The Russo-Ukraine war rages on, thirty months after Russia expanded its invasion of Ukraine. The largest land war in Europe since World War II continues to consume personnel and materiel at a disturbing rate. While the costs of this war continue to mount, neither side is eager to compromise, and both seek to exhaust the other’s political will and capacity to continue.
Even the recent Kursk offensive by Ukraine, while demonstrating an ability to “win” and thus sustaining Western support, does not fundamentally change the strategic correlation of forces or the trajectory of the conflict: Russian President Vladimir Putin appears convinced he can outlast the West. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy likely believes his ability to compromise is limited, given Russian brutality and the enormous sacrifices Ukraine has made to date. Further, Ukrainians fear that any pause in the fighting will only allow Russia time to rebuild its military and renew the war in the future.
Russia’s war on Ukraine is a blatant war of aggression and violation of international norms that is reshaping the geopolitical landscape. This war is leading to increased collaboration between an Axis of Upheaval consisting of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, who seek to create an alternative to the existing international order. The recent Commission on the National Defense Strategy has characterized the world we face as “the most challenging and most dangerous international security environment since World War II,” and Phillip Zelikow, respected historian and diplomat, argues we face a period of enormous risk, putting the chance of broader global war at 20–30 percent. The threats are real, and the war in Ukraine continues to consume much-needed resources while creating a risk of escalation.
While neither side is eager to compromise, there are signs that this war cannot continue forever. Russia and Ukraine both suffer from manpower and materiel shortages that will only continue to grow as the war drags on. Ukraine has long been dependent on outside support, but Russia increasingly is, as well. Finally, both sides have, at various points, indicated a willingness to negotiate, though they remain far apart on the conditions for those talks. Given all this, it is time to consider what a negotiated settlement might look like. How might this war end?
Why Now
Despite there being little appetite to compromise for either Russia or Ukraine, there are reasons why they may choose to do so. Russia surprised many with its ability to endure economic sanctions, but it cannot sustain the conflict indefinitely. Materiel and manpower costs continue to increase. Russia is reported to have suffered as many as 728,000 casualties through June 2024 and is consuming its stock of Soviet-era weapon systems at a rapid clip. Though experts debate how long Russia can sustain the war, its ability to do so at the current intensity is in large part dependent on Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean support.
While Russia continues to find sufficient manpower to continue the war, expanding mobilization efforts is politically and economically risky. In July, Putin announced a doubling of upfront payments for volunteers to fight in Ukraine, making the minimum pay of a Russian soldier in Ukraine triple the average wage in Russia. This comes as Russia’s military spending is already consuming roughly a third of the country’s budget, inflation is running at 9 percent annually, and the Russian central bank’s chairwoman is warning that “labor force and production-capacity reserves have been almost exhausted.”
Ukraine also faces manpower shortages and uncertainty over continued Western support. Under sustained pressure from Russian forces, Ukraine passed a mobilization law in April lowering the conscription age from twenty-seven to twenty-five. Passage of this law followed prolonged political tensions and the firing of General Valerii Zaluzhny, who had called for mobilizing five hundred thousand troops to sustain the war. Western support also appears unpredictable given the six-month delay in passing the last Ukraine aid bill in the United States and the reality that Germany’s proposed budget for 2025 would cut Ukraine aid in half.
Ukrainians have demonstrated an extraordinary will to resist Russian aggression throughout the war. Polls have repeatedly shown that large percentages of Ukrainians remain confident in eventual victory and reluctant to consider ceding territory to Russia. However, a July poll showed that nearly a third of Ukrainians—more than triple as many as a year before—are now willing to cede some territory to Russia to end the war. While a majority remain committed to liberating all Ukrainian territory, political maneuver space may be opening for Zelenskyy.
The administration of US President Joe Biden has repeatedly emphasized that its goal of a sovereign, independent, and secure Ukraine is central to broader European security. However, a recent Pew poll showed that only 34 percent of Americans believe Russia’s invasion poses a “major threat” to US interests, down from 50 percent in 2022, and only 48 percent feel the United States has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself. More importantly, Pew polling shows the percentage of Americans who believe the United States is providing too much aid to Ukraine has grown from 7 percent in March 2022 to 29 percent in July 2024. This type of polling highlights that public support for American aid to Ukraine has declined over time, and future support is far from certain.
