conventional forces in an entirely different light lately. That of a conventional deterrent. That is to say, we accept (well… at least, rational, intelligent people) that nuclear weapons are intended to be a permanently sheathed sword. The threat of drawing it is the real power – as opposed to the sword itself.
Consider that the idea of “lining tanks up in the desert” has pretty much been deemed nearly obsolete as of 1991. Sure, we did it in 2003 – but if anything it proved that those who have experienced an American armored thrust are not going to attempt to counter it conventionally a second time. While dropping the 173rd into northern Iraq did not do a great deal to help the war effort in 2003, there was a psychological aspect of it not to be ignored.
In short, there are plenty of tin-pot dictators and amateur generals out there who otherwise might violate international norms (like, say, invading a neighboring country*) were it not for the very real fear of waking up to a sky full of angry paratroopers. But then, admittedly, I am a bit biased.
*Nuclear-capability negates said conventional deterrent. See Crimea/Donbass/South Ossetia.
This is akin to the CAS debate, basically asking the question, “Is aerial delivery of troops using tactics and procedures developed in the ’40s still practical?” 130 knots at 800 feet? A paratrooper jumping into Normandy or Holland in 1944 would feel right at home.
The real question is, “Do we still have a need to deliver troops and material in some quantity by air into areas not readily accessible by other means?” The answer there is probably yes, and it’s a matter of figuring out what that looks like. Given the enduring airborne TTP that you try not to put a drop zone on top of the enemy, what does a survivable airdrop look like? Mass HALO drops from high-flying transports? Low-altitude, high-speed drops with the troops coming off the jet like retarded bombs? Probably something in between, but the point is that current airdrop techniques were driven by the capabilities of a C-47 and round, silk ‘chutes…we’ve moved on. Will that make airborne forces more expensive, and require more training? Undoubtedly…just like the initial cadre of paratroops was exotic and expensive at the outbreak of WWII.
You've completely flew by the point, and ignored the glaring problem. Mass-Drop of troops was something that resulted in high casualties in an environment more permissive than the one we exist in now. In WW2, which is primarily where most of the Mass-Airborne Combat-Operations, had taken place did not have sophisticated SAM's, and commercial drones that have proven to be a consistent and pervasive threat on the battlefield of Ukraine-Russia.
There have been 7 Mass Airborne Jumps in Combat-Areas, since WW2, I'm aware of only two since 1990 one was on an Airfield that was abandoned by the Enemy. The reason? Very simple, the risk is high, and the benefit is very low. Like, I discussed above Airborne Operations success in WW2 lay mostly in the lack of sophisticated weapon systems to deal with troops dropping in mass. That has ceased to be an issue as far back as Vietnam. SAM's have come a long way, and as has drone-technology, and if you don't think those are a threat to any Aircraft let-alone one filled with troops, I would point you to the Video of a Commercial Drone taking out an Apache in Ukraine.
A more interesting question, before discussing if they are indeed a thing of the past, might be whether or not they are even possible. Consider, for a moment, Operation Varsity. Over 16,000 Paratroopers exited several thousand aircraft. That’s not even remotely possible today. What constitutes as a “massed” operation in an era where the (now former) CSA proclaimed publicly that less than 10 Brigade’s were combat ready? Consider the culminating exercise at the USAF’s Weapons Instructor Course: JFE Vul. It is an absolutely massive under taking, truly impressive and designed to address exactly those points raised concerning A2AD. It involved 87 aircraft this past June. That might actually match well with the number of Brigade Combat Teams available, but do we really think this is a fit for “near peer” type conflict? Rand recently stirred the pot with a the assertion that if Russia moved against the Baltic States they would be dining in Vilnius/Riga in less than three days. Is every airborne BCT we currently posses enough to make a difference in that scenario? How many are ready to respond in 18 hours or less?
My point, in all that, is the following: the sort of high intensity conflict for which airborne forces may be considered is not one we are equipped to fight today, period. Mass airborne assault harkens back to a time when Divisions were maneuver units, within multiple Corps that were part of multiple Army Groups. The Army, period, cannot fight this kind of conflict today. To state that any force lacks relevance because they are not able to refight World War 2 is a bit fatuous. For limited conflict to pursue limited objectives, the speed and flexibility of Airborne forces still provides a flexible, rapidly deployable option. AFRICOM, in particular, is an operational theater that could make extensive use of airborne forces, for example.
Just a thought.
Looking at just the utilization of US airborne forces doesn’t paint a full picture of their overall utility, much less their utility in high intensity conflict against a peer competitor. I could make the same arguments against any capability, when faced with a peer; that is why they are peer competitors after all.
