Aviation has played an important role in irregular warfare, from its use by the British against rebellious tribesmen in Iraq and Transjordan in the interwar period to the era of the unblinking eye and precision strike in Afghanistan.
Our guests discuss this evolution in the use of airpower to support ground forces, illustrating that although rapid advances in technology have brought to the point of near perfection the various procedures recently employed in Afghanistan and Iraq, the role of aviation in war—irregular or otherwise—has not significantly changed to this point. They then go on to explain, however, that with the transition to more distributed operations across the globe, it will no longer be possible to provide the level of responsive support to which the US military has become accustomed. The capabilities and inventory of current aviation platforms are ill suited for the task in hand. Instead, the US military must be prepared to take a step back from its pursuit of continuous technological improvement and look to platforms—manned or unmanned—that are more versatile and robust. But to do so, and thus successfully meet the challenges that lie ahead, will require a fundamental change in culture across the joint force—and a greater willingness to accept risk. The question that they ponder, from their unique perspectives, is whether the US military is capable of taking such a step, and if so, what doing so will entail.
Our guests today are both experts in their fields. One is a practitioner with decades of experience in the use of airpower—from the cockpit to the halls of the Pentagon. The other is an historian and academic, renowned for his expertise not only on the topic of airpower but also irregular warfare and special operations. Together they provide a substantive and highly informative dialogue on a topic that is at the pinnacle of current national security issues.
Retired Lieutenant General Thomas Trask transitioned from the Air Force in 2017 after thirty-three years of service, retiring as the vice commander of United States Special Operations Command. During his career Tom flew rescue and special operations helicopters, accumulating more than 3,200 hours and over fifty combat missions.
Dr. James Kiras teaches at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. In addition to his knowledge of aviation history, his other areas of expertise include irregular warfare, international terrorism, and special operations, He is the author of Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast is produced by the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a collaboration between the Modern War Institute and Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. You can listen to the full episode below, and you can find it and subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, TuneIn, or your favorite podcast app. And be sure to follow the Irregular Warfare Initiative on Twitter.
Image credit: Tech. Sgt. Michael R. Holzworth, US Air Force
In 2005, I was a USAF JTAC supporting Army operations on LSA Anaconda and I reached out to a USAF Colonel venting my frustrations in regard to limited playtime with F-16s and F-18s when the base would receive rocket and mortar incoming. I stated I needed a long loiter low altitude aircraft which is highly fuel efficient overhead BEFORE the attack happens. Reacting to the attack was an exercise in futility. Based on found insurgent materials, it was my assessment the insurgents were gone before the first mortar/rocket exited the tube. I told the Colonel I needed an O-2 Skymaster with strike capability. He replied, "NO, you need an OV-10." He was a prior OV-10 pilot before he started flying a desk. He also provided more information. He stated, "There is a small group within the USAF that want a light attack aircraft capability but BIG Air Force doesn't want it." I have other anecdotal evidence to support the assessment that the USAF doesn't want a light attack aircraft but I will be beating a dead horse. It's frustrating that this discussion is still alive. This is the same conversation which was had 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 30 years ago, 40 years ago, 50 years ago…and so on. The problem is the USAF wants it's high operating cost jets to do deep strike, interdiction, and close air support damn the cost!!! The USAF doesn't care about efficiency, only effectiveness. "Using an F-16 burning $20,000 an hour to look for IEDs isn't efficient but it's effective." This was an actual quote. Thank you for the podcast. It was both enjoyable AND flipping frustrating!
Where would such an aircraft fit in future peer wars? Where it would have to fly in contested airspace? As we move away from COIN and futile nation-building, there (hopefully) won't be a wide scale need or place for such an airframe within Big AF. That's why SOCOM/JSOC needs its own fixed-wing air wing akin to the 160th to prosecute the CT/limited COIN mission. It could include legacy airframes like the A-10 and AC-130, current airframes under evaluation (Super Tucano, etc.), and UCAVs.
As David Kilcullen notes in his "Counterinsurgency Redux" (for example, see Pages 2 and 3), what the U.S./the West has been doing in places like Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003, this has not been, per se, "irregular warfare."
Rather, per Kilcullen's "Redux," what the U.S./the West has been doing in Afghanistan and Iraq, since 2003, this has been more as per "revolutionary warfare;" defined, or example, as attempting to transform other states and societies more along one's own (often radically different, alien and profane) political, economic, social and value lines.
From this such perspective, and as Kilcullen notes in his "Redux," what the Taliban (et. al) have been doing post-2003; this has been "resistance warfare."
As then-Special Forces Colonel Slavko N. Bjelajac noted in his "Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches" way back in 1962, the proper way to look at, understand and conduct revolutionary warfare, this must be more as follows:
"It must be understood that the success of the revolutionary is not due to the application of new principles of warfare, or to the technical efficiency of revolutionary forces and their tactics or the terrain; in spite of their importance, these factors, no matter how favorable, would not be sufficient for success. The numbers of warriors armed with rifles and hand grenades is not the decisive factor. The decisive factor is more in the nature of power. And the success of the revolutionaries can primarily be assigned to two extraordinarily powerful factors, namely, their closeness and appeal to the people — that is their ability to win over the population — and their ideological conviction. … "
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
If Kilcullen above is correct — and thus if what "air power" has actually been doing in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003 has actually been supporting our "revolutionary warfare" efforts transform Afghanistan and Iraq, at least somewhat, more along modern western political, economic, social and/or value lines (this, without the "closeness and appeal to the people," without "the ability to win over the population," and without the "ideological conviction" needed to achieve these goals?) — then what does this such (more-correct and more-strategic?) view of things tell us about air power's future?
