What are the hallmarks of an adaptable military force? What types of leaders best create cultures of adaptability in their formations? How do such forces employ rapidly changing technologies? And for forces—like the US military—that have an extraordinarily robust set of doctrine governing how they operate, how does that doctrine either drive or hinder adaptation?
In this episode of the Modern War Institute Podcast, John Amble is joined by two guests to discuss these questions and more. Retired Gen. Dave Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel are visiting professors of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the authors of the book Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime.
You can hear the full episode below, and if you aren’t already subscribed to the MWI Podcast, be sure to find it on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, TuneIn, or your favorite podcast app. While you’re there, please take a moment and give the podcast a rating or leave a review.
Image credit: Spc. David Barnes, US Army
I haven’t read the book, and so I might not have the full set of material. Taking only the podcast at face value, it was pretty good stuff. But there seemed to be two points I wish had been examined in more detail:
1. The US military’s willingness and ability to adapt seems to be directly, probably even disproportionally, related to the degree of loss suffered which drove/drives the need to adapt. I wish the mechanism that drives adaptation had been addressed, and how that mechanism could be tuned to improve adaptability. In going down that path, the crushing defeat at Pearl Harbor serves as a prime example. That disaster drove adaptations to an amazing extent. Not only did the US Navy immediately shift from battleships to carriers by necessity, they adapted to a certain level of carrier operations beyond what the Japanese were doing. One example was to eliminate slow battleships from carrier formations, which the Japanese failed to do until much later in the war.
So the question is, how can we adjust that mechanism which initiates adaptability to yield more adaptations without experiencing military disasters of the first order? There was some indirect discussion, relating to the inability to recognize the nature of the building losses in Iraq not driving adaptations. Maybe Leaders should more actively resist sugar-coating a situation to put it in its best light, at least with their staff. Instead, Leaders should adopt a bias toward declaring a situation intolerable, or even a loss, or requiring staff to view the current situation as an impending disaster. That could turn up the heat on finding ways to adapt and make improvements.
The mention of the importance of imposed failure, right at the end of the podcast, was close to this point. But there wasn’t enough discussion about how that experience drives, or could drive the process of adapting.
2. It’s obvious the current US military has lost the ability to adapt. The discussion about the MRAPs touched on this, but it’s not enough to blame “combatant commands” versus the “services.” Even the use of those terms implies an accusation that the US military is WAY too bureaucratic to adapt during wartime. This can’t be ignored, and the need for change goes far beyond training for senior leaders.
It might be instructive to think of Pearl Harbor again. At that time, there weren’t multiple flag officers per ship afloat, and the services WERE the combatant commands. So turning on a dime after December 7 was certainly easier, without an insanely bloated bureaucracy hindering or preventing change.
Recommending a one-third cut in the number of flag officers would never be countenanced. But that doesn’t mean it’s not an excellent idea.
I didn't listen to all of the Podcast so I don't know the topics being discussed besides the MRAP.
I find the US and NATO militaries slow to adapt because they don't address the fundamental issues of WW3. National defense is fine…defend the Homeland against threats as many know that Defense costs a lot of time, money, sacrifice, effort, and commitment. In times of trimming Defense budgets and a more peaceful attitude, the role of "Global Police" falls to just a few nations that want to achieve this role. The United Nations Blue Helmets can do this although their effectiveness is somewhat suspect.
As such, with peer nations wanting to expand for exploitation, influence, resources, territory, access, and power, with weapons of war that far out-range, out-gun, and out-yield us in firepower, then the US and NATO has a problem. The US often prides itself in bringing more combat firepower to bear than the enemy, but with peer nations' rising tank, VLS cells, soldier, small arms, MLRS, TBMs, and missile numbers, the US firepower advantage seems to shrink, especially considering that many RIMPAC and NATO nations can't field anything larger than a corvette, frigate, or a medium tank. Even today, the Navy's CVN Air Wing still out-power and out-number many air forces around the world.
Furthermore, the US often doesn't adapt to Think Tankers and comments from the public. Public outcry is enough to axe many programs from the Crusader SPH to the Future Combat System, but did the Pentagon adopt suggestions posted daily on how to better improve National Defense? Some of the public comments are extremely wise and good, coming from active and retired military personnel. Programs such as Land Warrior, FMBT, and the Light Tank didn't materialize or had to be rebooted many times for results. The US Army tried to adapt, but no one seemed interested at the time so the programs were shelved, canceled, or axed. The same with SHORADs, MEADS SAMs, CKEM/LOSAT, 155mm ERCA, railgun, etc….all these programs were requirements to better the US Army that were ahead of their time and just didn't yield results whereas the IDF fielded "Iron Dome" and "Arrow" SAMs, made with US "know-how" and funding, and are working and in-service today. If the US DoD constantly starts programs of adaptation and doesn't gain results, then the money and effort is lost whereas peer nations don't fail in delivery and it seems like each month is a new weapon system placed into service. The MRAPs are being left behind or sold off because the US Army can't afford to maintain, ship, and keep them all, so that adaptability is somewhat lost as newer systems are released.
A problem with unmanned systems and drone adaption is that the firepower seems less than the Legacy systems that these unmanned systems are replacing, and that means less combat firepower. A CROWS M2HB on an unmanned drone cannot compete against a 120mm tank cannon. 32 VLS cells on a USV aren't going to replace 96 VLS cells on a destroyer. The quest for innovation and technology without the firepower equality isn't going to overwhelm peer nations that retain tank and AFV armor and build new manned warships. Replacing AFVs with loitering munitions and drones might work until one has to get into urban settings where ranged munitions just can't seem to destroy everything and a ground invasion is required—that requires mobile armor and firepower for CQB and soldiers. If the US DoD doesn't adapt for warfare in all environments against mechanized and naval forces, and peer nations do, presenting threats and challenges that NATO and the US cannot counter, then WW3 has already been predetermined ahead.
That is the challenge and threat presented today…to deter and prepare for the next war and many see WW3 as it in addition to fighting the daily wars that government staff do. Not many nations can achieve this in light of terrorism, cyber, crime, PSYOPS, space race, espionage, drug war, Human and sex trafficking, poverty, Homelessness, education, (now COVID-19), STEM race, scandals and harassment, Racism, economy, infrastructure decay, migration, and all the ails of society on a great power nation. Those nations that lack these issues don't dare, care, or want to up-arm for global defense, instead bolstering their national defense and siding with nations that can reach further.
Adapting to a war-footing attitude is hard to change when many nations have prospered in peace for so long.
There are plenty of folks who would argue that PME, especially at the War College, has gone "too civilian" in its topics focus and particularly has lost focus on the nuts and bolts of war and warfare.