As the US Army embraces the challenges articulated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, its special operations forces must redefine their role in large-scale combat operations. For two decades, these forces were the tip of the operational spear, a prioritized element of US counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns. Now, they must be prepared to contribute to the joint force’s success in a very different operational environment, against a more capable adversary, and with the stakes extraordinarily high. The specific challenge for Army special operations forces is to identify—and demonstrate—how they can provide value to the joint force by employing multidomain capabilities to create effects and set conditions for victory.
The Army’s 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) recently set out to explore what form this value might take, testing multidomain concepts outlined in US Army Special Operation Command’s ARSOF (Army special operations forces) Strategy 2030. It is useful to frame this effort within the list of special operations forces’ core activities. While Army SOF primarily executed direct action operations, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense during the post-9/11 campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, large-scale combat operation (LSCO) requires ARSOF to employ the full suite of its core activities. With the 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and companies from the 98th Civil Affairs and 1st Psychological Operations Battalions, 7th Special Forces Group participated in the first ARSOF-only rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from March 25 to April 20, 2024. These units formed a combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF) and leveraged the placement and access unique to special operations forces to converge effects across the SOF, cyber, and space triad. They specifically targeted critical vulnerabilities in enemy C5ISRT (command, control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting) in the corps deep area and along the periphery to set conditions for the joint forcible entry of a conventional airborne division. Ultimately, the experience highlighted the unique capabilities special operations forces could bring to bear in a LSCO context, including developing resistance forces and enhancing partner force resilience; conducting deep and denied area sensing; enabling deep area fires; conducting deep area irregular partner force maneuver; and gaining, maintaining, and exploiting information advantage. ARSOF’s long-term irregular warfare campaigns enable access and influence through persistent presence and long-term partnerships. In turn, if leveraged properly, this access and influence can create relative advantages in competition and set conditions for victory in conflict.
The JRTC rotation identified a way ARSOF can contribute to joint force success in LSCO. Further experimentation will be vital to uncovering further ways. However, in keeping with the chief of staff of the Army’s call to strengthen the profession through writing, what follows is a description of what 7th Special Forces Group learned during its JRTC rotation.
Exercise Overview
US Army Training and Doctrine Command has developed a scenario, based on the operational environment of the Indo-Pacific region, which served as the exercise’s backdrop. SOF were persistently deployed to South Torbia during competition to build partner force capacity to defend against its bellicose neighbor, North Torbia. As the threat situation transitioned through crisis and into conflict, the CJSOTF’s mission evolved into a multidomain irregular warfare campaign against a peer adversary to set conditions for the conventional force’s joint forcible entry. After North Torbia’s invasion of South Torbia, the CJSOTF commander directed Special Forces teams (Special Forces Operational Detachments–Alpha, or SFOD-As, and Special Forces Operational Detachments–Golf, or SFOD-Gs) in South Torbia to go to ground to allow the enemy to advance past them while the CJSOTF infiltrated additional SFOD-As to link up with South Torbian resistance forces. The combined efforts of the SFOD-As, partnered with resistance and conventional host-nation forces, and SFOD-Gs compelled North Torbia to culminate short of its operational goals and prematurely transition from offense to defense. The rotation’s final phase featured the CJSOTF’s synchronized multidomain actions to set conditions for the joint forcible entry.
The CJSOTF’s concept of the operation included four phases. Phase one, set the theater, included both SFOD-As and SFOD-Gs building human and physical infrastructure. Phase two, survive, began with the enemy invasion and included the SFOD-As going to ground and permitting the enemy to advance beyond their locations. The joint force commander prioritized survivability of the SFOD-As to provide depth for future operations rather than delaying the enemy as it attacked south. Phase three, conduct reconnaissance, began as the enemy established its rear area. This phase critically enhanced the joint force commander’s understanding of the enemy’s composition and disposition. During phase four, enable the joint forcible entry, SFOD-As, by and with resistance and partnered forces, executed synchronized targets to destroy, dislocate, and disintegrate key enemy capabilities.
Setting the Theater in Competition: Depth and Operational Reach
SOF establish depth and operational reach during competition through their unique placement and access. Field Manual 3-0, Operations defines depth as “the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results.” Depth, the manual continues, can only be achieved when the commander understands enemy strengths and vulnerabilities and attacks them “throughout their dispositions in simultaneous and sequential fashion.” And operational reach is doctrinally defined as the “distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities”—in essence, the depth a unit can attain on the battlefield.