As to the continued utility of airborne envelopment; in 2015 alone, the French military conducted six company team sized airborne combat jumps in support of OPERATION BARKANE in the African Sahel.
It’s a tool that should be used in the right circumstances.
For a listing of airborne operations conducted since WWII, check out the following link.
http://kdcnova.com/CJR_2013_Files/Combat_Jump_Record_03.07.2013.pdf
Here are some of the news reports on the French combat para drops in Mali/Niger in 2015.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3044147/Geronimo-Incredible-radar-im
age-shows-French-paratroopers-dropping-enemy-territory-night-time-anti-terro
r-operation-Libya-Niger-border.html (April Jump)
Same operation with greater detail in the French military press.
http://www.opex360.com/2015/09/04/nouvelle-operation-aeroportee-du-8e-rpima-
dans-le-nord-du-niger/ (August Jump)
http://www.opex360.com/2015/08/05/operation-aeroportee-du-8e-rpima-dans-le-n
ord-du-niger/ (July Jump)
Here’s the video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zAu9oU_5Ob0
http://www.janes.com/article/54049/france-conducts-another-parachute-drop-in
-sahara (August jump)
Light Infantry has its place. Airborne capability provide it with significantly greater operational reach than any other land force (circumstances permitting). My argument is not that Light Infantry is no longer relevant. My point is that the US Army, in general, is far less equipped to conduct “massed” operations of any sort against a near peer than its times past counterpart. That capability gap is not one that can be used to single out any particular capability as no longer relevant.
Agreed! Read any of MG Scales’ recent articles referencing the conflict in Ukraine, if you want a sobering view of how bad things have possible become.
Your analysis is superficial. You claim IADS would defeat an airborne assault prior to drop. What is the percentage of aircraft that you are assuming would be destroyed? What is the minimum force you are assuming the operation would require that would not be dropped? Why do you assume that despite SEAD, which the US has significant capabilities at, the enemy would correctly mass it’s MANPADs at the desired airfield? What is your metric and method of assessment that the casualties associated with air forced entry would be greater than ground forced entry? Airborne operations in WWII occurred not because of greater acceptance of casualties per se, but because of the threat to our national security. There is no reason to assume such a threat will never again occur.
I would argue, most if not all of them. The battlefields, of WW2 without sophisticated SAM's, and now drones is a glaring problem that many of you are refusing to consider or see. There are a fair amount of issues that need to be addressed with Airborne Operations as they are.
In a very interesting paper from 2004 Marc DeVore looks at airborne operations from the past and comes to the conclusion that even in the past such operations were less effective than most people think. So, according to him, not only are mass airborne operations a thing of the past, but they should not have been conducted in most cases in the past as well.
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/working_papers/wp04-1.pdf
In a previous life I was a Paratrooper for two tours, saw combat, and now work in the airborne electronic warfare business for a major Military-Industrial Complex player. I am routinely involved in operational analysis of manned and unmanned platforms designed to operate in or penetrate both contested and denied airspace environments. I believe the capability to fly armed forces to a location and drop them off quickly still has significant military utility, even against near peers. The trick is to diminish the local ADS threat through attrition or suppression to the point where you can reasonably expect to deliver a viable force at the point of action. It is probably a reasonable call that we won’t send these folks in day one in a kick-down-the-door operation but they may find great opportunities available on D+20 once the major ADS systems have been dealt with.
Another clear indicator might be this – does the near peer still maintain this capability?
In the case of Russia, the answer is yes. They also have continued to provide forces with much greater mobility/firepower equipment than US forces.
Unlike the US, Russian paratroops drop from faster moving aircraft (180+knts vice 130knts). This, however, is due to the inability to field a transport aircraft with a slower stall speed, rather than a decision to improve survivability. The higher speeds necessitate different parachute designs and a trade off in individual equipment carried (basically LBE and weapon) on landing.
Disclaimer: I’ve jumped Russian equipment, but wouldn’t recommend it for US employment.
The author’s position requires one to view opponents as being able to completely cover all air avenues of approach, a doubtful premise. And even if such a state of affairs could be attained, the author’s contention may be true in just Phase 2 of the 6 phases of the Continuum of Military Operations (Seize the Initiative). However, large airborne operations would be useful in both Phase 0 and Phase 1 (as the allusions to Just Cause and OIF in other posts above note). Airborne forces could also have a significant value in Phase 3, Dominate the Enemy, once air superiority had been established (as was the case with Overlord, Market Garden and Varsity in WWII). Airborne forces may also be of value in Phase 4 to dispatch forces to a disrupted/disruptive locale much more quickly than ground forces could arrive.
