Episode 6, Season 2 of the Social Science of War is the second in a two-part series looking back at lessons learned from the United States’ war in Iraq. Major Gabe Royal is joined by Dr. Isaiah “Ike” Wilson III, a veteran and scholar of the conflict. After twenty-eight years as An Army officer, he served as the director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College and subsequently as the president of the Joint Special Operations University. He is the author of the book Thinking Beyond War.
In the first part, which you can listen to here, the discussion focused on the prewar planning period through the ten-year anniversary of the initial invasion. In this second part of the conversation, Dr. Wilson begins by highlighting learned from Iraq by examining the force structure of security force assistance brigades. He goes on to identify six lessons, which he says the US military has “gathered” but not yet learned, from the war in Iraq. He challenges the next generation of military and civilian leaders to consider how we can restore peace and governance in places like Iraq once major combat operations cease. This fascinating discussion includes a story of how research and scholarship played a role in finding and capturing Saddam Hussein in Tikrit. Finally, the episode concludes with a critical look at force protection in the Middle East today as Dr. Wilson calls for a redefining of America’s mission across the region.
The Social Science of War podcast is produced by the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Visit our website if you would like to be a student or teach in the department, or if you would like to connect with any of our instructors based on their expertise.
Kyle Atwell created the Social Science of War. Hosts on Season 2 of the podcast are Dr. Nakissa Jahanbani, Dr. Alexandra Chinchilla, Lieutenant Colonel Sean McKnight, and Major Gabriel Royal. Please reach out to the podcast team with any questions about this episode or the Social Science of War podcast in general.
Image credit: Spc. Quincy Adams, US Army
Much of the early discussion in this second podcast, re: "Learning from Iraq," relates to Phase Four/Stability Operations and SFABs.
But, in order to understand the problems relating to Phase Four (and, indeed, the other operational phases?) and, thus, the problems that the SFABs are supposed to help us deal with (?), might the addition/the injection of the U.S./the West's — enduring — grand and overarching political objective — to wit: the transformation of the outlying states and societies of the world more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines — prove useful? In this regard, consider the following from the first two paragraphs of Sir Adam Roberts "Transformative Military Occupations: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights" (with emphasis added here by me here):
"Within the existing framework of international law, is it legitimate for an occupying power, in the name of creating a more democratic and peaceful state, to introduce fundamental changes in the constitutional, social, economic, and legal order with an occupied territory. … These question have arisen in various conflicts and occupations since 1945 — INCLUDING THE TRAGIC SITUATION IN IRAQ SINCE THE UNITED STATES-LED INVASION OF MARCH-APRIL 2003."
As to this such grand, overarching and repetitive political objective of the United States, consider the following re: the various operational Phases:
a. In Phase 0 (Shape), how do we (with the use of SFABs, etc., now?) convince governors and governments (if they are the problem) — or those opposed to same (if they are the problem) — to transform/to allow us to help them transform their states and societies more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines?
b. In Phase I (Deter) how do we (with the use of SFABs, etc., now?) convince governors and governments (if they are the problem) — or those opposed to same (if they are the problem) — to transform/to allow us to help them transform their states and societies more along modern western political, economic, social and/or value lines?
c. In Phase II (Seize the Initiative), same question.
d. In Phase III (Dominate), same question.
e. In Phase IV (Stabilize), same question.
f. In Phase V (Enable Civil Authority), same question.
Two other quoted items, from the paper referenced by Sir Robert Adams above, may prove useful here. These such additional items "hammering home" — the enduring — "transformative" political object of the U.S./the West that I address above.
a. First, on Page 601 (with emphasis here added by me), see the second paragraph of "Part III. Post-1945 Occupations with a Transformative Purpose:"
"This part looks selectively at foreign military presences aimed at a fundamental democratic transformation, and considers their possible implications for the law on occupations. Put crudely, the traditional assumption of the laws of war is that had (or potentially bad) occupants are occupying a good country (at least one with a reasonable legal system that operates for the benefit of the inhabitants). In recent years, especially in some Western democratic states, various schools of thought have been based on the opposite idea, crudely summarized as good occupants occupying a bad country (or at least one with a bad system of government and laws). Both of these crude views of occupations are questionable. The second view — of the occupant as the bringer of progress — can lead to dangerous mix of crusading, self-righteousness, and self-delusion. YET THIS VIEW IS THE PRODUCT OF SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS BASED ON ACTUAL EVENTS, INCLUDING THE POST-WORLD WAR II OCCUPATIONS, THE INTERVENTIONS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, AND THE CASE OF IRAQ."
b. Next, and last, from the first paragraph of “Part IV. Conclusion: The Relevance of the Laws of War and Human Rights” (see Page 618) of the Sir Adam Roberts paper that I reference above. (Again, with emphasis here added by me):
“The idea of achieving the transformation of a society through a military intervention is far from new. IT WAS A KEY ELEMENT IN MUCH OF EUROPEAND COLONIALISM AND IN FRANCES'S WAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 1978."
(Thus, maybe I have come "full circle?" This, given my comments relating to Napoleon and Spain — to be found at the first "Learning from Iraq" podcast?)
Obvious correction — to the last quoted item of my comment immediately above — obviously, this should read:
“The idea of achieving the transformation of a society through a military intervention is far from new. IT WAS A KEY ELEMENT IN MUCH OF EUROPEAN COLONIALISM AND IN FRANCES'S WARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 1789."
Apologies.