Because ends exist only in the imagination, they can be infinite. . . . Means, though, are stubbornly finite…Ends and means have to connect if anything is to happen. They’re never, however, interchangeable.
In October 2019 we marked the eighteenth anniversary of the start of operations in Afghanistan—and with each year, the “Forever War” label applied by some pundits becomes more difficult to argue with. After eighteen years of conflict, lost lives and expended treasure it is past time to consider other options for action in the Department of Defense range of ways to more effectively employ military power. The range of military responses offered to a president who must do something in response to an incident sufficiently jarring to the national psyche must include punitive expeditions.
Given the scope of poorly governed and ungoverned spaces on the planet and the “stubbornly finite” means that Gaddis describes, a carefully crafted punitive-expedition option establishes a measured response to the action of a foe, is within the scope of existing laws of land warfare, and offers focus for military action taken in support of a policy objective. It is time to reconsider the military’s use of them. Including a punitive-expedition option when developing use-of-force options for policy makers fits into the absolute requirement to connect policy ends to the finite means of both military forces and sustaining the support of the people for a desired policy objective.
Application of Punitive Measures
Bearing in mind the Clausewitzian trinity—enmity, chance, and reason—and the effort required to sustain the will of the nation, the military must resurrect the option of the punitive expedition. After an attack like the one on 9/11 the demand for action will be irresistible. The Clausewitzian definition of war reminds us of the purpose of deciding to use force. “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”
Another reason to bear Clausewitz in mind is his rejoinder regarding bloodshed and the use of force:
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect.
A punitive expedition results in a measured, relatively swift, focused response. It can be of some duration but only long enough to achieve the policy ends of punishing the group that threatened US interests or caused US casualties. There is no regime change, no re-ordering of the existing power structure in a region. A punitive expedition demonstrates the will and ability of the US government to act with violence. Especially when striking into ungoverned areas there is no Phase V (enable civil authority) as there is no civil authority to reestablish. The purpose of the punitive expedition is to act with violence and return to home station. The linkage to policy is straightforward. In ungoverned or poorly governed spaces, a punitive expedition is measured, focused, and not open-ended. A punitive expedition acts with diplomatic and informational efforts, each reinforcing the other. Indeed strategists and planners must bear in mind the political object irrespective of the development of use of force options. Again we return to Clausewitz: “The political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”
A punitive expedition is not the “easy button”; rather, it is a more difficult operation to conceive because it requires a recognition of the limits of force. The need to bear in mind the policy end at which the use of force is aimed remains paramount prior to and during the operation. Moreover, the ability to cease, escalate, or deviate operations will need to be as dynamic as the political climate demanding action. The dialogue between the senior civilian policymakers and the military requires constant engagement—and, I offer, more effort on the part of the military. Planners and military decision makers must develop a range of response options conforming to an understanding of the need to do something now with an equal understanding of the conditions driving policy. And policy will change as conditions change, polls measure the limits of public support, and social media observations turn into developing and competing narratives. These conditions act as limits on the utility of using force.
Beginning with the End in Mind
The multi-phased approach to planning conflicts remains useful in order to structure and synchronize the dynamic and daunting tasks of accomplishing military objectives that achieve political conditions favorable to the United States. Again, the successful execution of any strategy demands a recognition of the ever-balancing Clausewitzian trinity: enmity, chance, and reason. The government, purveyor of reason, must remain engaged in the conduct of the war while sustaining the passion of the people to support the war.
Short of declaring war, which is apparently antiquated in this modern age, and even asking the legislative branch to remain engaged by reviewing and updating the authorization for the use of military force, it falls on the military to bear in mind framing the war upon which the nation enters. As Clausewitz wrote,
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something alien to its nature. (Emphasis added.)
The statesman and the commander must understand and agree to the kind of war upon which they are embarking—or in other words, the use of force as an extension of policy they are going to conduct. This is why it is so important that military people know how to speak to politicians and policymakers in a language they understand—not merely talking in terms of “body bags and trips to Dover,” but a clear understanding of and the ability to convey what the use of force can and, significantly, cannot do. As a quote attributed to Talleyrand goes, “you can do anything you like with bayonets, except sit on them.”
This is not to say the military is bloodthirsty and desires combat, but to acknowledge that the determination to use force as an extension of policy carries with it the fact people will die and property will be destroyed. The decision to use force must be made with a mind open to loss and the repercussions of loss in the Information Age of social media and twenty-four-hour news and political-commentary cycles.
Violence is Not an End within Itself
Punitive expeditions are merely the physical stimulant for changing behavior and only enable a greater effort to achieve decisive results within the psychological aspects of diplomatic and economic competition.
