Since 2019, academics, government analysts, and civil society watchdogs from across the world have increasingly raised alarms about Russia’s expanding disinformation campaigns in Africa. These Kremlin manipulations aim to advance authoritarian narratives, deepen societal divisions, and erode trust in democratic institutions—all in service of Russia’s objectives. The most urgent of these concerns are voiced by African governments, heads of state, African-authored studies, African fact-checking websites, and civil society organizations, documenting Russia’s growing influence through digital platforms and covert media operations.
Despite this, some remain skeptical about the magnitude and impact of these efforts. But as Russia’s influence operations expand across the continent, the skepticism risks becoming an inadvertent assist to Moscow’s denials of its underhanded influence efforts. Moreover, it risks blinding observers to the tangible effects of Russian disinformation in Africa. Only once a consensus view of Russian efforts and their impacts is reached can practical steps for countering this growing threat be developed.
The Growing Threat of Russian Influence Operations
In recent years, Russia has steadily increased its efforts to influence African politics and societies through disinformation and covert information manipulation. These operations are part of a broader strategy by Russia to undermine democracy in Africa and promote authoritarian alternatives. From fake articles and social media manipulation tactics to covert media networks, Russia’s campaigns target African countries with a clear agenda: to amplify social divisions, foster distrust in democratic systems, and brand Russia as a friend of Africa.
For example, the US State Department recently uncovered a secret Russian campaign involving RT (formerly Russia Today) and its African Stream network, which used platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube to reach millions of African users. This operation was part of a broader set of Kremlin campaigns—now numbering at least eighty—to influence political discourse, promote anti-Western narratives, and elevate Russian-backed authoritarian figures in Africa.
In another case, Russia’s influence operations in the Central African Republic began as a shadow campaign to manipulate public sentiment but have since evolved into a deeply entrenched and ruthlessly effective system. Ephrem Yalike, a former Central African journalist turned Russian-paid disinformer, recently exposed how Wagner-linked disinformation networks infiltrated local media, spreading pro-Kremlin narratives through hidden intermediaries, financial incentives, and intimidation. These efforts have not only destabilized the country but also fostered deep anti-Western sentiment and further entrenched authoritarian rule.
The scale and growing sophistication of these campaigns are deeply concerning. Russia has invested heavily in developing a network of radio stations, television networks, doppelgänger websites, social media accounts, paid influencers, and on-the-ground support groups to push its agenda across Africa. These assets produce, plant, and continually cross-circulate false and inauthentic content, including cartoons, TikTok videos, AI-generated voiceovers, articles purporting to be by African journalists, and staged conspiracies. The content they generate is not only deceptive but also strategically designed to exploit local grievances, inflame tensions, and weaken democratic institutions. These efforts are clearly having an impact, as seen in the increasing acceptance of Russian-backed narratives in certain African countries, which is undermining the ability of citizens to engage in constructive discourse.
Misconceptions and Misplaced Skepticism
Despite the mounting evidence, a vocal segment of scholars and policy analysts has raised doubts about the extent of Russia’s influence in Africa. These skeptics argue that Western emphasis on Russian disinformation is overblown or misdirected.
One camp criticizes the focus on Russian activities as a distraction from the region’s real problems and drivers of instability: a lack of democratic governance, violent extremist groups, and unjust economic practices, among others. They suggest that Western powers are using the Russia narrative to deflect attention from their own historical shortcomings in Africa’s challenges. Moreover, this group tends to argue that the Western view of Africa is too often through the lens of Russian activities rather than through a bilateral or multilateral lens.
Another group of critics, particularly from within Africa, views the focus on Russian disinformation as condescending. They argue that it underestimates the agency and political sophistication of African nations, portraying them as passive victims of foreign manipulation rather than active agents shaping their own futures. These critics often point to longstanding discontent with Western powers, particularly France, as evidence that anti-Western sentiments are not new or entirely shaped by external actors.
Finally, some Russian sympathizers dismiss the idea that Russia’s information operations in Africa represent a unique threat. They claim that Russia’s influence in Africa is merely an extension of traditional power dynamics, and that Moscow enjoys far less influence in Africa than commentators believe.
As recent history around Ukraine has shown, too many observers have underestimated Russia’s capacity to manipulate and obfuscate. By dismissing the impact of Russian interference campaigns, these observers now risk playing into the hands of Russia in Africa, naively giving Vladimir Putin a pass while remaining unaware of the complexities of contemporary influence tactics.
Addressing the Disconnect: Why Russian Influence Operations Matter
Skepticism about Russian influence operations in Africa often stems from misunderstandings about the evolving nature of influence campaigns and how experts study them. Critics who dismiss Russian manipulation fail to grasp the full scope of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) tactics. Unlike a comparatively narrower focus on traditional disinformation or propaganda, the comprehensive FIMI framework allows for a more complete analysis of foreign-backed influence operations—encompassing deceptive content, coercive tactics, and algorithmic amplification. By drawing concepts from cybersecurity and hybrid warfare, FIMI shifts the focus from isolated falsehoods to the broader strategies that enable foreign actors to manipulate information ecosystems at scale.
