Hezbollah may need to resort to homing pigeons. Last week, more 2,500 people in Lebanon and Syria were reported injured and at least ten killed by exploding pagers—yes, pagers. The incident, during which the devices exploded virtually simultaneously, seemed to target members and affiliates of Lebanese Hezbollah, a group designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization. Israel is likely behind the attack. One day later, thousands of two-way personal radios used by Hezbollah members in Lebanon also detonated.

In the wake of the attack, the Wall Street Journal published a report describing the analog system by which Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas, issues commands to his followers. Handwritten, encoded notes delivered by a stable of fleet-footed couriers—a medieval solution to dire constraints.

There are at least two puzzles here. First, pagers, walkie-talkies, and penciled messages are not the cutting-edge tools we tend to expect to be wielded by high-capacity terrorist organizations. Second, Hezbollah’s innovative use of low-tech communications devices seemingly backfired in spectacular fashion. What do these dynamics mean for our understanding and treatment of terrorist innovation?

Our research offers insight into the logic and risks of terrorist innovation and the distinct ways in which terrorist organizations integrate technology into their operations. Rather than a glitch in the matrix, the cases identified above are consistent with the logic of terrorist innovation and offer an important reminder that innovation often doesn’t produce the outcomes it is intended to. Moreover, we argue that groups under tight constraints are compelled to accept the risks that may come with innovation.

Why Does This Matter?

Assumptions about the process of terrorist innovation directly shape where the counterterrorism mission community looks for warnings, collects intelligence, assesses threats, and develops deterrence and prevention measures.

Innovation doesn’t always work. Exhibit A: Hezbollah pagers. Estimates are that 80 to 90 percent of creative ideas fail; yet creativity is required where constraints are severe. Circumventing a skilled and diligent counterterrorism force requires novel approaches. And some groups are better positioned to employ innovative ideas and connect these to desired outcomes than others.

Of course, terrorists are not the only party innovating. For counterthreat efforts, innovations can also expose terrorists to a different set of vulnerabilities. The Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah pagers was a masterstroke. There is a back-and-forth between counterterrorism forces and terrorist forces, as both sides strain to stay on the forward edge of the innovation curve. The Israeli one-two punch not only puts a dent in Hezbollah’s command-and-control apparatus, but it also lands a major blow on morale, cohesion, and trust in leadership.

Terrorist Organizations and the Impetus for Innovation

Terrorist groups champion political aims and use violence to bring about those objectives through fear and intimidation, often targeting the most vulnerable in a society.

Historically, the odds of success—and even survival—are rarely in terrorists’ favor.

Terrorist organizations operate in environments often characterized by tight surveillance, time-tested security measures, and a lethal state apparatus. Coordinated arrests and high value targeting operations have been the demise of many an upstart militant cell. Terrorism scholar Brian Philips, for example, finds in a metastudy that “on average about 50 percent of terrorist organizations do not make it past their first year.”

For terrorist leaders and organizations, concealment and cover are at a premium. This is particularly true for those operating in urban environments.

But here’s the rub; while remaining clandestine, terrorist commanders must maintain basic mechanisms of command and control as well as the capacity for lethality. Innovation offers the means to walk the tightrope.

Innovation centers on solving a problem or challenge with the implementation of an idea that, by standard definitions of creativity, is both novel and useful. Yet there is an oft-forgotten third dimension of creative performance that has particular relevance here. Namely, creative ideas are also characterized by their elegance as well as novelty and utility. Elegance, colloquially speaking, refers to the generation of ideas that produce solutions with the fewest moving parts needed for the novel solution to function. Elegant ideas are robust, stand up to shifting sands, and can be counted on in proverbial bad weather.

The takeaway here is that creativity and innovation need not be flashy or modern. Indeed, simple solutions not yet dreamt of by an adversary are a ripe area for creativity. To equate innovation with high tech is to miss that the novel idea must work and do so consistently. Overwrought designs increase the likelihood of failure. See, for example, perspiration from a foot dampening the sophisticated but sensitive combination of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) and triacetone triperoxide (TATP) in an innovative shoe bomb and preventing it from igniting. See, as a counter illustration, the AK-47, whose simplicity and novel design made it the most produced firearm in history. Elegance means more consistent success.

