Episode 73 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines the National Defense Strategy and the way it interacts with irregular warfare.
Our guests begin by describing the importance of the NDS and the way it distills guidance from the National Security Strategy down to the Pentagon. They then examine how the military operationalizes strategic guidance from the NDS. Finally, they discuss how the NDS affects irregular warfare efforts and the interagency approach needed to optimize America’s ability to defend its interests.
Dr. Kori Schake is a senior fellow and the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Schake has had a distinguished career in government, working at the highest levels of the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council at the White House. During this episode’s discussion, she dissects the unclassified version of the National Defense Strategy, which serves as the anchor for Episode 73.
Retired Brigadier General Chris Burns is the senior advisor to the Irregular Warfare Center. He has nearly four decades of experience leading organizations in both the public sector and across private industry. During his thirty-six-year military career, he led special operations units at multiple echelons. Before retiring, he commanded Special Operations Command North at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.
Ben Jebb and Julia McClenon are the hosts for Episode 73. Please reach out to Ben and Julia with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.
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If irregular warfare is about achieving such things as "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage," then how does a group of nations (for example the U.S./the West) — acting through its "whole of government" assets —
a. Achieve these such "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage" objectives; this,
b. While SIMULTANEOUSLY trying to achieve "revolutionary change" throughout the world/while SIMULTANEOUSLY trying to "modernize" the world both at home and abroad? (Such things as a nation's "whole of government" initiatives, etc., to best be understood from — and, indeed, best to be questioned from — THIS EXACT such perspective?) Example:
“Since the 1990s the focus of American international security policy has been focused on creating conditions for extending zones of security and prosperity to other states under the theory that ‘political as well as economic globalization would make the world safer — and more profitable — for the United States.’ Consequently, the United States saw expansion, rather than retraction, of American military presence around the world.”
(See the bottom of Page 2 of the Introduction chapter of the 2016 edition of the book “Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military” by U.S. Naval War College Professor Derek S. Reveron.)
In this regard, consider the following from Samuel Huntington's "Political Order in Changing Societies;" therein, see Page 41:
“The apparent relationship between poverty and backwardness, on the one hand, and instability and violence, on the other, is a spurious one. It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable.”
Conclusion:
As you can see from Huntington's observation here, (a) instability is brought about when (b) a nation tries to modernize. Thus, again the question becomes, how does a nation working hard to "modernize" (such things as "national security" depending upon this), (a) retain and/or gain such things as "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage" within its own country and/or elsewhere; this, (b) while SIMULTANEOUSLY attempting to modernize/change?
Note: Those individuals and groups — and those regimes in states and societies — who presently owe their power, influence, control, status, privilege, safety, security, etc., to the status quo — or to a status quo anti if too much unwanted "modernization"/"revolutionary change" is thought to have already taken place — these folks, re: your modernization initiative, you certainly ARE NOT going to gain — and/or retain — "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage" with them !! However, if your enemies — noting your vulnerability here — adopt a "conservative" and/or "traditionalist" stance — then they CERTAINLY WILL achieve such things as "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage" — at your expense.)
Addendum question — based on my thoughts above:
If our NSS, our NDS, etc., do not clearly and specifically address the matters that I have presented above, then how can ANYONE — from our young soldiers on the ground to individuals in position of high leadership in our "whole of government" offices — "connect the dots" ????
With regards to my thoughts above, consider the following from the introduction to Dr. Kori Schake's (one of our interviewees on this podcast) paper (go to Amazon) entitled "America vs the West : Can the Liberal World Order be Preserved?":
"With the end of the restraining force of Cold War competition, the United States and its allies became much more assertive in shaping international relations and the domestic practices of other countries to conform to the West's philosophy: There was NATO expansion, democracy promotion through regime change, and the European Union's 'neighbor-hood" policy, and an increasing insistence on liberal values as a prerequisite for security guarantees.
Public attitudes within the Western governments now suggest a deep skepticism about effecting such change internationally. The apparent success of authoritarian capitalism, especially by China, posits an alternative model, attractive to societies that desire Western prosperity without the cultural influences, economic volatility, or political hectoring of the West."
Now ask yourself:
Does the U.S.'s national security strategy — and/or our national defense strategy — and/or such things as "campaigning," etc. — address any of these such matters ????
If not, then, once again I must ask:
How can ANYONE — from our young soldiers on the ground — to individuals in position of high leadership in our "whole of government" offices — hope to "connect the dots" ??