There is also a growing desire to focus on China as America’s pacing threat. The 2022 National Security Strategy highlights China as the top security priority for the United States. While American spending on Ukraine is a small percentage of the defense budget, and that spending is enabling the Ukrainians to attrit the Russian military, some call for ending the war to free up resources to focus on China.
The Art of the Possible
Given Russia’s blatantly illegal aggression, it is entirely legitimate for Ukraine to remain committed to a victory that restores its pre-2014 borders and avoids Russian escalation. For Ukraine’s international supporters, insisting on such a victory as the only acceptable outcome is a morally justifiable and principled position. And to be sure, that outcome would be ideal. But given the current dynamics of the conflict, it is also unlikely. Therefore, it is worth considering how this war might end in a way that supports Ukraine and broader US security interests.
Wars rarely end in the total defeat of an adversary. Instead, wars typically end in some form of compromise. In Ukraine, this will undoubtedly be the case as Kyiv lacks the capacity to march on Moscow and, as long as Western aid continues, Russia lacks the capacity to defeat Ukraine militarily. The details of any settlement must be negotiated between combatants—something that appears remote today. Thus, what follows is not the solution to the problem of ending the war, but rather an attempt to spur thought.
As unpalatable as it is given the costs of war for Russia to date, Putin will require something to end the war. Despite being an autocrat, Putin must maintain elite and even some level of public support. If, in return for a Russian withdrawal of all forces from eastern Ukrainian territory, Ukraine were to recognize Russian sovereignty over the Donbas territory it has occupied since 2014 and give up its immediate ambition of joining NATO, Putin could claim victory even as Ukraine put its NATO ambitions on pause until Putin’s successor takes charge, whenever that may be. Putin could argue that he had fought NATO-backed forces to a standstill in Ukraine (and thereby checked NATO’s eastward expansion), safeguarded Russian nationals in Ukraine, and forced international acceptance of the Donbas as Russian. He could further argue that by forcing Ukraine to rule out joining NATO, he had mitigated the security threat he used at times as justification for invading Ukraine.
Perhaps Putin’s most challenging issue would be justifying the return of annexed territories to Ukraine. Some form of sanctions relief, internationally observed referendum, and Ukrainian assurances regarding Russian speakers or portions of the Minsk agreements could serve as a foundation. Ultimately, Putin might justify it as necessary to allow Russia to rebuild its military forces while implicitly leaving open the possibility of readdressing the situation.
Zelenskyy will be rightfully reluctant to compromise, but given the uncertainty about long-term Western support, he may ultimately decide doing so is necessary. In return for renouncing claims on the Donbas, Ukraine would regain Crimea and the annexed territories—areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts—that it likely cannot regain through force of arms while also gaining some form of security guarantees and significant economic support to rebuild its country.
While the 2024 Washington Summit reaffirmed Ukraine’s future in NATO, it also noted that an invitation will only be extended once the allies agree and conditions are met. Given the uncertainty of when that might happen, Ukraine may be better off with an alternative security guarantee. For example, a Polish tank division stationed in eastern Ukraine, along with bilateral or multilateral agreements with NATO eastern flank nations that complement the US-Ukraine bilateral security agreement signed in June, would provide increased protection against renewed Russian aggression. Further, the United States could agree to permanently station an American tank division in Poland. This would both offset the stationing of a Polish tank division in Ukraine and strengthen NATO’s deterrent against Russian aggression. It would also provide other NATO nations with time to rebuild their force capacities in the face of increased recognition of the chronic nature of the Russian threat.
Ukraine would also require substantive commitments from the West to help it rebuild its economy and infrastructure. Though the West provides significant humanitarian and financial aid today, much more will be needed. In February, the World Bank estimated that recovery and reconstruction will require around $486 billion over ten years, and those costs will only continue to climb as Russia deliberately targets Ukrainian infrastructure.