With adequate preparation and allowance for risk, cases may exist in which large airborne operations would be used to good effect even during Phase 2. Vertical envelopment can be used as an economy of force mission to divert or delay enemy response from a main effort. An airborne force may also serve as a way of adding mass to a main effort through a combination of surprise and unexpected maneuver. Suppression of enemy SHORAD weapons would not require coverage of a large area–just a narrow corridor for the transport aircraft to penetrate the opposing forces and a second corridor to return to friendly airfields
The argument presented in the article applies much more strongly to helicopter assault forces than to airborne forces. Take for example, the results of the 11 AHR attack in 2003 at Karbala–31 AH-64s–2 lost, 2 damaged beyond repair, the remaining 27 significantly damaged by ground fire.
Disclaimer: Similar to a previous poster, 20-year active duty career as a leg, arguing against the continuation of the 18th Imperial Airborne Corps. Maybe with maturity has come wisdom.
The key issue is strategic projection. Heavy divisions take months to load up and deploy. Conversely, the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne can be wheels up in 18 hours. After that, it’s just a matter of flight time. Humanitarian problem? Instability? Government collapse? Early stage insurgency? Send in the Airborne.
The author’s focus on Russia and China is a red herring. Where are all the heavy divisions in his scenario? In major conflicts like those, the Airborne would be the strategic reserve, ready to create havoc where needed.
Well, I'm a nobody, but my dad was a paratrooper in the 508th, and I enlisted at 17 in the Nasty Guard as a 12B. Spent a year doing that, then went active switching over to 13E. Retrained as 13C and regularly ran the DivArty set during operations. Ran a Bn TACFIRE FDC after that and during which I got my Air Assault wings. Transfered over to tanks after that, and spent my last 16 years on tanks. 2 Tours in Germany, 1 in Korea, mine roller tank breaching the main line in Desert Storm and passed through 2nd ACR in that all night tank battle. Ended the war watching Norman fly into the airfield we were guarding to sign the cease fire and put down riots and and watched Serbian Migs getting shot down while trying to kill us. I taught platoon through brigade tactics and combat trains command at Knox for four years and even worked on the FCCS, which evolved into today's integrated command and control systems. In all that time, with all those experiences, working in three different branches, prepared to fighting anything from the 1981 "Potato Riot" in Maine, to the Warsaw Pact, to the KPA, to Iraq and Serbia, and I only give that verbal vomit to let you know that I had a VERY diverse experience and exposure to more than most of the fellow vets I know. I can tell you one thing;
The only thing that dooms an operation's chances of success, other than overwhelming enemy force, is a lack of informed and creative imagination. Anyone else here remember the RDF? Remember the concept? A highly mobile quickly deployable force to be employed at short notice in crisis areas outside the normal theaters of operation (Europe and Korea). You know, things like protecting oil fields in the middle east. The mission became so critical that the RDF evolved into CENTCOM.
I don't know how many times I've read articles by well trained and well educated soldiers that have declared the obsolescence of current weapons systems and doctrine. The Soviet AT3 was the end of the tank in warfare, until Israeli tanks got the hang of them and started coming back for logpac wrapped in AT3 wires. The tank was dead again after ODS, until they needed them to lead the Thunder Run into Baghdad. The tank was dead again when they decided a tin can on 8 wheels could do the same job, until they realized it couldn't and brought the tanks back in covered in TUSK. Will the lack of informed and creative imagination that manifests itself into definitive judgements never end?
Can none of these people imagine ideal circumstances for large scale use of airborne forces? I know I can. There are a couple of old axioms that apply. "The firstest with the mostest" is one. "The only tank on the battlefield, is the best tank on the battlefield". An M3 Stuart light tank from WW2 can create havoc and disaster on a company armed only with small arms in some s_it hole. An airborne drop at the Straights of Hormuz can secure the gulf with a carrier task force and USAF SEAD covering it. The Straights of Malaca? Atolls in the South China Sea? Far side security of a beach head in North Korea? Forget geopolitics, that's not our job. Using educated imagination to get any job done is.
Grrrrrrrrrrrrrr from an old retired fart nobody.
When was the last time we seized an airfield belonging to Russia or China?
Our next conflict will 100% be someone other than a first rate military power. First rate powers don’t risk fighting the largest, most experienced military in human history.
Our next military engagement will happen in a poorly developed area,
Seizing an airfield so we can control and deliver assets seems like a pretty handy idea. Are there any airfields in the world without state of the art anti-aircraft defenses? Oh yeah, pretty much any airfield on earth could be seized today with very little fire (avoid military bases anyway, choose an airport).
How can you conclude we’re never going to want an airfield we can’t drive to?