Terrorism, Technology, and Malevolent Innovation

Worldwide, violent extremists are innovating, they are adopting creative means of sustaining their organizations or creating harm and disruption. In many cases, this is made possible by new—or old—technology.

Emerging commercial, off-the-shelf technologies can open newfound pathways to circumventing security protocols, they provide grounds for tactical surprise, and they can expose new targets and vulnerabilities. As a result, much of today’s terrorist innovation hinges on an increasingly accessible suite of new technologies. These are integrated into various stages of the terrorist radicalization, mobilization, and attack cycles. Small drones deliver explosives. Artificial intelligence streamlines the generation of propaganda content. Extended reality can be leveraged for recruitment and training.

In other cases, seeking an edge over counterterrorism forces, some terrorists favor the simple over the sophisticated. Terrorists can anticipate certain benefits from the creative use of basic technology. We highlight three such benefits below.

First, low-tech methods are generally more accessible and affordable. This has certain desirable operational implications. For group members, the threshold of knowledge, skills, and abilities required to operate basic technology is lower, as is the related training burden for the organization. Firearms, basic explosives, and edged weapons remain the predominant tools of terrorist operations worldwide. Basic technology supporting battlefield tactics or intragroup communications can be more readily distributed and employed across the rank and file at speed and scale.

Second, in the case of communications, low-tech methods present security forces with unique surveillance challenges. This permits terrorist commanders to, at least temporarily, pass between the horns of the concealment-versus-control dilemma. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah reportedly ordered members in February to stop using cell phones in favor of other methods such as pagers and landlines. A source reportedly close to Hezbollah put it this way in July: “When you face certain technological advances, you need to go back to the old methods—the phones, the in-person communications . . . whatever method allows you to circumvent the technology.”

Finally, from an operational standpoint, low-tech methods can capitalize on cognitive blind spots to achieve tactical surprise. The October 2017 New York City truck-ramming attack changed how law enforcement agencies assess the potential threat presented by vehicles and identify related suspicious activity. Inspired by ISIS, Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov drove a rented Home Depot pickup truck into cyclists and runners on a bike path alongside the Hudson in Manhattan. Eight people were killed, and eleven more injured. As illustrated in this attack and others like it, low-tech methods have the related benefit of requiring little preparation and using common items, reducing the footprint of warning indicators that may be tracked to proactively counter plots and attacks.

Looking Ahead

As we’ve written elsewhere, terrorists are sometimes adopters of high-tech innovations and sometimes the core drivers of that innovation. And this is decidedly not the time to pull our eye away from terrorist malign exploitation of emerging commercial technologies. But this should be couched in a broader understanding of how and why terrorists innovate. In some cases, a pivot to a creative low-tech solution will be in terrorists’ best interest. As the extremism landscape continues to evolve and shift, we should be ready for the breadth of novel attacks made capable by an innovative collection of adversaries.

Dr. Austin Doctor is a political scientist at the University of Nebraska Omaha and the head of counterterrorism research initiatives at the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education (NCITE) Center, a Department of Homeland Security center of excellence. He has served as a nonresident fellow with the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point as well as the National Strategic Research Institute, a Department of Defense university affiliated research center. His research focuses on militant actors, terrorism and political violence, irregular warfare, and emerging threats. X: @austincdoctor.

Dr. Sam Hunter is the Regents-Foundation professor of industrial and organizational psychology at the University of Nebraska Omaha and head of strategic initiatives at the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Education, and Technology (NCITE) Center, a Department of Homeland Security center of excellence. His research focuses on leadership and innovation, spanning both malevolent and benevolent application. X: @dr_samhunter.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image: Hezbollah member participates in a training exercise in southern Lebanon on May 21, 2023. (Source: Tasnim News Agency)