As the United States and China are locked in strategic competition with one another, China’s increasingly dangerous and illegal activities in the gray zone form one of the most potent legs of its approach to that competition. The United States, however, is not without means of leveraging its own effective but legal activities. It can meaningfully affect the strategic balance between the two countries by more aggressively targeting China’s vulnerabilities—efforts that can be specifically aimed at deterring destabilizing behavior. China’s defense industrial base, the policies and essential infrastructure supporting its military industrial complex, is one such area where US activities can have such an effect. Disrupting this base could significantly erode China’s military capacity, giving the United States and its allies a strategic advantage in the global balance of power. The capabilities and methods employed to achieve this effect are already in the US military’s irregular warfare toolbox, and an irregular warfare campaign, if carefully calculated to be both effective and non-escalatory, could have outsized impact on the strategic competition between the United States and China.
China’s rise as a global military power has been underpinned by a rapidly developed defense industrial base, a formidable engine for producing conventional military capacity, space technology, advanced weaponry, and the influence that derives from these advancements. This transformation is the result of substantial investments, technological progress, and a focused strategy on enhancing military capabilities across various sectors, including aerospace, shipbuilding, electronics, and weapons manufacturing. Of course, a full understanding of China’s industrial policy remains elusive, and intelligence capabilities and strategic attention should be deliberately aimed at closing this gap. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the defense industrial base is not only vital for China’s military but also plays a crucial role in its overall economic power, generating jobs and driving technological innovation. Despite these advancements, China’s defense industrial base remains vulnerable to various forms of disruption, making it a strategic target for the United States.
One of the most effective tools the United States can deploy to weaken China’s defense industrial base is the imposition of stringent export controls and targeted sanctions. China’s rapid military modernization relies heavily on foreign technology, especially in areas like semiconductors, high-performance computing, and advanced materials. By restricting China’s access to these dual-use technologies—those with both civilian and military applications—the United States can create significant bottlenecks in China’s defense production process. This would require a higher degree of decoupling of US-China technology ecosystems than the process that is currently underway. The result would force China to either rely on inferior domestic alternatives or invest heavily in developing its own capabilities, both of which would likely slow down its military advancements. Sanctions targeting Chinese defense companies and individuals involved in the defense industrial base could further isolate China’s defense sector from the global financial system, compounding the difficulties in sustaining its military production.
In addition to technological controls, the United States can also exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in China’s complex global supply chains. China’s defense industrial base depends on a steady flow of raw materials and components, many of which are sourced from abroad. The United States, in collaboration with its allies, could disrupt these supply chains by restricting the export of critical materials such as rare earth elements, high-end microchips, and precision machinery. Such disruptions could delay production, increase costs, and create significant inefficiencies within China’s defense manufacturing sector. Furthermore, encouraging global companies to diversify their supply chains away from China would not only reduce China’s leverage over global markets but also diminish the economic resources available to fund its defense sector.
The cyber domain presents another opportunity for undermining China’s defense industrial base. Cyber capabilities can be used against vulnerabilities in the digital infrastructure that supports China’s defense industry, including networks that manage research, production, and logistics. By disrupting these systems—which could range from strategically useful in competition to imperative in crisis or conflict—the United States could cause significant delays and errors in the production of military equipment. Moreover, protecting sensitive intellectual property from Chinese cyber espionage would deny China access to advanced technologies that could enhance its military capabilities. As US intelligence and cyber leaders have argued, offensive cyber operations are a critical component to the United States’ ability to compete with China in cyberspace. Such operations—as well as cyber and espionage—could, for instance, be used to sabotage China’s research and development efforts, further hindering its ability to innovate and deploy new technologies.
Another strategic measure involves targeting the human capital that drives China’s defense innovation. Despite its large population, China faces challenges in attracting and retaining top talent within its defense industry. The United States could exploit this by offering incentives for Chinese scientists, engineers, and other professionals to emigrate, effectively creating a brain drain that weakens China’s defense sector. Encouraging defections or supporting counterintelligence operations could further erode the talent pool available to China’s defense intelligence base, complicating its efforts to maintain a competitive edge in military technology. There are risks in this component of the irregular warfare strategy, of course—not least the prospect of inviting individuals who may be engaged in espionage for China into the United States. Careful implementation of all activities in an irregular warfare campaign is critical, but especially so in this line of effort.
Information warfare is an additional tool that the United States could deploy to undermine China’s defense industrial base. By spreading information that highlights inefficiencies and corruption within the Chinese defense industry, the United States could sow mistrust and reduce morale among Chinese defense workers. Exposing these vulnerabilities could also pressure Chinese leaders to implement reforms that might slow down production and innovation, thereby hampering the overall effectiveness of China’s defense industrial base.
As for the United States itself, strengthening regional military alliances and partnerships and increasing arms sales to countries in the Indo-Pacific region could further strain China’s defense resources. By enhancing military cooperation with nations like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India, the United States has already begun to create a regional counterbalance that complicates China’s security calculations. More aggressive, bilateral and multilateral defense development programs with allies could accelerate technological advancements, making it harder for China to keep pace. These initiatives would enable the United States and its allies to develop more advanced or cost-effective weapons systems, slowing the erosion of the technological gap that the United States has long enjoyed over China, and potentially even widening it—not only for the United States but for its regional allies and partners, as well.