Herein, "connecting the dots" to be considered — not so much as between our national security strategy and our national defense strategy (an exercise which, from the perspective that I provide above, may serve absolutely no purpose at all) — but — rather — as connecting the dots between (a) the U.S./the West's — both at home and abroad — "achieve revolutionary change"/"modernizing" political objective and (b) how our soldiers, statespersons — and indeed "whole of state and society" agencies — are expected to carryout this such mission; this, (c) in the face of opponents (both here at home and there abroad) who (1) prefer/desire/require the status quo [or a status quo anti] and who will, accordingly, (2) stand hard against the U.S./the West using such "weapons" as "traditional values."
Example: Of China using such things as "traditional values" against/versus the U.S./the West's "achieve revolutionary change"/"modernizing"/'westernizing" political objective:
“This may, in fact, be the missing explanatory element. Ideologies regularly define themselves against a perceived ‘other,’ and in this case there was quite plausibly a common and powerful ‘other’ (to wit: Western liberalism) that both (Chinese) cultural conservatism and (Chinese) political leftism defined themselves against. This also explains why (Chinese) leftists have, since the 1990s, become considerably more tolerant, even accepting, of cultural conservatism than they were for virtually the entire 20th century. (Items in parenthesis above are mine. See the April 24, 2015 Foreign Policy article “What it Means to Be ‘Liberal’ or ‘Conservative’ in China: Putting the Country’s Most Significant Political Divide in Context” by Taisu Zhang.)
Example: Of Russia (and of U.S./Western conservatives/traditionalists in this case) using such things as "traditional values" against/versus the U.S./the West's "achieve revolutionary change"/"modernizing" political objective:
"Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past." (See "The American Interest" article "The Reality of Russian Soft Power" by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
In the Old Cold War of yesterday, the Soviets/the communists had the extremely unenviable task of (a) achieving "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage; this, while — simultaneously — (b) pursuing "revolutionary change" both at home and abroad.
In the New/Reverse Cold War of today, the U.S./the West has this — exact same — unenviable task.
Thus to ask: Where in our national security strategy — in our national defense strategy — and/or elsewhere — is the "how to do this" guidance provided — to our soldiers — to our statespersons — and to our other "whole of government and society" personnel ???
So let me attempt to answer my own final question above; this being:
Given our seemingly dual and simultaneous requirement — of (a) achieving "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage" while (b) pursuing "revolutionary change" both at home and abroad; given this such apparent dual and simultaneous requirement, where — in our national security strategy — in our national defense strategy — and/or elsewhere — might we find the "how to do this" guidance that our soldiers, our statespersons and our other "whole of government and society" personnel require?
As to this such question, might we get closer — to finding such a "how to do this" guide — this, by considering the following from Joint Publication 3-22, "Foreign Internal Defense;" therein, see Chapter II, "Internal Defense and Development," and Paragraph 2, "Construct:"
"a. An IDAD (Internal Defense and Development) program integrates security force and civilian actions into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may, in turn, promote unrest in the society. The strategy, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.” (Item in parenthesis here is mine.)
As yet another way of getting closer to the "how to do this" guidance that we need, as to this such task, we might also look to this quote from General Sir Rupert Smith's "The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World:"
"The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided."
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
Both JP 3-22 and General Sir Rupert Smith's discussions above seem to recognize that (a) "development"/"revolutionary change" — both here at home and there abroad — this is the U.S./the West's political objective post-the Old Cold War and that, accordingly, (b) "unrest in the society" (both here at home and there abroad) is the price that we will have to pay to achieve these such objectives.
Accordingly, both JP 3-22 above and GEN Sir Rupert Smith's strategy/method above DO NOT seem to suggest that we will — simultaneously — pursue such things as (a) "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage;" this, alongside (b) "revolutionary change" both at home and abroad.
Rather, both JP 3-22 and GEN Sir Rupert Smith's strategy/method above seem to suggest that we will:
a. Forego such things as "legitimacy, credibility and political advantage" (for example, with conservative/traditionalist/no-change nations and population groups); this, while we — over a significant period of time — :
b. Pursue "revolutionary change"/"development" — both here at home and there abroad. (Much as GEN Smith, et. al, did — over a significant period of time — in N. Ireland, etc.?)
Question: Is THIS (to wit: my "forego"/"pursue" thoughts above) what our national security strategy — and our national defense strategy — are more about?
(Thus, some better "connectable dots" — for our soldiers, our statespersons and our other "whole of government and society" personnel to consider?)