On a cold November morning in the mountains of Utah, “A. C.” produces a surrender appeal in Russian using a standalone artificial intelligence tool kit known as the Ghost Machine. A psychological operations instructor from the PSYWAR School, part of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, in a matter of minutes he builds, translates, and disseminates a notional message directing the opposing force to surrender via a man-portable loudspeaker. The goal is to dislodge the entrenched enemy forces by persuading them to give up, saving both lives and ammunition in a real combat scenario. It is apparent from the lessons of Ukraine that both will be at a premium should the United States find itself in a similar scenario against a peer adversary.
A. C., a combat-tested prior infantryman, is a noncommissioned officer with operational psychological operations experience in the US Southern Command area of responsibility. He is also a full-stack software developer and drone pilot. During the week of operational testing in November, A. C. integrated with like-minded, tech-savvy joint special operations forces at 19th Special Forces Group’s field experimentation training exercise (FETX) at Camp Williams, Utah. A. C. not only used generative AI tools to create and disseminate products but also leveraged his mixture of tactical and technical skills to build sensors, conduct reconnaissance, find downed pilots, and set conditions on a simulated modern battlefield. A. C. is not alone. He is one of many special operations forces at the FETX that represent a growing but underappreciated group of service members that can develop, integrate, and deliver exquisite technical capabilities faster and cheaper than existing Army and DoD systems and processes.
Talent Management: Closing the Tech Procurement Gap
DoD has processes for developing, funding, and integrating new technologies, but they are largely designed for expensive, high-end weapons and platforms. The lengthy planning, programing, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) processes are reasonably well suited for the F35 Lighting II, the M1E3 Abrams tank, or the Freedom-variant Littoral Combat Ship. The process takes years or decades to deliver—unsurprisingly, given oversight considerations, federal budgetary cycles, and the intense field testing required.
At the other end of the spectrum, Army commanders can acquire new capabilities with a government purchase card. This is used for unit-level purchases at the commander’s discretion using operational funds, though it comes with significant limitations like a $10,000 ceiling for equipment.
The problem should be apparent. With a program to marshal billions from the DoD bureaucracy to buy fighter jets and ships on one end of a spectrum and a credit card for small, unit-level purchases on the other, a chasm is left in the middle. With no middle-level acquisition process, the Army should harness the talent in its ranks to refine requirements and interface with technical experts to deliver solutions. To do so, it should adopt systematic practices that allow commanders to do nametape-level talent management for service members with the unique, requisite talents and abilities. Talent management should be understood as part of the solution to fill the technology acquisition gap, in coordination with efforts like the Army’s transform In contact initiative, which prioritizes unit-level innovation.
Modernizing Our Talent Management Processes
The problem of streamlining technological innovation and procurement is not shared by the United States’ strategic competitors. Most notably, China’s Civil-Military Fusion policy sees no line between private and state-owned enterprises. People’s Liberation Army leaders do not request funding to acquire edge technology from companies like OpenAI. They already own it. A democracy like the United States cannot, and should not, replicate a policy like Civil-Military Fusion. The only solution can be dramatic changes to our internal systems so that organizationally, the Army can rapidly absorb technology and retain the talent necessary to maximize its utility across the joint force.
Despite the doom and gloom there is hope for Western democracies. That hope lies in properly leveraging service member talent and DoD-affiliated research labs to ensure that the United States develops a cohesive counterweight to China’s growing technical advantage. The way the Army can harness this human potential is by updating talent management processes, reimagining technological acquisitions paradigms, and aligning incentives to current operational requirements. Furthermore, the Army’s 2021 Modernization Strategy provides a clear roadmap to how the service will compete with modern threats, particularly with regard to the modernization framework (see figure below).
There are several initiatives that would advance the Army’s technological warfighting capacity while also supporting the modernization framework “Who We Are” line of effort focusing on talent management. First, DoD-affiliated research labs could approximate China’s Civil-Military Fusion strategy. There are twenty-five federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) and university-affiliated reach centers (UARCs) in the United States. These organizations represent big names in tech and academia, including John Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab, RAND, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Labs. Collectively, they represent a diverse academic portfolio including aerospace and space technologies, nuclear engineering, modeling, human perception, and social sciences. Unit-level teaming with FFRDCs and UARCs is a way for commanders to gain access to edge or edge-adjacent technologies geared toward their operational gaps. Remember the Ghost Machine AI tool kit that A.C. used to craft a Russian-language surrender appeal during 19th Special Forces Group’s FETX? His unit—5th Battalion, PSYWAR School—was able to scale it and rapidly deploy it not only to the FETX but also in the PSYOP Qualification Course’s data and AI instruction by working with the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab. These unit-level relationships are vital.
Second, the Army should establish clear guidelines for developing and scaling emerging technology to ensure US forces receive the next greatest capability quickly, rather than an irrelevant product five or more years behind our adversaries. Major procurement pipelines like planning, programming, budgeting, and execution are insufficient for AI and robotics development, which occurs on rapid and dynamic timeline. If AI and robotics capabilities are beholden to these processes, the Army—and the joint force as a whole—will never compete with an adversary like China.
Third, the Army needs unit-level technology integrators. While the chief of staff of the Army’s transformation in contact initiatives afford select brigade commanders the opportunity to innovate, the Army lacks the ability to scale and sustain rapid integration across the service. To rapidly integrate new technology, the Army must have personnel that can do so. Specifically, having unit-level talent that understands technology enables commanders to properly communicate operational gaps to product developers and translate technical jargon into doctrinal language military leaders understand.
Finally, the Army must modernize incentives to meet current requirements. The Army provides incentive pay and promotion points for things like jump status, language capability, and demolition duty. These are all vital capabilities and incentive programs that the Army should fund. However, it should also provide incentive pay for demonstrated technical expertise in AI, coding, data literacy, robotics, drones, or additive manufacturing. Furthermore, commanders at the brigade level and higher should have annual funds to reward select individuals that develop technical solutions to meet valid capability requirements. On-the-spot monetary or nonmonetary awards are a contemporary business management practice that could save the Army millions in research and development spending. Moreover, the Army should promote talented service members and not chain its talent to the traditional professional development models.
You Fight with What You Got
Talent management is not the be-all and end-all of technological modernization. However, given finite budgets and significant recruiting challenges, talent management is how the Army can do more with less. By leveraging talent management, the Army can maximize effectiveness with limited resources, foster a more agile force, and better prepare for the technological challenges of the twenty-first century. However, this requires a paradigm shift, including a reexamination of legacy acquisition and personnel systems to create mechanisms that rewards and retains the precise talent the Army needs. If the service fails to adapt at pace with US adversaries, America risks being unprepared for future conflicts, with a landpower service tailored for yesterday’s battles rather than tomorrow’s challenges.
Jon Reisher is currently the battalion operation’s officer for 5th Battalion, PSYWAR School. He holds a master’s degree in public policy and management from Carnegie Mellon University’s Heinz College and has multiple deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the wider Middle East.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Micah Wilson, US Army