What Happens Then
To reiterate, this is not an ideal solution. Ukraine was the victim of an unprovoked invasion and had a war forced on it that has cost the nation dearly. However, a negotiated settlement—along these or other lines—mitigates against the risk of eroding Western will and uncertainty over future Western support. Meanwhile, it would provide Ukraine with the time and space to rebuild its infrastructure and economy, thus encouraging its large diaspora to return to Ukraine. Perhaps, in time, it would allow Ukraine to build a functioning and prosperous democracy that serves as a contrast to the Russian system.
For the West, a settlement reduces the near-term strain on resources and allows some refocus on China. It provides time to build up both forces and a defense industrial base to prepare for future large-scale wars. Perhaps most importantly, it allows the United States to act on the recommendations of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy.
For Russia, this would most likely simply be an opportunity to pause the bleeding and rebuild its military forces. Putin’s worldview is such that he will likely just see this as a phase in a larger confrontation with the West consistent with Russia’s 2021 Russian National Security Strategy and 2023 Foreign Policy Concept. Given this, he, or his successor, would almost certainly choose to sustain a political or irregular warfare campaign against the West while seeking to work with the Axis of Upheaval to erode US influence globally.
Counterarguments
Of course, no examination of a potential negotiated settlement is complete without due consideration of counterarguments. And given this is a war that has been fought at such cost in blood and treasure, there are bound to be counterarguments because of the sheer challenge of intellectually and emotionally accepting an imperfect outcome. Some will argue that compromise represents a moral failure and further erosion of international norms. There is a substantial element of truth to that claim. However, given the political divisions in the West and uncertainty around sustained support, there would also be a potential moral failure if Western aid were to end, potentially enabling Russia to defeat Ukraine’s conventional resistance. Such a scenario would likely result in a prolonged guerrilla war and the brutalization of Ukraine. Similarly, some would argue that absent the West providing Ukraine with the resources needed to win decisively, with the inherent risk of escalation that comes with that, this war will only drag on at an enormous cost in lives.
Others will argue that compromise rewards aggression and would embolden Russia, China, and the rest of the Axis of Upheaval. Again, there is some truth to this. However, the costs to Russia have been high, forcing others to think twice, and the West could use any pause in the fighting to build up its forces and realign resources for the broader global competition. By doing so, the West could deter similar aggression and thus avoid the risks and costs of direct large-scale war.
An Imperfect Peace and a Chance to Prepare
The Kursk offensive is the latest development in a largely stalemated war. Ukraine’s operational success will likely force Russia to reallocate resources to its border defenses at the expense of its efforts in Ukraine proper. Given Russia’s lack of proficiency in maneuver warfare to date, this will likely involve manpower-intensive fixed defenses. Ukraine may even contest the strategic initiative Russia has controlled through grinding attritional operations since late 2023. However, because the action does not meaningfully shift the war’s trajectory, the greatest value Ukraine obtains, if it is able to continue to hold Russian territory, is in the notable strengthening of Kyiv’s bargaining position—which brings the discussion back to political negotiations. While the probability of a settlement remains remote—war is, after all, highly unpredictable—it is useful to consider how this war might end, given the costs and risks involved.
If the war in Ukraine were to conclude in the manner described above, the result would be less than satisfying for all involved. Yet, fighting often concludes in unsatisfying ways—like the Korean War, for example, where the combatants fought to a standstill within the context of a broader global competition and potential conflict. A negotiated settlement may be both imperfect and the least bad alternative.
The West now faces the likelihood of a sustained political and irregular warfare campaign by the Axis of Upheaval to undermine US dominance of the international system. Bringing the Ukraine War to an unsatisfying end while increasing NATO unity and deterrence of further Russian aggression may prove to be not only more feasible than concluding the war on the battlefield, but also a better alternative than a grinding war that continues to cost lives and resources with no end in sight. And it may provide the West with the opportunity it needs to rapidly prepare for the possibility of global conflict.
Colonel Chase Metcalf is a faculty instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the Army War College. John Nagl is a retired Army officer and professor of warfighting studies at the Army War College. They work together on the Army War College Ukraine War Integrated Research Project.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Mil.gov.ua
