Episode 5, Season 2 of the Social Science of War is the first in a two-part series looking back at lessons learned from the United States’ war in Iraq. Major Gabe Royal is joined by Dr. Isaiah “Ike” Wilson III, a veteran and scholar of the conflict.
Part one of this conversation centers on Dr. Wilson’s book, Thinking Beyond War, and an op-ed he authored at the ten-year anniversary of the 101st Airborne Division’s invasion of Iraq, titled “Beyond COIN. ”We begin with a discussion of the prewar planning period and former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services committee in February 2003 regarding estimates of troop requirements. Dr. Wilson draws parallels between the outset of the Global War on Terrorism and Israel’s current conflict with Hamas. Finally, the discussion concludes with lessons learned regarding counterinsurgency and security force assistance brigades.
Dr. Wilson has over thirty-three years of experience in international affairs, most recently serving as the president of the Joint Special Operations University at US Special Operations Command following his time as the director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. He is a retired colonel with twenty-eight years of service in the US Army and a former professor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. As the chief of the US Central Command Commander’s Initiative Group, he directed and guided the command’s staff of over five thousand personnel in providing strategic and operations concepts and plans to the commander. His book Thinking Beyond War chronicles lessons learned from his time as chief of plans of the 101st Airborne Division during the invasion of Iraq.
The Social Science of War podcast is produced by the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Visit our website if you would like to be a student or teach in the department, or if you would like to connect with any of our instructors based on their expertise.
Kyle Atwell created the Social Science of War. Hosts on Season 2 of the podcast are Dr. Nakissa Jahanbani, Dr. Alexandra Chinchilla, Lieutenant Colonel Sean McKnight, and Major Gabriel Royal. Please reach out to the podcast team with any questions about this episode or the Social Science of War podcast in general.
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Caleb Barrieau, US Army (adapted by MWI)
Even in this podcast, we still seem be scared; that is, afraid to openly and clearly state — for all the world and for even our own people here at home to hear — that what we seek to achieve throughout the world — via war and/or via other means — this is the political, economic, social and value transformation of the states and societies of the world (to include our own states and societies here in the U.S./the West); this, so that same might be made to better interact with, better provide for and better benefit from such things as capitalism, markets and trade. (A proper democracy being thought to be an important part of this such project/effort?)
Only when you have this specific political objective "out there" — for all the world and even for our own people here at home to hear and understand — only then can you properly plan if, when, where, how, with whom, under what circumstances, etc., you will pursue this such objective.
Thus, for example, if this such political objective (see my first paragraph above) of the U.S./the West was well-known at time of the Iraq War — by people of the world, by the people of Iraq, by the people of the Middle East, by the people of the U.S./the West, etc. — then (a) would Secretary Rumsfeld's ideas on what would required to "win" this war/to achieve this such political objective have been thought to be ridiculous and (b) GEN Shinseki's ideas of what would be required to "win" this war/to achieve this such political objective have been thought to be exactly correct/"right on?"
(Thus, the problem lies in [a] not clearly stating the political objective and, thereby, [b] failing to provide a basis for all those concerned to understand exactly what it will take [time, blood, other resources] to achieve this such political objective?)
Based on my initial comment above, one can, I believe, also see why the debate as to whether conventional forces and theory — or counterinsurgency forces theory — BOTH miss the mark.
Clearly, as I note in my initial comment above, our political objective in Iraq (etc.?) was of a revolutionary and/or of a transformative nature.
Accordingly, only a discussion relating to the forces, the capabilities and the theory — relating to achieving revolutionary/transformative "ends" — would seem to need to be studied and debated here?
Given my revolutionary/transformative thoughts above, let us compare the problem that Napoleon had with Spain; this, with the problem that the U.S./the West had with Iraq.
First, for a Napoleon/Iraq "revolutionary"/"transformative" link, let's look to the first paragraph of "Part IV. Conclusion: The Relevance of the Laws of War and Human Rights” in Sir Adam Roberts 2006 paper "Transformative Occupations: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights." (Therein, see Page 618.)
“The idea of achieving the transformation of a society through a military intervention is far from new. It was a key element in much of European colonialism and in France’s wars after the Revolution of 1789.”
Next, let's look to Hegel's observations of Napoleon's revolutionary/transformative war effort in Spain — and why it failed. In this regard, let us look to G.W.F. Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right,” Page 287, T.M. Knox trans.,1962.:
Even though the constitution that Napoleon imposed on “the Spaniards was more rational than what they had before, … they recoiled from it as from something alien.” Herein, Hegel suggesting that the reason why the Spaniards recoiled (“as from something alien”) — from the more rational constitution that Napoleon had given them — this was because “they (the Spaniards) were not yet educated up to this level” and that, accordingly, “the mass of people” (needed) — “to be animated by such an idea" — this such mass of animated people simply was not present.
(The U.S./the West — in Iraq also — thought that we had given the Iraqi people a more rational constitution, etc. However, the problem in Iraq was much the same as the problem in Napoleon's Spain — this being that [a] the Iraqi people "were not yet educated up to this level" and, accordingly, [b] no mass of necessarily "animated" people, at that time, had become manifest?)
Accordingly, to hope to "win" transformative wars — without massive military involvement and without exceptionally long transformative occupations — then you must simply get the "education" and the "animation" question/requirements/answer right.
(Re: Rumsfeld, Bush, etc., in Iraq — we can see where they get it wrong. Rumsfeld, et. al, think — because we recently won the Old Cold War — that the “education” and the “animation” has already occurred in Iraq, etc. Thus, Rumsfeld, et. al, believe that only a small number of U.S./coalition military personnel will be needed in Iraq — who will only be needed for a very short period of time — this, to deal with the very few remaining [his words] “dead-enders.” Thus, Napoleon's misjudgment in Spain, this being like Rumsfeld, et. al's misjudgment in Iraq, and for the same reason?)