There are recent incidents wherein the threat of force gained policy objects without a shot being fired: Libya giving up its nuclear weapons in 2004, for example, and the Russian conquest of Crimea. Perspectives on these incidents abound but here again On War provides the ultimate observation:
Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. (Emphasis added.)
As John Lewis Gaddis points out, connecting the means to the ends is difficult but vital. This ability must be in the military strategist’s intellectual toolkit. Including a punitive expedition into the proposed range of military responses to an enemy action can satisfy the need to act relatively swiftly and can assist in crafting a policy end within the ability of the applied means to achieve. A punitive expedition does not close the door on other options. A punitive expedition as a response option is also not a substitute for a strategy. But it can fit well into the conditions around which policy and strategy are developed and refined as conditions change—and strategists know conditions will change.
The narrative accompanying action must also be considered as a part of both the government policy and the supporting strategy. Playing well in Peoria is important, but a consideration of how the narrative plays in Paktia province and Paris must also be incorporated into both thinking and action. As Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley suggested during the 2019 Association of the US Army convention, whoever wins the narrative of the first battle may well win the war.
The purpose of the punitive expedition is to act with violence and return to home station. The linkage to policy is straightforward as execution of these types of expeditions will serve to demonstrate that the United States will reach out and take action to destroy a foe who threatens vital national interests and American lives. In ungoverned spaces, a punitive expedition is measured, focused, and not open-ended. A punitive expedition must act in coordination with diplomatic and informational efforts, each reinforcing the other. Indeed strategists and planners must bear in mind the political object irrespective of the development of use-of-force options.
It is time to return to consideration of punitive expeditions.
Col. (ret) Kevin Benson, PhD, commanded from company to battalion level and served as a general staff officer from corps to field army. He was the CFLCC J5 (Plans) at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the director of the School of Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Author’s note: I wish to thank Lt. Col. Mark Lavin for his review and comments. All quotations from On War, Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Whitney Houston, US Army
Punitive expeditions would not seem to be able to help us/would not seem to be able to solve our problems; this, for the reasons I outline below:
The problem with this line of thinking ("punitive expeditions") is that it does not address either (a) a/the central underlying goal/focus of U.S./Western foreign policy (maximizing our economic growth potential overseas) nor (b) a/the central underlying problem which stands directly in the way of the U.S./the West achieving its such political objective overseas (to wit: the "cultural backwardness" of other states and societies).
As noted in the quoted item below, Joseph Schumpeter, as early as 1919, identified (a) a/the central objective of U.S/Western foreign policy (see achieving "normal economic intercourse" and "free trade" in other states and societies ), (b) the central underlying problem he saw with regard to achieving this such political objective (various overseas states and societies exhibited "cultural backwardness;" that is, they were not organized, ordered and oriented more along Western lines; this, so as to better accommodate capitalism and free trade) and (c) the solution that he saw with regard to this such problem ("colonization"):
"Where the cultural backwardness of a region makes normal economic intercourse dependent on colonization, it does not matter, assuming free trade, which of the civilized nations undertakes the task of colonization." (See Joseph Schumpeter's "State Imperialism and Capitalism")
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, however, did not think that colonization was the best way to achieve our such economic growth objectives re: other states and societies. He, in the alternative, thought that something (that would later be called "nation-building"/"advancing market-democracy?") was the better way to go, for example, for the "billions were pennies" reason he notes below:
"Imperialists don't realize what they can do, what they can create! They've robbed this continent (Africa) of billions, and all because they are too short-sighted to understand that their billions were pennies, compared to the possibilities! Possibilities that must include a better life for the people who inhibit this land." (See Niall Ferguson's "Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire.")
Thus, to understand how "punitive expeditions" simply cannot "fix" — and/or "cure" —
a. The "cultural backwardness" problems of other states and societies (and the terrorist problems which emanate from same?) which
b. Stood then — and still stands now — directly in the way of the U.S./the West achieving its "economic growth" political objectives re: other states and societies?
Addendum:
Re: my thought above, should we consider that, for example in a country such as Afghanistan, the cost of overcoming Afghanistan's "cultural backwardness" problems simply are not worth the "economic growth" benefits that, thereby, might be derived?
In this regard, let me suggest that — before we move out smartly in that direction — we first consider these "cost" and "benefit" matters more from a "regional" perspective, much as Schumpeter does in my initial comment above, and/or even from a "global" perspective.
Thus, from a "regional" and/or "global" economic growth potential "gained" — or "lost — perspective, how then does, respectively,
a. Dealing effectively with the "cultural backwardness" problems of places such as Afghanistan (think "nation-building?"). Or:
b. Not dealing effectively with these "cultural backwardness" problems (think "punitive expeditions?")
Make sense — or not?
