On November 4, 1979, fifty-two Americans were seized in Tehran. The 444 days they spent in captivity is one of the most notable cases in recent history of a state actor using hostages to advance its interests.
But it is not the only case. This episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines how—and why—states engage in hostage diplomacy. To do so, hosts Ben Jebb and Julia McClenon are joined for a fascinating discussion with Ambassador Roger D. Carstens and Dr. Dani Gilbert. Ambassador Carstens is the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs at the US Department of State, where he previously served as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Dr. Gilbert is an assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University, where her award-winning research explores the causes and consequences of hostage taking and hostage recovery.
Their discussion addresses the incentives for states, as well as nonstate actors, to engage in hostage taking instead of relying on other, more traditional instruments of power. They also describe the means with which the United States and others secure the safety of their citizens against hostage taking, along with how concepts like deterrence apply to the unique challenge of hostage taking.
You can listen to the full episode below, or find it on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. Be sure to subscribe so you don’t miss an episode!
From the Texas National Security Review article "Caught Between Giants: Hostage Diplomacy and Negotiation Strategy for Middle Powers" by Danielle Gilbert and Gaëlle Rivard Piché:
"Nevertheless, there are several important factors that differentiate hostage diplomacy from other forms of hostage taking. For most forms of hostage taking, the perpetrator is a nonstate actor, such as a terrorist or criminal. In hostage diplomacy, the perpetrator — like the target — is a state. The rhetorical distinction between “hostages” and “detainees” goes beyond semantics. There are legal and practical implications that, in theory, separate these categories. Specifically, the government’s means for recovering someone held by state versus nonstate actors differ dramatically. The fact that state actors have a 'return address' makes recovery easier in some ways but more challenging in others. Current U.S. law, for instance, explicitly prohibits paying ransoms to actors that have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S. Department of State, but there is no prohibition on paying ransoms (or making any other type of concession) to state actors. States can also use legal measures, including extradition, to bring detainees home. Conversely, a central mission set of special operations commands in the United States and Canada is executing hostage rescue — an acceptable recovery option for kidnap victims, but practically off the table for detainees. In any case, hostage rescue operations are highly risky, specifically because the safe recovery of a civilian hostage under guard involves a high degree of precision."
Question — Based on the Above:
If one believes that a state sponsor of terror (for example Iran in the current case of Israel today) is behind the taking of hostages by a terrorism organization (for example behind Hamas' taking of Israeli, etc., hostages today), then which approach applies and/or takes precedence:
a. Hostage diplomacy? Or
b. Hostage taking?
My question above possibly stated another way:
In the scenario that I describe above (a state sponsor of terror — Iran — is thought to be behind a terrorist organization — Hamas' — taking of Israeli, etc., hostages today);
In this such case, is "hostage taking"/"hostage rescue" the way that we must proceed?
Or, given the "state sponsor of terror" angle that I describe above, can we — and indeed should we — pursue the "hostage diplomacy" approach also — or instead?