Last week, Russian forces invaded Ukraine and triggered the largest military conflict Europe has seen in eighty years. How did it happen, and what is likely to come next? On March 3, seven days after the invasion began, the Modern War Institute at West Point hosted a multidisciplinary panel to provide an operational assessment of the current state of the conflict and explore what the future holds.
What trends can we learn from the tactics Russian forces have employed? What can we learn about Russia’s strategic objectives and operational approach in the campaign? What tools, equipment, and other resources have been most important for defending forces? What role have drones, antitank weapons, and other systems played? What have been the effects of the broad-based international response in support of Ukraine? Participants engage with these questions and more during a fascinating and insightful discussion.
The virtual panel features three guests. Dr. Rob Person is an associate professor of international relations in the United States Military Academy’s Department of Social Sciences. Retired Colonel Liam Collins, PhD, helped reform Ukraine’s defense establishment from 2016 to 2018. And Mr. Michael Kofman is the research program director in the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses.
Watch the video of the panel below, and be sure to subscribe to MWI’s YouTube channel to see videos of similar events and follow MWI on Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn so you don’t miss the articles, research, and podcast episodes we publish every day—including commentary and analysis of the unfolding war in Ukraine.
The views expressed are those of the speakers and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Yan Boechat, VOA
Regardless of overall strength, the side which is able to bring to bear the decisive strength at the critical points can prevail.
"Git thar th' fustest wit' th' mustest.*
And there is a specific reason – which I ain't sayin' – why this is right now especially true in Ukraine.
Historical examples are the Finns in the 1939-40 Winter War and our 4th Armored Division's annihilation of all those factory-fresh German Mark V Panther tanks at Arracourt in 1944.
That said, this growing tragedy is our fault – not the Russians' – for denying them the Monroe Doctrine type treaty they need and we owe them after our breaking past security promises to them and our Budapest breaking Kiev coup.
"we owe them after our breaking past security promises to them and our Budapest breaking Kiev coup."
This statement definitely requires some supporting explanation, or it's nothing but a bold take with nothing to back it up.
"And there is a specific reason – which I ain't sayin' – why this is right now especially true in Ukraine."
Either say it, or don't mention it.
Can the buying of a foreign currency (Russian) be used as leverage against (Russia) at a later date? If so, is a 'buy and hold strategy in order?
In terms of borders, does it matter where the borders are between Russia and NATO? If Russia continues to take Ukraine, the border moves west. Will a no-fly zone ensure that it doesn't? What are the prospects of ensuring re-supply and tactical information to a dwindling Ukrainian ecosphere? What is the current attrition rate and how will the future attrition rates be affected by proper support to Ukraine?
Superb panel, thank you for your analysis.
Lou , you sound like a guy who probably lives in Norway and designs wargames! Hope you are doing well. You might like this link: John mearsheimer on why Ukraine is the wests fault. https://youtu.be/JrMiSQAGOS4
Russia seems heavily reliant on artillery and air strikes clearing a path for columns. I can see a Taliban situation where what is owned on the map doesn't take account of the insurgency around it. Although I note Russia seems more competent in the South. Their command and control structure seems poor overall. I take into account it's ability to disregard losses but how sustainable that can be is questionable. For Eastern European nations they must realise this is their own Spanish civil war moment and a loss here means a push on them in decades to come. Ukrainian force attrition and resupply is a vital factor on who comes out on top.
It was quite telling the style of Russian leadership on a short clip of a televised address Putin gave while speaking to his senior leadership shown on BBC news. The head of Intelligence was clearly scared of him, and being asked to speak freely made the situation worse. He would agree that the world is flat at the slightest hint that was what the leader wanted to hear. If your head of Intelligence is like that then the rest are the same and you are closed to criticism.
I've seen this type of leadership before, they are scared to contradict the leaders will and are second guessing yes's too him. This adds weight to their botched now embarrassing 'special operation'.
The cost factor and deals made to keep the internal Russian rule together cannot be underestimated. Putin could lose his rule should local leaders, Oligarchs, security/mafia feel too much of a pinch. I would guess sustainability is around a month for this war should losses and sanctions stay at the current rate of bite.
I have just posted my exposee Biden&Blinken’s War Crime Ukraine War Begetting Holocaust: Facts, Footnoted … on LinkedIn
at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bidenblinkens-war-crime-ukraine-begetting-holocaust-facts-lou-coatney/?published=t&trackingId=GAEgT2ztU0K%2Fxaicy9FJMg%3D%3D
Upon LinkedIn threat of expulsion, I had to leave out why the Russians accuse the Ukraine government of being Nazi.
Feedback there or here is welcome.
On 23 March, MSNBC's Richard Engel gave a live report from inside a Ukrainian HQ in Kyiv that showed a close-up of their situation map.
Interestingly, it gave new detail of places where Ukrainian forces had pushed Russian forces back — including an especially critical suburb NW of Kyiv that would be essential for the Russians to capture the river bridge to the city.
In looking at that map, it was clear that the Russians' spearhead W of Kyiv that bogged down trying to encircle the city has created a salient. The Ukraininans have forces at its base, on the W side. Would they have the resources and strength, perhaps, to create a temporary local superiority there and make a quick strike toward the river? If so, it would cut the spearhead off at its base. The Russans would then need to shift focus to breaking out and restoring their LOC to the north — and that would force them to weaken the tip of the salient or pull back from there.
In this way, the Ukrainians could maneuver the Russians out of their positions near the bridge instead of grinding away in frontal attacks for for little incremental bits of territory. The Russians in the salient would be cut off and trapped against the river, with Western Ukraine and NATO to the west.
To make an attack like this work even better, start with a bombardment and seeming attack preparations at the tip of the salient — helping to freeze the Russian forces there in place, and leading the Russians to brace for an attack at the tip.