The article, which poses an interesting argument, starts with a major flaw…the notion that there is no end. End is always relative, but wars do end, they may transition into a uneasy peace, but World War Two did end and began a new era of the Cold War. The US has a history of "punitive expeditions" with a mixed bag of results. Punitive Expeditions are not always successful, case in point the punitive expedition into Mexico in 1916 was a failure in its stated goal and only America's entrance into World War One prevented it from being a longer expedition than it was. The American punitive expedition against Korea in 1870 was a mixed bag, it temporarily brought a halt to Korean mistreatment of shipwrecked sailors, but it didn't change Korea's attitudes nor did it open a trade route to the "Hermit Kingdom". Punitive expeditions only work where there is an isolated opposition that can be engaged with overwhelming force either in numbers or technology or both, otherwise the punitive expedition turns into a quagmire. General Rupert Smith's Utility of Force makes the point, an industrialized nation spends roughly one million dollars a year to put a soldier in the field, where insurgent forces supported by one or more outside groups can field entire armies for what it costs NATO to put a rifle company in the field…the math is not on the side on modern industrialized nations. It isn't just time that determines the success of a military intervention…it is the timing and amount of violence that is the best counter to long drawn out wars.
If I get this correct, weren't Punitive Expeditions done to Afghanistan already? The U.S. special forces and CIA entered Afghanistan shortly after 9/11 and pushed the Taliban back into the cities. Nearly defeated, the Taliban retreated to Tora Bora. But strategy, Hearts and Minds, and politics made the U.S. ally with the Afghan Army and word was that the Afghan Army allowed or failed to stop the retreat of the Taliban into Pakistan. History told the rest of the story…thus began the manhunt for the Taliban Leader that lasted for over a decade.
If Punitive Expeditions is to seek out, close in, destroy the enemy, and return to base, then that was done. It led to Operation Anaconda and Tora Bora. The problem with dealing with enemies running around with AK-47s, PKMs, RPKs, and RPGs dates back to "Tour of Duty" patrols in Vietnam where the American 5.56mm M-16A1 was vastly outranged and outgunned by the 7.62mm AK-47, RPK, and PKM…similar results in Afghanistan…5.56mm again.
As shown on TV, movies, and stories, the GI had a hard time tracking down and killing the AK-47 and RPG enemy due to ambushes, bobby traps, reinforcements, IEDs, and the like. Therefore, this essay covers a topic that has already been accomplished, but strategy and political agendas have curtailed the American Punitive Expedition to not be a 100% USA affair, instead involving allied elements that had dubious military quality, loyalty, skills, and combat experience, just like in Vietnam. The objective for Blue infantry to seek out with a swift hard-hitting response has already been achieved by U.S. special forces early on in the war.
Was it the conventional U.S. Army and Marines that fouled the pursuit of the Punitive Expedition, or was it Friendly Fire deaths by Close Air Support? The death of the Northern Alliance Leader also hindered the ability for the Northern Alliance to aid the USA, not to mention that the Taliban assembled their own Punitive Expeditions and conducted harassment and skirmish missions on Blue Forces.
As History shows, the Taliban retreated to Pakistan and each warm season, they come back into Afghanistan to close with Blue Forces and harass them. The border wasn't sealed so Fire Bases were established and U.S. Forces were locked in a static stalemate position. The USSOCOM conducted Punitive Raids with good results and Operators ended up getting worn down after all these years of war (sounds like Vietnam again…GIs, Marines, LRRPs, and Navy SEALs).
Punitive Expeditions cannot fix/cannot cure an objective/goal without a sound strategy and in-depth analysis of the battlefield and war situation. The goal of sharing combat with the host nation lead to the Vietnam-era syndrome where the host nation lacked the skills, the training, and the proper motivation and arms to defend their country against (you guessed it) AK-47, RPK, PKM, and RPG-toting enemies (yet again). The fact that practically every man in Afghanistan carried an AK-47 for protection didn't help, and Punitive Expeditions turned into shootings with local civilians protecting their sheep herds…who was the enemy and who wasn't?
Whereas the Taliban and Insurgents used Punitive Expeditions of children, women, and scouts against Blue Forces, the USA had to rely on high-tech sensors, drones, helicopters, and Mark 1 eyeballs to find and close with the enemy (Vietnam again), only this time in the hot barren rocky desert and mountains and not the lush green dense jungle.
If we were to succeed so well in 2001 and 2002, would not neighboring nations fear USA's involvement and send reinforcements to quash the small forces of the CIA and SOCOM (the Korean War again)? Would not successful Punitive Expeditions to kick a (small) threat lead to a massive Godzilla of allied enemy nations coming to kick our small special operations force and wasn't that what happened in Afghanistan)? Why can't the USA Think Tankers, supercomputers, analysts, Historians, strategists, planners, military teachers, and politicians not see such an in-depth analysis of the battleground and this war from past wars and previous lessons? Mission Creep thus sets in…perhaps.