(Again, not as per "irregular warfare" — which would not seem to be what we have actually been doing in places like Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003 — but, rather, as per, [poorly/improperly done?] "revolutionary warfare.")
(Note: Should you disagree with Kilcullen and my suggestion above, that what the U.S./the West has actually been doing in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003 is "revolutionary warfare," then consider the following from Sir Adam Roberts "Transformative Military Occupations: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights:"
"Within the existing frame work of international law, is it legitimate, for an occupying power, in the name of creating conditions for a more democratic and peaceful state, to introduce fundamental changes in the constitutional, social, economic, and legal order within an occupied territory? … These questions have arisen in various conflicts and occupations since 1945 — including the tragic situation in Iraq since the United States-led invasion of March-April 2003. …" )
This debate on providing cheap CAS has been going on (believe it or not) since the Burt Rutan ARES prototype built in 1990 = 31 years ago!
For "The best military in the world that money can buy," the decades of quagmire is apparent. I still believe that the ARES is a better choice than the Light Attack Plane (LAP) "Overwatch" with a propeller as the 25mm cannon and jet engine's faster speed make it special. However, one doesn't need an airplane with such a unique design to signal USSOCOM presence so a propeller plane would also be suitable, especially if armed. The new OV-10 would be ideal too.
The ambush in Niger renewed interest in the lack of cheap, effective, and sustaining "Overwatch" to protect the Green Berets. Nothing really happened and the LAP dragged on. For elite soldiers that the USA spent lots of money developing and training, not having the proper CAS is a shame.
SOCOM can submit a request for funding, but Congress is a stubborn bunch and I believe some hoop is missing that SOCOM isn't seeing properly. So a few AT-6s were purchased for the Air Force (according to TheWarZone) and Air Combat Command said the first LAPs went to Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio, which ISN'T SOCOM in Florida! Therefore, SOCOM Acquisition can't just "Walk the walk in and talk the talk in" for busy Congress to pay attention, especially during COVID. I really believe that SOCOM needs to produce some hard printed evidence to obtain funding because the trillions of dollars for COVID and infrastructure rebuilding is there, but SOCOM just doesn't seem to produce the proper key to the lock to unlock any funding for the SOCOM AT-6s. Can SOCOM even see what kind of lock it is that needs opening, let along to find the right key?
The gist is that SOFs are deployed throughout the world, and LAP "Overwatch" is vital to their mission success. Many SOFs and missions were lost because of the lack of sustained and cheap CAS with over-matching heavier firepower than the enemies. The complexity was that LAPs cannot survive in a contested environment with SAMs, radars, AAA, and enemy fighter jets. It's not so much the money, but the fact that I believe Congress is afraid that LAPs, especially slow propeller planes, will get shot down since they're non-stealthy and lack speed and AAMs. Despite that, LAP and ARES didn't mature/modify enough to fit SOCOM's interest, and THAT is the mistake as ARES lacks hardpoints under the wings and SOCOM lacks fighter jets. Nowhere in SOCOM's Public Affairs/Command did SOCOM state that it will acquire AIM-9Xs, Stingers, flares, chaff, NODs, FLIR, or ECM/EW and armor for its AT-6s against enemy fighters or enemy AAA and SHORADS. How will the SOCOM AT-6 differ from the USAF's version? Why duplicate planes? Does SOCOM have everything together to do this? Where are the hangars, the ground crews, the pilots, the bombs and missiles? If SOCOM can't get everything in order, then there will be no order for AT-6s for SOCOM because SOCOM doesn't fly attack propeller planes.
An AT-6 having pod machine guns, 2.75" rockets, and small bombs would make a HUGE difference. Vital systems and the cockpit have to be armored.
I believe why Congress is stalling is because USSOCOM has made almost LITTLE PROGRESS in modifying the SOCOM AT-6 design for SOFs! One can't say, "I want this, Plain Vanilla" without reports, studies, and documentation and manuals on how the AT-6 (or ARES) will fit into SOFs' missions compared to the USAF. Without "finger-flipping good" pages of reports for Congress, Congress isn't going to fund anything for SOCOM. Talk, and talk, and talk doesn't produce hard green dollars if SOCOM is still talking and doesn't print out anything for Congress to read as to when, why, how much, who, what, and where. Someone isn't properly leading the LAP from SOCOM brainstorm to a Congressional desk for a passage of a Bill for AT-6s for SOCOM. If there is nothing special in the AT-6 SOCOM version, Congress will just tell SOCOM to call the Air Force for CAS….and that isn't proper because the USAF isn't present at all SOF missions.
I would like to concur with most/all of what Sic Semper and FOR Overwatch said about daily/routine fixed wing support for troops on the ground. Whether SOF or conventional, we don't have enough of it. It needs to be organic to our organizations / ODBs / task forces. The USMC has this figured out…and well. The F-18 pilots and the ground commanders serving in the same MAGTF personally know each other. When you're on the radio in a combat situation, that can make a difference in outcomes.
I think the Army should take over the A-10 for CAS (probably the AF isn't too interested in that mission anyway), and SOF get a lighter weight cheap but available solution for overwatch in other missions.
The cost of airpower is huge. How these strategies help to keep the budget under belt?