SOF’s persistent presence, long-term relationships with partner forces, and establishment of human and physical networks in competition establish the depth and operational reach required during crisis and conflict to rapidly develop the situation and synchronize effects. The depth and operational reach of forward-deployed SFOD-As in positions behind the enemy’s forward lines provide the joint force commander immediate flexibility, options, and time. As SFOD-As emerge from their go-to-ground positions, they operate in the enemy’s support area, can penetrate the enemy’s antiaccess and area-denial systems, and can force early culmination of enemy offensive operations.
In this JRTC rotation, the commander of the special operations joint task force, the CJSOTF’s higher headquarters, made a critical decision to enable CJSOTF success in establishing depth with devastating effects: he authorized SFOD-As and SFOD-Gs to conduct operational preparation of the environment activities during competition. This authority, with corresponding permissions from the ambassador, enabled teams to set the necessary conditions for success in the event of conflict. For example, the commander tasked SFOD-Gs to develop human and digital infrastructure with specific capabilities to be leveraged during crisis and conflict to extend the CJSOTF’s operational reach, gather intelligence, and provide operational support. Similarly, SFOD-As cached supplies and developed physical infrastructure enabling survivability when they would later go to ground. Failure to permit these activities during competition prevents SFOD-As and SFOD-Gs from achieving the full potential of their capabilities during crisis and conflict.
Transition to Crisis, Convergence in Conflict
The special operations joint task force commander made a second key decision by leaving the SFOD-As in place despite undeniable indicators and warnings of an impending invasion. As the enemy invaded, the SFOD-As went to ground and allowed the enemy to advance past them as it attacked south. Had the commander withdrawn the SFOD-As from the battlefield when competition transitioned to crisis, he could have only recovered depth by reinserting units of action later in the fight at far greater cost after the enemy had established its antiaccess / area-defense bubble. Infiltration of SOF in the rear of a peer enemy introduces extremely high risk. Stay-behind operations remove the high risk of infiltrating a denied area and present the more manageable risk of going to ground ahead of an enemy invasion.
Once the enemy advanced past them, SFOD-As conducted special reconnaissance, a core activity of SOF, to identify the composition and disposition of the enemy. The human and physical infrastructure the SFOD-As and SFOD-Gs built in competition through operational preparation of the environment activities now sustained the teams, allowing them to move and maneuver around the battlespace, provide medical aid and intelligence, and strike high-payoff targets. Without these capabilities, which may require years to develop during competition, the CJSOTF could not have forced the enemy’s early culmination nor adequately degraded enemy antiaccess and area-denial systems to enable the joint forcible entry.
The SFOD-As prosecuted targets from the CJSOTF and airborne division high-payoff target lists. During the targeting cycle, the CJSOTF intelligence and fires sections conducted center-of-gravity and critical-factor analysis to identify the enemy’s critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. The North Torbians’ objectives were known to be seizing energy resources and denying US force projection into South Torbia. As a result, the North Torbian military mission was to seize key energy infrastructure, aerial ports of debarkation, and seaports of debarkation. The source of power, or center of gravity, enabling this was the enemy 4th Division Tactical Group. In turn, this unit’s critical capability was the 44th Brigade Tactical Group, equipped with T-90 and T-72 tanks. The joint force was concerned these armor elements would disrupt or delay the joint forcible entry, and the CJOSTF J2—the task force’s intelligence officer—analyzed how to disrupt the enemy capabilities. Several critical requirements enabled and protected the brigade: logistics; air defense; fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; cyber; electronic warfare; and information operations. These requirements presented critical vulnerabilities across the battlefield framework in the form of logistics nodes, communication networks, radar, and electromagnetic spectrum signatures.
Understanding the enemy’s capabilities and intent two levels up from the 4th Division Tactical Group helped the CJSOTF isolate the enemy commander’s decisions critical to his success. The task force’s J2 then mapped the scale of enemy initiative and tempo to identify key transition periods. Transitions forced the enemy to push and pull capabilities between the two countries as the conflict unfolded, presenting the CJSOTF opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities and converge effects to force enemy decisions. Understanding where vulnerabilities would be and controlling operational tempo provided a proactive approach to targeting and collection rather than passively observing which decisions the enemy commanders would choose. In LSCO, the targeting process does not change, but the pace and scale at which SOF execute the process must accelerate and widen to affect the enemy on a broader scale.
