What is required to defeat an enemy force in a city? That question has plagued militaries for generations and is the focus of this episode of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. Host John Spencer is joined by retired General David Petraeus, who served thirty-seven years in the US Army, culminating his career with six consecutive commands as a general officer, including five in combat. He served as commander of Multi-National Forces–Iraq during the troop surge, commander of US Central Command, and commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan. Following his retirement from the Army, he was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
General Petraeus earned a PhD from Princeton University and is the coauthor of the recently published book Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine. He brings both his background as a scholar of war and his deep, firsthand experience fighting enemy forces in urban areas to this conversation, sharing insights on both recent and ongoing urban battles and campaigns—including the Israel Defense Forces’ war against Hamas.
You can listen to the discussion below or find the episode on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, TuneIn, or your favorite podcast app. Be sure to subscribe, and if you’re enjoying the Urban Warfare Project Podcast, please take a minute and leave the podcast a review or give it a rating!
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Bradley Lail, US Army
David Kilcullen, in his Counterinsurgency Redux (see the bottom of Page 2 and the top of Page 3), notes at least two differences in what, today, is (incorrectly?) called "counterinsurgency;" these differences being that:
a. Today, it is often the government or the invading coalition that initiates the conflict — not the insurgents as in days past: :
"Similarly, in classical theory, the insurgent initiates. Thus, Galula asserts that 'whereas in conventional war, either side can initiate the conflict, one one — the insurgent — can initiate a revolutionary war.' … But, in several modern campaigns — Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya, for example — the government or invading coalition forces initiated the campaign, whereas insurgents are strategically reactive (as in 'resistance warfare.')" And that:
b. Today, it is often the counterinsurgent (i.e., the government or the invading coalition) that represent "revolutionary change" — not the insurgent, as in earlier times:
"Politically, in many cases today, the counterinsurgents (the government or the invading coalition) represents revolutionary change, while the insurgents fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier — a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counterinsurgency." (Item in parenthesis here is mine.)
Thus, to better understand GEN Petraeus' "clear, hold and build," today, this must be done:
a. NOT from the perspective of Galula's time — when the goal was to maintain the colonial status quo. But, rather,
b. FROM the perspective of the post-the Cold War; wherein, to goal has been to achieve "revolutionary" political, economic, social and/or value change (more along modern western lines) more throughout the world?
Minus this such intention (to, post-the Cold War, achieve revolutionary political, economic, social and/or value change — more along modern western lines — more throughout the world), then the "conservative"/the "hands off" principles and guidance of international law (as noted below in the first two paragraphs of Adam Roberts "Transformative Occupations … " below) (b) would seem to apply?:
"Within the existing framework of international law, is it legitimate for an occupying power, in the name of creating the conditions for a more democratic and peaceful state, to introduce fundamental changes in the constitutional, social, economic, and legal order with an occupied territory? … These question have arisen in various conflicts and occupation since 1945 … They have arisen because of the cautious, even restrictive assumption in the law of war (also called international humanitarian law or, traditionally, jus in bello) that occupying powers should respect the existing laws and economic arrangements within the occupied territory, and therefore, by implication, should make as few changes as possible. …"
Based on the information that I provide in my initial comment above,
If the "root cause" of the insurgency is that the population sees that the U.S./the West is using the conflict to (against the will of the population) transform the political, economic, social and/or value orientation of the subject state and its societies more along modern western lines (i.e., along — from the perspective of the population — potentially alien and/or profane political, economic, social and/or value lines?),
Then how does one "defeat the urban enemy" in these such specific — and extremely common and routine — circumstances?
(Even though the constitution that Napoleon imposed on "the Spaniards was more rational than what they had before, … they recoiled from it as from something alien." See G.W.F. HEGEL's Philosophy of Right, Page 287, T.M. Knox trans., 1962.)
Herein, for example, is the use of "concrete" (listen to the podcast) likely overcome the specific problem that I present above?