As the global information environment rapidly changes, revisionist states are increasingly enabled to wage information warfare. They leverage networked information systems to sow political chaos in target societies. But as states weaponize strategic narratives to advance their interests, what can democracies and their populations do to protect against foreign information operations?
On this episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, hosts Ben Jebb and Adam Darnley-Stuart are joined by two guests to explore this challenging topic. Dr. Andreas Krieg is a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London and a fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies. He has spent over a decade throughout the Middle East and North Africa, studying the pernicious effects of information operations, and is the author of Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives. Dr. Andrew Whiskeyman is an associate professor at the National Defense University’s College of Information and Cyberspace where he teaches on the topics of leadership, disruptive technology, and information warfare. He previously served in the US Army for over twenty-seven years and was the chief of the Information Operations Division within US Central Command.
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Beginning at approximately the 05:40 point in this podcast, Dr. Andreas Krieg points to the fact that Russia and China — beginning at approximately the end of the Old Cold War (1989) — (a) reflected on how they had lost the Old Cold War due to the effective use by the U.S./the West of information warfare and then (b) determined that they (Russia and China) could now use same in their effort to defeat the U.S./the West going forward.
What is missing from this such observation, however, is the fact that Russia and China understood — not only that the U.S./the West had effectively used information warfare against them in the Old Cold War but also WHY and HOW the U.S./the West had one this.
In this regard, consider that:
a. WHY the U.S./the West was able to so effectively use information warfare against the Soviets/the communists in the Old Cold War, this was because the Soviets/the communists, back then, sought to achieve "revolutionary" political, economic, social and value change (more along communist lines) throughout the world — a process which threatened all status quos — and which threatened all those who depended on same for their power, influence, control, status, privilege, safety, security, etc.
b. Thus HOW the U.S./the West was able to so effectively use information warfare against the Soviets/the communists in the Old Cold War, this was by appealing to these such gravely threatened entities.
Thus, post-the Old Cold War, when the U.S./the West sought, ourselves, to achieve "revolutionary" political, economic, social and value change throughout the world (in our case, more along market-democracy lines) — a process which, likewise, had the exact same "threatens all status quos and all those who depend on same for their power, influence, control" effect — then Russia and China understood that they — now in the New/Reverse Cold War — could use information warfare against us (by appealing to these such gravely threatened entities); this, in much way as we had used information warfare against them in the Old Cold War?
The title of our podcast above is "the STRATEGIC weaponization of narratives" (emphasis added).
Q: This being the case, then — in consideration of my initial comment above — what, exactly, are the "strategy(ies)" that our opponents — such as Russia and China — would be (a) using against the U.S./the West today and, thus, would be (b) basing their narratives on?
A: Consistent with my initial comment above, these such U.S./Western opponent "strategies" today would be:
a. "Containment" and "roll back." (Yes: the same as our strategies in the Old Cold War); wherein today:
b. It is Russia and China, this time, who seek to influence — and to work more "by, with and through" (much as we did in the Old Cold War) — those entities who are threatened by an opponent nation's efforts to achieve revolutionary political, economic, social and value change more throughout the world.
The subject of our podcast above — and much of the title of Dr. Andreas Krieg's referenced book above — this is "The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives."
This begs the questions:
a. What, exactly, is our opponents' (common?) strategies — upon which they base and develop their narratives? And:
b. What, exactly, is model — and/or historical event — which (a) influenced these such opponents the most and, thus, (b) came to be what these opponents (example Russia and China) came to base their such strategies on?
In answer to these such question, consider that:
a. The (common?) strategies that our opponents came to base their narratives on, this was and is "containment" and "roll back," of — in this case — the power, influence and control of the U.S./the West throughout the world. And
b. The model — and/or the event in history — which influenced these opponents the most — and thus came to be what they would base their such strategies on — this was and is (a) the defeat of the Soviets/the communists — in the Old Cold War — this, (b) by a U.S./the West who used the strategies of containment and roll back — and the complimentary narratives that the U.S./the West used so successfully back then — in that such effort.
(Dr. Krieg alludes to at least part of this thought — this, beginning at approximately the 06:15 point in this podcast.)
Now the "killer" questions — this being, HOW did the U.S./the West, post-the Old Cold War, become so susceptible to strategies of "containment" and "roll back" and, thus, HOW did the U.S./the West become so susceptible to opponent narratives, based on such strategies?
The "killer" answer: Post-the Old Cold War, the U.S./the West (much like the Soviets/the communists post-WWII) moved out smartly in an attempt to achieve "revolutionary" political, economic, social and value change both at home and abroad. (In the Soviet/the communist post-WWII case, more along communist political, economic, social and value lines; in the U.S./the West post-the Old Cold War case, more along market-democracy political, economic, social and value lines.)
Bottom Line Thought:
If you move out smartly in an effort to achieve "revolutionary" political, economic, social and value change — as the Soviets/the communists did after WWII and the U.S./the West did after the Old Cold War — then you are literally BEGGING your real and/or potential opponents to (a) adopt "containment" and "roll back" strategies and (b) develop and employ narratives in support of same; these, for example, to (c) specifically focused on bringing over to your side those who your "revolutionary change" efforts are most likely to harm, to wit: those who derive their power, influence, control, status, privilege, protections, etc., from the status quo.
My two comments above — obviously — beg this follow-on question:
In the New/Reverse Cold War environment in which we find ourselves today (U.S./the West, post-the Old Cold War, now being the one's seeking to achieve "revolutionary change" both at home and abroad; our opponents now being the one's seeking to "contain" and to "roll back" our such efforts, and seeking to defeat us accordingly), how do we "win;" this, when the Soviets/the communist — in much this exact same environment (but reversed) in the Old Cold War — "lost?"
(The best way to "war game" this such question, this would be to task strategists/game players to tell us how — using narratives, etc., — they, working for the Soviets/the communists in the Old Cold War — would have defeated [a] the U.S./the West, [b] our containment and roll back strategies back then and [c] our narratives developed and employed in support of same?)