Wow, talk about a great
Idea gone horribly wrong. I’ve been saying we needed to simply conduct a Punitive Expedition to Afghanistan, and another to Saudi Arabia, since 9-11 happened. All of Colon (sic) Powell’s bullshit about “proportionality and legitimacy” and “you break it you own it”, is just that – bullshit.We should have inflicted massive death and destruction on AQ, the Taliban, and every Saudi town that spawned a 9-11 hijacker. Not as retribution and as a lesson to the rest of the Moslem world – a lesson that should have made the world gasp.
So far so good regarding this article. But our “military intellectuals” love to dazzle us with their grasp of nuance, the fine understanding of theory, etc. to complicate this is to neuter it. We just needed to crush our enemies.
When I said this to a civilian once he said, “My God, do you want to be at war with a billion Moslems?!” My answer? No, but we are whether you accept it or not. We need to act like it. And if we deal harshly and decisively with our enemies, the rest will get the message. It’s like ripping off the band aid.
"My God, do you want to be at war with a billion Moslems?!” My answer? No, but we are whether you accept it or not. We need to act like it. And if we deal harshly and decisively with our enemies, the rest will get the message."
Can you be serious?
Sounds like a Rambo movie. Real life ain't like that.
When an invasion force of Anglicans invaded Washington DC and burned down the US Capitol, did that put us "at war with all Anglicans?"
What a simplified and useless, for American interests, understanding of the world.
If we project our power, and meddle in millenia-old conflicts that have nothing to do with American interests, into regions thousands of miles from our country, we must expect that those subjected to our deadly power and presence will notice. And they won't forget. And they'll plot pay-back.
We've been dealing harshly and "decisively" with the enemies of the hostile foreign power that controls our politics for the last 18 years. What "message" do you think they've gotten?
What's the band-aid on? Who's pulling it off?
The punitive expedition is one of many strategic "ways" to reach a strategic objective. Alone, it serves little more than an emotional outlet for an angry nation. BTW – Aren't our air attacks/cruise missile launches a type of punitive expedition? IOW – ask President Assad?
I agree with the author, and wrote on the same topic in 2007 at the Naval War College. The idea was not well-received, but after over a decade and many thousands of lives, it is good to see it finally raised again. Many of the comments on this thread seem mired in conventional thinking and considerably off-point. A Clausewitzian analysis of war aims in 2001 might indeed have led to the early phase of our engagement in Afghanistan – but not to Anaconda and Tora Bora. The logic of a punitive expedition does not call for chasing down individual hostile fighters with AKs because as we very well know, they spring up like dragon's teeth. Our approach was very much driven by the Powell doctrine and the neoconservative nation-building conceit, which is precisely what a "punitive expedition" strategy abjures. In Afghanistan, there might never have been conventional forces on the ground at all. Enabling a swift, decisive Northern Alliance victory over the Taliban might be reasonable if cold and rational analysis indicated it could be done quickly – with a clearly defined (if not advertised) end state, and within reasonable bounds of cost. If not, the focus of effort would have been on making the provision of sanctuary to Al Qaida prohibitively expensive for any Afghan government. It is not hard to imagine how that might have been done. The state of governance of Afghanistan was arguably not our concern. Its ability to provide aid, comfort, and sanctuary to our active enemy was very much our concern.
A punitive expedition in the Vietnam context might have looked like Nixon's bombing and mining of Haiphong harbor in December 1972, done 10-15 years earlier, and repeated until North Vietnamese behavior changed.
This is not about opening markets or nursing the "culturally backward" toward the light. it's about changing behavior through harsh punishment. One might consult Thomas Jefferson and Stephen Decatur for advice on how that can work.
"…it's about changing behavior through harsh punishment."
Yeah, how's that working out for us?
Afghans, Iraqis, Libyans, Syrians, Yemenis all straightened up and following American-style rules of behavior?
Maybe that works with 7th grade boys in Missouri, but it's a really terrible method of foreign relations.
There first is a normative issue with the idea of "punitive" attacks, as if the US was the international judge and jury. Second, at least in the initial phase of its intervention in Afghanistan, the US did defeat Al'Qaeda the same way Daesh was defeated in Iraq and in Syria, the issue being scope creeping to save the world. And third, the fundamental issue is not the lack of brawn but a lack of brain in employing them so instead of so-called "punitive attacks" more surgical ones are required that are strategically smarter and sharper. Indeed, terrorism is akin to a wart that does not require amputation: https://cdainstitute.ca/e-expectations-why-terrorism-is-just-the-smoke/ Eric .