The North Torbian offense culminated after seventy-two hours due to the 4th Division Tactical Group outpacing its supply lines. As the enemy established hasty defensive positions and its operational tempo slowed, the US SOF and partner force’s operational tempo accelerated, focusing on the already vulnerable class III (fuel), V (ammunition), and IX (repair parts) supply depots in the enemy support zone. This marked the first transition point in the conflict for both friendly and enemy forces: the enemy could no longer sustain offensive operations, and friendly forces pivoted from a preeminent focus on survivability to deliberate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Here, the CJSOTF employed the SOF, cyber, and space triad to simultaneously converge effects against the enemy. After disrupting enemy sustainment, the CJSOTF shifted its targeting focus to the remaining air defense, command-and-control, and fires capabilities that provided protection to the armor elements centered on the defense of energy infrastructure. The CJSOTF needed to neutralize these capabilities to soften the armor assets’ protection and enable the friendly airborne division’s rotary-wing assets to air assault the division for the joint forcible entry. CJSOTF targeting maximized convergence effects by prioritizing the targeting of enemy critical requirements instead of simply targeting what was available or easily identifiable.
Transition and Return to Competition
The cessation of hostilities does not trigger SOF’s retrograde. Rather, SOF’s persistent presence assists in the area’s stabilization and converts short-term gains into long-term capacity. What will undoubtedly change during transition, however, is the primacy placed on certain SOF core activities. During conflict, direct action, special reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare are critical to denying or degrading enemy influence and capabilities. However, during transition and the return to competition, SOF core activities such as foreign internal defense and civil affairs operations become increasingly important. Two critical requirements for both SOF and a host nation during this transition period are force generation operations and network development, each of which increase resilience against future acts of aggression, and reposture SOF to respond during crisis.
While often singularly focused on the generation of manpower, force generation encompasses multiple elements of force management, including training, materiel, and facilities. These actions are common to multiple SOF mission types, such as joint combined exchange training and subject matter expert exchanges, and are conducted by Special Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations personnel. While a primacy of effort is frequently given to military units, SOF is also uniquely postured to assist with force generation of political and social institutions, as well as information capabilities, each of which hardens a society against outside influence and enhances regional stability. Unfortunately, most combat training center exercises and similar training events conclude prior to testing an organization’s ability to plan for force generation. To best posture SOF for the return to competition, CJSOTF staffs must begin planning for force generation operations as soon as conflict occurs.
Another critical requirement during transition and the return to competition is the reestablishment of networks. Networks exist throughout cultures and change during the course of LSCO due to the loss of human life, critical infrastructure, and influence mechanisms. During transition, specific attention must be given to both physical and human networks in addition to the stability and resistance networks necessary to deter future conflicts. The hardening of a society against subsequent incursions occurs through the simultaneous reestablishment of these networks, which can each be leveraged to degrade threat actor influence during competition, crisis, and conflict. Finally, the establishment of networks by SOF assists conventional forces when conducting stability operations in areas arrested from enemy control by enabling the rapid consolidation of gains and return to civilian control.
Exercise Gaps and Way Ahead
During JRTC 24-06, 7th Special Forces Group experimented on multiple fronts, gathering lessons that will undoubtedly spur innovation across the United States Special Operations Command and the wider Army. However, opportunities were also missed, which must be addressed prior to future conflicts. The largest of these was the ability to achieve true integration between SOF and conventional forces, due to 24-06 being a SOF-only rotation. This lack of integration manifested in three primary forms: technical, physical, and relational. Each of these gaps must be addressed by increasing habitual relationships and aligning technical systems that allow seamless communication.
One of the largest exercise gaps was the ability to utilize technical means to achieve integration between the joint force’s SOF and conventional forces as well as partner nation entities. While 7th Special Forces Group remedied many communications architecture issues that were internal to the CJSOTF, the fact that SOF, conventional forces, and partner forces utilize different platforms for their common operational pictures and common intelligence pictures (COP and CIP) was a complication 7th Special Forces Group could not address during the exercise. The current lack of a COP and CIP standard across the Army and joint force requires operations and intelligence professionals to understand not only their own architecture, but also how to connect with other units’ and agencies’ architectures. This is complicated further by classification requirements when corresponding with host nation and coalition partners.
