10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), in cooperation with the Modern War Institute and Project 6633, is pleased to announce an essay contest to generate new ideas and expand the community of interest for special operations in the polar regions.
Defending American strategic interests may require special operations in the polar regions. Whether in competition, crisis, or conflict, the polar regions’ extreme weather, natural resources, and diplomatic divisions present challenges to any operations. If special operations are to succeed in the polar regions, polar state actors must develop the appropriate mixture of force posture, equipping, and readiness. Polar nations will improve their competitiveness in these regions by drawing on history, experimentation, and exercises.
Topic
Essays must answer the following prompt: How can American special operations forces compete with near-peer adversaries in the polar regions?
This topic is broad. We encourage authors to clearly articulate a specific idea or concept in their response.
Eligibility
- Essays will be accepted from any person from any field, and submissions from non-US participants are welcomed.
- Up to two people may co-author an essay entry.
- Participants may submit only one entry to the competition.
- Essays must be original, unpublished, and not subject to publication elsewhere.
Submission Guidelines
- Essays will not exceed 1,000 words.
- Use the standard submission guidelines for the Modern War Institute.
- Email your entry to USASOC.10.SFG.Polarsofcontest.SHDMBX@socom.mil with “Polar SOF Contest” in the subject line. Once submitted, no edits, corrections, or changes are allowed.
- Submission deadline: essays will be accepted until 11:59 PM EDT on May 2, 2021.
Selection Process
Submissions will be reviewed and evaluated by a team from the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), the Modern War Institute, and Project 6633. Submissions will be assessed based on how well and creatively they address the topic of the contest and provoke further thought and conversation, as well as their suitability for publication by the Modern War Institute (e.g., style, sources, accessibility, etc.). See evaluation questions below:
- Does the essay clearly define a problem and present a solution?
- Does the essay show thoughtful analysis?
- Does the essay inject new provocative thinking or address areas where there needs to be more discussion?
- Does the essay demonstrate a unique approach or improve current initiatives?
- Does the essay take lessons from history and apply them to today’s challenges?
- Does the essay propose a project or concept that could realistically be applied by the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) or Army Special Operations?
- Does the essay demonstrate knowledge of relevant existing writing on polar operations and challenges?
- Is the essay logically organized, well written, and persuasive?
The commander of 10th Special Forces Group and Project 6633 co-directors will make the final judgement for the contest.
Winning Submissions
The top three essays will be announced publicly, and will be published by the Modern War Institute.
Depending on the evaluation of the Modern War Institute editorial team, revisions may be required before publication.
Image credit: US SOCEUR
Although I do not have sufficient knowledge of special forces, etc., necessary to take on this essay myself, let me suggest some matters for consideration regarding same which others, who are so sufficiently knowledgeable, may find both interesting and useful — in both their essay and other endeavors.
My starting point here will be to suggest:
a. A specific "context" that will be used to focus our thinking; that is, to suggest "the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood and assessed" (Oxford Languages.). And to suggest that:
b. This such context might best be used to best address the question "How Can American Special Operations (and Other) Forces Compete with Near-Peer Adversaries in the Polar (and Other) Regions."
(As you can clearly see here, I DO NOT, in this case, see the polar regions — and/or the use of our special forces there — in some isolated manner.)
From this perspective, let me suggest that the context within which we find ourselves today, this is a context which finds the U.S./the West's promotion of such things as globalization and the global economy, over the past few decades, as now:
a. Having sparked worldwide anti-modernist sentiments and movements; anti-modernist sentiments and movements that:
b. Our opponents (importantly both here at home and there abroad) are only too willing to exploit today.
Example:
"For Putin, he suggests, the populist wave in Europe was a predictable response to the permissiveness of European societies, particularly with regard to immigration and gay rights. And in the rise of the right across the continent he sees an opportunity to address himself to a wider audience. 'The Russian conservative turn . . . must be exported, and Putin sees himself as the harbinger of that anti-modernist movement.' "
(See the Mar 24, 2018 The Irish Times article "Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin: Two Takes on the Russian President" by Raudhan Mac Cormaic.)
As we all know, the rise of the Right in the U.S of late, this also seems to be largely based on the appeal of these anti-modernists sentiments and movements — which themselves — would seem to be a response to the adverse effects of the political, economic, social and value "change" demands of U.S./Western-led globalization, etc.
Combine this knowledge and information with our knowledge of how such things as Russian New Generation Warfare is intended to operate today and, I suggest, we may (a) be able to find a "special forces" connection(?); this, as relates to, for example, (b) the nations surrounding the polar regions (and indeed elsewhere?):
1. The main battlespace is in mind:
"Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population."
(See “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine,” in National Defense Academy of Latvia [April 2014], Page 5, by Janis Berzins.)
2. There (in our and our partners and allies' minds) to create an "internal opposition" to operate as a "permanently operating front" within one's own borders:
"Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy´s advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected."
(See the initial quotes at "Russian New Generation Warfare: Deterring and Winning at the Tactical Level," in Army University Press Military Review [Sep/Oct 2020] by James Derleth.)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
Hopefully this "context" — and the information that I have provided in support of same — hopefully this will be of some use to those more-knowledgeable, and those more-capable, individuals who do decide to take on this essay and its compelling question: "How can American special operations forces compete with near-peer adversaries in the polar regions?"
Best of luck to you.
Another way of looking at the "context" that I describe above, this is via the lens of a New/Reverse Cold War:
Explanation Part I:
In the Old Cold War, it was the Soviets/the communists who sought to "transform"/to "change" both their own states and societies — and the states and societies of the rest of the world — this, more along, in this case, Soviet/communist political, economic, social and value lines.
The "natural enemies" of the Soviets/the communists, in this such "global change" initiative, was, of course, the conservative elements of the world's populations — to include the conservative elements in both the Soviet Union and in the U.S./the West.
This, of course, made these conservative types — in these such countries (again, to include in both the Soviet Union and in the U.S./the West) — the U.S./the West's "natural allies;" this as relates, for example, to our mission to "contain and roll back the Soviets/the communists" back then.
Explanation Part II:
In the New/Reverse Cold War of today, however, it has been the U.S./the West that has sought to "transform"/to "change" both our own and other states and societies; this, so as, in this case, to better provide for and better benefit from such things as globalization and the global economy.
The "natural enemies" of the U.S./the West — in our such "global change" initiative — has (tragically, ironically but indeed quite understandably) been these exact same conservative elements of the world's populations (again, to include those in Russia and in the U.S./the West).
This, of course, makes these conservative types — in these such countries (again, to include in both Russia and in the U.S./the West) — our opponent's "natural allies;" this, as relates to, in this case, our opponent's mission to "contain and roll back the U.S./the West."
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
Given the information that I have provided here, I suggest that:
a. Those folks wishing to consider the question "How can American special operations (and other) forces compete with near-peer adversaries in the polar (and other) regions?;" these folks, I suggest,
b. Must come at this question from the perspective of the New/Reverse Cold War that I describe above, to wit: from a perspective that acknowledges:
1. Our post-Cold War "global change" mission (in our case, in the name of such things as globalization and the global economy).
2. Our opponents decision to "stand against and contain and roll back the U.S./the West" as per our such mission. And from a perspective which acknowledges, accordingly,
3. Our opponents' decision to see, target and use the conservative elements of the world's population (to include our own — see my initial comment above) — much as "we" did versus "them" during the Old Cold War — as their "natural allies" in their such endeavors.
(Such things as "great power competition" — and also our conflicts with lesser state and non-state actors today also — all of these to be seen — in whole or in part — from the New/Reverse Cold War perspective that I provide above?)