The field has moved beyond early debates over terminology to a more standardized approach, with clear definitions and taxonomies that facilitate systematic documentation of FIMI attacks. Yet, many still conflate disinformation with misinformation and FIMI with conventional democratic influence tactics, a misunderstanding that obstructs productive discussions on the issue.
Recent developments in FIMI research have revealed a shift in how Russia’s campaigns operate. Key findings show how Kremlin attacks are less about convincing with falsehoods and more about shifting discourse through their algorithmic muscle toward “simplistic, populist narratives, paving the way for extreme, authoritarian ideologies.” Whereas early disinformation efforts relied heavily on “coordinated inauthentic behavior” the latest operations have moved to employing more deniable methods, such as the use of spreader accounts and locally recruited influencers to amplify narratives while disguising state involvement. This shift makes it harder to trace the true origins of these campaigns and more difficult for governments to counter them effectively. Recent research is beginning to show how these spreader networks are burrowing in across Africa, using local languages and deeply embedding pro-Russian and antidemocratic messages into the political landscape of multiple African nations.
These influence methods are incremental, often taking years to fully unfold, and require advanced training in computational networks to track. Depending on the political structure of a target country, some of these campaigns target protest movements while others are more narrowly tailored to reach and influence a country’s online political elites. These subtle and calibrated forms of influence that Russia is deploying in Africa have already destabilized governments, harmed public health initiatives, and perpetuated authoritarian agendas. It must be addressed as part of any strategy to support democracy and uphold sovereignty in Africa.
Steps to Counter Russian Influence Operations
The response to Russian influence operations in Africa should expand to match the scale of the threat. African governments, civil society organizations, and media outlets are working to build capacity to identify and resist foreign interference, but they need sustained support. This requires investing in a community of African counter-FIMI professionals trained to detect, analyze, and expose campaigns before they take root. These practitioners—journalists, fact-checkers, cybersecurity experts, and media literacy educators—can serve as frontline defenders of their countries’ information ecosystems, equipping both policymakers and the public with the tools to make informed decisions.
A practical approach to countering FIMI involves bolstering professional training with structured collaboration, data-driven analysis, and public engagement. African researchers, journalists, and civil society organizations are already leading these efforts, working to uncover influence campaigns and assess their local impact. However, expanding and formalizing these networks—through regional training hubs, cross-border investigative partnerships, and shared analytical frameworks—would enhance their ability to rapidly track and counter evolving Russian tactics. Meanwhile, strengthening multilateral cooperation, particularly through African Union and regional political organization initiatives and partnerships with democratic allies, can help ensure a more coordinated, adaptive response to foreign influence campaigns.
The security sector has a role to play but must operate within clearly defined boundaries to avoid politicization and overreach. African military and law enforcement agencies can contribute by securing communication channels, monitoring FIMI threats, and developing strategic communication capabilities to preempt and counter security-related disinformation. However, their involvement should be limited to safeguarding the information space from foreign manipulation rather than engaging in content moderation or narrative control of authentic content. To ensure their contributions are effective and appropriately scoped, security forces should develop a strategic understanding of threats in the information environment, emphasize multistakeholder countermeasures, and receive regular training on emerging FIMI tactics. Counter-FIMI efforts will remain more effective when they are civilian led, with security actors supporting rather than leading the response.
While technical expertise is vital, long-term resilience requires investment in democratic institutions that can withstand external manipulation. This includes supporting independent media, promoting civic engagement, and ensuring African-led governance strategies are at the forefront of counter-FIMI efforts. With US policies and aid under review, prioritizing resources for these initiatives would not only help counter Russian influence but also reinforce stable, self-sustaining information environments in one of the world’s most strategically significant regions.
Prioritizing the Threat
While skepticism is healthy in seeking to understand any emerging phenomenon, it should not cloud the reality of Russia’s efforts to manipulate public opinion and destabilize democratic processes in Africa. The evidence is clear that Russian influence operations are real, pervasive, and growing. Addressing this threat requires a coordinated and multifaceted approach, focusing on strengthening information resilience, supporting genuinely democratic governance, and countering foreign interference through both local and international efforts.
It is time to move the debate beyond the existence of this threat and focus on the practical steps needed to safeguard the future of African democracy and sovereignty from foreign manipulation.
Dr. Mark Duerksen is a counter-FIMI expert advisor for Africa, with experience mapping, analyzing, and mitigating foreign malign influence in the information space. He has guided and worked with NATO StratCom, the EU’s European External Action Service, and dozens of African counter-disinformation organizations to develop partner-led strategies that strengthen information resilience across the continent.
Dr. Jason Warner is the director of research, a senior Africa analyst, and a senior terrorism analyst at the US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, part of the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. He is a nonresident fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Africa Program.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: WwJLaik (modified by MWI)