Another exercise gap was the inability of the CJSOTF to physically integrate with a division or corps. While advanced operations bases and SFOD-As are accustomed to integrating with battalions or brigades during combat training center rotations, the SOF staff at the group level rarely has the opportunity to observe, understand, and contribute to operations at echelons above brigade. Due to the fact that combat training center rotations are executed by brigades, the natural solution to this gap is increased SOF group participation in Warfighter exercises, the capstone event for divisions and corps. This would not only develop personal relationships that will pay dividends on the battlefield, but would also allow SOF to refine liaison packages, mission-essential tasks, and supporting collective tasks that posture SOF for success at echelon. By failing to integrate, SOF puts divisions and corps at a disadvantage when planning for LSCO and reinforces the divide created by over twenty years of post-9/11 operations.
Similarly, in the past two decades SOF often enjoyed the benefit of being the supported command during counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. In LSCO this paradigm will shift, causing a change in SOF’s role from the supported command to the supporting command. JRTC 24-06 challenged the CJSOTF and subordinate units to pivot from existing movement and maneuver concepts to a role Army Special Forces has not played for over two decades—the supporting unit to a corps or division attack. While SOF units of action are extremely well versed in operating with limited guidance, the shift to more prescriptive guidance and direction that supports division and corps objectives can only be understood through increased integration at multiple training venues. SOF objectives must be clearly tied to division and corps end states and a mindset shift must occur in which tactical activities are planned and executed in the context of operational effects.
7th Special Forces Group’s JRTC rotation tested a way ARSOF operates in LSCO by providing deep sensing throughout the competition continuum to converge multidomain effects and enable offensive maneuver by the joint force. SOF’s persistent presence, cultural knowledge, long-term relationships, and distinct capabilities set the theater for and provide unique value to joint force commanders. Still, much room for growth exists and ARSOF must continue testing these multidomain concepts. Doing so is crucial to ensure that ARSOF will be ready to support and enable victory in LSCO’s first fight.
Major Richard Fetters is a Special Forces officer and the outgoing deputy S-3 for 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He looks forward to continuing to inform SOF’s role in LSCO in his next assignment at JRTC’s Special Operations Training Detachment.
Major Brigid Hickman is the intelligence officer for 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). She is an alum of the Bradley Fellowship (OSD/JCS Internship Program) and was a 2021 Modern War Institute nonresident fellow. She cofounded the professional development blog Thought to Action.
Major Ryan Jones is the outgoing intelligence officer for 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He previously served in the Joint Special Operations Command and has over a decade of experience targeting in competition, crises, and conflict across multiple areas of responsibility.
Major Josh Reed is the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) future operations planner and civil affairs officer. He previously served in 5th Special Forces Group and the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion with deployments at the SOTF and civil affairs team levels in multiple areas of responsibility.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or those of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces Command, US Army Special Operations Command, and US Special Operations Command.
Image credit: Cpl. Craig J. Carter, US Army
Is the following worthy of consideration?:
In the Old Cold War of yesterday, when the Soviets/the communists were the ones seeking to achieve revolutionary political, economic, social and value change more both at home and abroad, this, more along Soviet/communist lines back then — and when the U.S./the West, thus existentially threatened back then, became the ones attempting to contain and roll back these such revolutionary changes — back then, U.S. and allied/partner special forces could more easily find indigenous population groups to work with throughout the world; this because, back then, these such indigenous population groups' ways of life, ways of governance, values, etc. — much like our own — were being existentially threatened by the Soviets/the communists.
After the Old Cold War, however, when the U.S./the West became the ones seeking to achieve revolutionary political, economic, social and value change more throughout the world (in our case, more along market-democracy lines) — and when nations such as Russia and China, thus existentially threatened, became the ones attempting to contain and roll back these such revolutionary changes — Russia, China and their allied/partner special forces, it would seem, became the ones who might more easily find indigenous population groups to work with throughout the world; this, because these such indigenous populations groups' ways of life, ways of governance, values, etc. — much like those of Russia and China — are the ones, today, which are being existentially threatened, in this case, by the U.S./the West?