Finally, the United States must continue to invest in its own defense capabilities to maintain a technological edge over China. China has routinely demonstrated its ability to target the US defense industrial base through direct and indirect instances of espionage, intellectual property theft, elite capture, undermining academic institutions, targeting critical infrastructure on American soil, and other nefarious methods of destabilization. In June 2024, the head of US Cyber Command, Air Force General Timothy D. Haugh, said China is “engaging thousands of intelligence, military, and commercial personnel” to steal US intellectual property and disrupt defense firms’ business processes. Increased American investment in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic platforms, and quantum computing will ensure that the United States remains protected while also positioned at the forefront of military innovation. As the United States advances in these areas, China would be forced to allocate more resources to catch up, potentially straining its defense industrial base and diverting funds from other critical areas.
By employing a combination of tools—export controls, supply chain disruptions, cyber operations, diplomatic and economic pressure, and information warfare—the United States can significantly hinder China’s ability to sustain or grow its defense industrial base. Additionally, strengthening regional alliances, promoting joint defense programs, and accelerating US innovation will help maintain a strategic and technological advantage over China. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the United States right now is the ability to orchestrate all of these offensive and defense irregular warfare measures, across government and society, in unison. With the necessary legal authorities in place, these actions, carefully managed to avoid unintended consequences and escalation, would ensure that the United States and its allies remain well positioned to deter China’s dangerous and illegal behavior as well as increase stability in the global security environment.
Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaca, PhD, is a retired US Army Green Beret and current Department of Defense professor of irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and special operations at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He can be found on X/Twitter @LumpyAsia.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
This article makes familiar arguments that the United States needs a whole-of-government approach to the PRC, and calls that approach Irregular Warfare. The truth is that much of what this article calls for is happening, does not involve the military operationally, and is not at all IW — export controls, targeted sanctions, supply chain resilience, cyber security, defense industrial base investment, technological investment, etc.
Calling these things IW causes confusion and prevents realization of more unique ways to campaign that would center more directly on actual irregular ways for the military to provide strategic impact.
From Zach Hanson's comment immediately above:
"Calling these things IW causes confusion and prevents realization of more unique ways to campaign that would center more directly on actual irregular ways for the military to provide strategic impact."
As to Zach's such thought above, let us consider "actual irregular ways for the military to provide strategic impact;" for example, as suggested and described by retired LTG Charles Cleveland and retired GEN Joseph Votel below:
“In the same way that the conventionally focused American way of war is defined by America’s technical and industrial capacity and technological edge, the American way of irregular war is tied to our notions of religious pluralism, democracy, and, above all, human rights. And although the American way of war protects us against near-peer powers and guarantees the lanes of global commerce, the American way of irregular war protects our way of life by both promoting our worldview and giving people the tools to realize the same opportunities that we have had. … ” (See last paragraph of Page 5 of the Introduction chapter to Rand paper by LTG [ret.] Charles Cleveland entitled: “The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir.”)
“The Achilles’ heel of our authoritarian adversaries is their inherent fear of their own people; the United States must be ready to capitalize on this fear. … An American way of irregular war will reflect who we are as a people, our diversity, our moral code, and our undying belief in freedom.” (See the “Conclusion” of the Rand paper “The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir” by Charles T. Cleveland and Daniel Egel.)
“Advocates of UW first recognize that, among a population of self-determination seekers, human interest in liberty trumps loyalty to a self-serving dictatorship, that those who aspire to freedom can succeed in deposing corrupt or authoritarian rulers, and that unfortunate population groups can and often do seek alternatives to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice. Second, advocates believe that there is a valid role for the U.S. Government in encouraging and empowering these freedom seekers when doing so helps to secure U.S. national security interests.” (See the National Defense University Press paper “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone” by Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin)
Problem:
Today, unlike yesterday in LTG Cleveland and GEN Votel's time, many American people, and many other peoples of the world also it would seem, no longer seem to believe in — and no longer seem to subscribe to — such things as LTG Cleveland and GEN Votel's "actual irregular ways for the military to provide strategic impact" above. (To wit: via such things as our “religious pluralism,” “democracy,” “human rights,” “diversity, and “helping unfortunate population groups who seek alternatives to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice.”)
Thus, with (Right-leaning?) Americans and others largely eliminating these "classic" — and highly successful over time — "actual irregular ways for the military to provide strategic impact" weapons from our irregular warfare arsenal today, what, now, can we use to replace same?
An addendum to my initial comment above:
Note that, the fact that almost half of all Americans today no longer seem to believe in and/or support such things as religious pluralism, democracy, human rights, diversity, and helping unfortunate population groups seeking alternatives to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice;
Note that this would seem to render the U.S./the West incapable to doing irregular warfare — and/or of mounting irregular warfare campaigns — along the "normal" lines addressed by retired LTG Cleveland and retired GEN Votel above?
If this indeed is the case, then do these such Americans truly understand the amazingly negative — and potentially catastrophic — consequences of their such beliefs and associated/related decisions and actions?
If not, then should they not be immediately educated — for example, by a senior spokesperson from the U.S. military (special operations forces?) community, and/or by the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. military himself — as to exactly these such amazingly negative, and potentially catastrophic, consequences?
(Thus, while Zach Hanson — in the second paragraph of his initial comment above — calls for "actual irregular ways for the military to provide strategic impact," the question becomes, what to do if these such "actual irregular ways" no longer exist — due to the reasons that I have outlined above?)