The recent detonation of the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast to dislodge the Islamic State’s caves and tunnels in eastern Afghanistan did not change the reality of the lost opportunities, mistakes and wild pitches the United States has witnessed in the country since 2001, but it did make a difference. The strike was indeed the “right munition for the right target” and a tactical military success, but it was also a hopeless reminder of America’s unfinished war in Afghanistan. While the strike introduced a new symbol to fighting the Afghan war, it also suggested a search for a new and realistic Afghan war strategy.
As the Trump administration reviews its Afghan policy, it is imperative to recognize that Afghanistan’s stability remains inescapably linked to two fundamental factors: peace with Pakistan and peace with the Taliban. Unfortunately, the solutions to both pieces are intertwined and revolve principally around Pakistan, a poster child for proxy and terrorist groups in the region.
Since 2001, Pakistan has received over $30 billion in generous U.S. military and civilian assistance—second only to Israel—but these inducements have done little to persuade Islamabad to abandon its lethal support to the Taliban and other terrorist groups. Instead, Pakistan has continually frustrated the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan, and its proxies have claimed the lives of almost 2,400 American military and civilians and countless Afghans. Pakistan rationalizes its use of proxy groups because they are expendable and low-cost compared to deploying conventional forces and it provides Islamabad a plausible deniability. More important is that Washington has struggled with clarifying whether Pakistan is a friend or a foe. The broader spectrum of America’s relationship with other countries can be summed up in four categories: friends and allies, friendly rivals, unfriendly adversaries and enemies. That said, Pakistan arguably falls somewhere between a friendly rival and an unfriendly adversary. In this, Trump was correct to call Pakistan “some U.S. ally” after the U.S. Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in his compound only steps away from Pakistan’s military academy.
Read the full piece at The National Interest.
Image credit: Sgt. Mark Fayloga, US Marine Corps
I think that viewing Pakistan as part of the Afghan problem is exactly backwards. Afghansitan should be seen as part of our Pakistan problem. The plain fact is that the west has no vital interest in Afghanistan at all. It does however have a vital interest in preventing an unstable nuclear muslim state from being captured by islamists. That interest, it seems to me, vastly outweighs counterterrorism or statebuilding in Afghanistan.
With regard to what we should or should not do in Afghanistan our first question should be: Does this measure increase or decrease the stability of Pakistan? Any action which decreases Pakistani stability should be avoided. That would include any presence in Afghanistan beyond low-level covert measures unlikely to be noticied on the Pakistani street. Obviously that means we should not have any troops there.
Sadly, this policy probably means accepting that the Taliban will retake the government. So be it. If that’s the price we pay to keep Pakistani nuclear weapons out of the hands of our enemies, then thats a price worth paying.
Some may object that the original reason the US and allies invaded Afghanistan was to punish and evict Al Qaeda and that if we leave they may come back. Of course if they come back then we can too. We can always evict them again. But more fundamentally this misses the point that they can simply evolve and move elsewhere. They dont need Afghanistan any more than we do.
Unfortunately, we have become the prisoners of inertia, our pride and our rhetoric. Having foolishly committed to the Afghan state we are unable to admit that we made a mistake and withdraw. If the only price we paid for that intransigence was blood and treasure it would be bad enough, but if jihadists ever capture the Pakistani state we will realize that the price of our stubborness was in fact much higher,
I personally would like to see a deeper analysis to really define what needs to be done. Current Pakistani government is not helping Taliban because of any particular irrational preference. It is because the Pakistani government sees them as the solution for their perceived problem. But the question is truly what is that the Pakistani government true need which make them believe the Taliban is a solution. I would do the same analysis for the Taliban, the current Afghan government, and other players in the current conflict like AQ, Russia, ISIS, and the major tribal leaders. Once we have their needs mapped, and their current mental process to pick one option over another, then we can start mapping which needs are considered acceptable for the U.S. perspective and create plans in how we could partner with these groups (allies or potential allies). Any group which their needs doesn’t meet ours becomes a clear adversary (politically, economically, militarily, socially). Now we can talk about the end game (we and our allies help each other to meet needs) and how to proceed (plan, which can be an economic plan, a political plan, a social plan, a battle plan, or the combination of all). This should be done by our military Commander. Then showed to the civilian government for their take of what is out of reach based on our current political/sovereign needs (rules of engagement). The our military leader can adapt the plan, double check the consequences, and come back with an updated list of allies, neutrals, and adversaries, plus a plan in how to tackle. The more we understand each group needs, easier is to get them to join us and more stable the future becomes when we are not there, but our allies are.