Thus, one might suggest that, today — as relates to the U.S./the West and our allies and partners special forces being able to find indigenous population groups to work with — to achieve our "achieve revolutionary change more along market-democracy lines" goals — this will need to be done by, with and through those indigenous folks ls who wish to overthrow and replace — and therefore not protect, defend and/or champion as in Old Cold War days — their time-honored (but now considered outdated?) ways of like, their time-honored (but now considered outdated?) ways of governance and their time-honored (but now considered outdated) values?
Based on the matters that I present above, other exercises for our special forces to be involved in today, these such other exercises would seem to need to feature:
a. The U.S./the West being involved in activities (both here at home in the U.S./the West and there abroad elsewhere) to transform the states and societies of the world (to include our own); these, more along contemporary/ultra-modern U.S./Western political, economic, social lines. (I.E., more along what might be called more "progressive" lines.) Feature:
b. Such entities such as Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists — and even individuals and groups here within the U.S./the West itself — thus existentially threatened — being involved in activities (both here at home in the U.S./the West and there abroad elsewhere) to prevent, to contain and/or to roll back these such unwanted transformative attempts (and/or successes).
In this such exercises, we would need to find:
a. U.S./Western special forces working more by, with and through the more liberal elements of the states and societies of the world; this, to achieve the transformative goals of the U.S./the West. And find:
b. Russian, Chinese, Iranian, N. Korean, Islamist special forces personnel working more by, with and through the more conservative elements of the states and societies of the world; this, to prevent, to contain and/or to roll back these such unwanted transformative attempts/success.
Note that — with exercises developed as I describe above — U.S./Western special forces would seem to be better prepared for ALL of the conflicts that we find ourselves ourselves involved in today, for example, (a) the so-called "war on terror" — against Islamists — who do not want to be transformed more along contemporary/ultra-modern U.S./Western political, economic, social and/or value lines, (b) the so-called "great power competition" — against Russia and/or China — who do not want to be transformed more along these such lines, (c) the so-called "war with lesser states and societies" — such as N. Korea and Iran — who also do not want to be transformed more along these lines and even (d) the internal conflict occurring within the U.S./the West today — wherein, certain populations groups here in the U.S./the West do not wish to be so "progressively" transformed. (In this later case, of course, Congress would need to first modify/end Posse Comitatus?)
Note: Given that ALL of the "enemy" entities involved in the conflicts/the conflict-types that I describe above; not that ALL of these such enemies have (a) a common cause (prevent, contain and/or roll back unwanted transformations) and (b) a common enemy (U.S./Western governments); given this such observation, then should not our special forces exercises also incorporate within them the possibility/the eventuality/the reality that these such diverse "enemy" folks — in certain circumstances — might even come to considering each other as each other's natural ally? Example:
"Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past." (See "The American Interest" article "The Reality of Russian Soft Power" by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
Question: Given the matters that I present above, have I suggested special forces exercises that are appropriate — or at least somewhat more appropriate — to the conflicts/the conflict-types that we find ourselves in today???
Let me "clean up" my last paragraph above. It should read:
Thus, one might suggest that, today — as relates to the U.S./the West and our allies and partners' special forces being able to find indigenous population groups to work with — to achieve our "achieve revolutionary change more along market-democracy lines" goals — this will need to be done by, with and through those indigenous folks who wish to overthrow and replace — and therefore not protect, defend and/or champion as in Old Cold War days — their time-honored (but now considered outdated?) ways of life, their time-honored (but now considered outdated?) ways of governance and their time-honored (but now considered outdated) values?
Here is the second to last article from our article above:
"Similarly, in the past two decades SOF often enjoyed the benefit of being the supported command during counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. In LSCO this paradigm will shift, causing a change in SOF’s role from the supported command to the supporting command. JRTC 24-06 challenged the CJSOTF and subordinate units to pivot from existing movement and maneuver concepts to a role Army Special Forces has not played for over two decades—the supporting unit to a corps or division attack. While SOF units of action are extremely well versed in operating with limited guidance, the shift to more prescriptive guidance and direction that supports division and corps objectives can only be understood through increased integration at multiple training venues. SOF objectives must be clearly tied to division and corps end states and a mindset shift must occur in which tactical activities are planned and executed in the context of operational effects."
Question:
During the entirety of the Old Cold War, and since then, were U.S. Army Special Forces often/ever used to support division and corps attack/objectives? And, if so, how and where were they used, were they successful and what lessons were learned?