Editor’s note: In this article for the RUSI journal, Emily Knowles and MWI Non-Resident Fellow Dr. Jahara Matisek identify how security force assistance is failing due to its technical focus on developing military effectiveness when SFA could be better used to stabilize political settlements between various formal and informal security actors in weak states.
The failure of two costly military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to establish a viable state has led some commentators to announce the death of the nation-building project. This has led to a Western emphasis on increasing security force assistance (SFA) as a way of supporting host-nation security forces who are now shouldering the bulk of the front-line fighting against various violent nonstate actors. Such “outsourcing” is an attempt at making host-nation security forces more lethal and effective, but this can have second- and third-order effects that strategically undermine such a tactical focus in the long term. Of course, the broader problem with this Western SFA approach is the flawed thought process that small intervening forces—such as American Special Forces and SFABs and British SIBs—can make the armed forces, in an otherwise ineffective state, effective.
While there are many practical reasons why SFA efforts fail, we contend there is a greater problem: failure of vision. This article uses the example of international humanitarian law (IHL) courses to show that technical training (i.e., host-nation military effectiveness) does not fix political problems. Instead, for SFA to succeed in these fragile environments, it must be approached as part of a political peacebuilding process between different security actors and their civilian counterparts. This means focusing on civil-military relations, which in turn requires local ownership of the process, timelines, and objectives. Case studies of Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service, Somalia’s Danab (“lighting force”), the Malian armed forces, Cameroon’s elite Rapid Intervention Battalion, and Chad’s military are all considered in context of how Western SFA is influencing the behavior of these militaries and their respective governments.
Emily Knowles is Director of the Remote Warfare Programme at the Oxford Research Group. She has conducted research on military partnerships throughout Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East since 2014 including fieldwork in Iraq (2017), Afghanistan (2017), Mali (2018) and Kenya (2018).
Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek completed his PhD in Political Science at Northwestern University on the topic of creating strong African armies and how weak states redefine military effectiveness. He is an officer in the US Air Force, an assistant professor in the Military and Strategic Studies department at the US. Air Force Academy, and a non-resident fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Sgt. Heather Doppke, US Army
From the beginning of our item above:
"The failure of two costly military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to establish a viable state has led some commentators to announce the death of the nation-building project."
This "problem statement" would seem to be wrong. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were viable states prior to our military interventions. Thus our military interventions must have been undertaken to achieve some other result.
In order to understand what this "other result" might be — and to be able to discuss such things as "international humanitarian law" and "nation-building" in relation to same — the following paper, by Sir Adam Roberts, is offered:
Excerpt:
"Within the existing framework of international law, is it legitimate for an occupying power, in the name of creating the conditions for a more democratic and peaceful state, to introduce fundamental changes in the constitutional, social, economic, and legal order within an occupied territory? … These questions have arisen in various conflicts and occupations since 1945 — including the tragic situation in Iraq since the United States–led invasion of March–April 2003. They have arisen because of the cautious, even restrictive assumption in the laws of war (also called international humanitarian law or, traditionally, jus in bello) that occupying powers should respect the existing laws and economic arrangements within the occupied territory, and should therefore, by implication, make as few changes as possible."
https://weblearn.ox.ac.uk/access/content/user/1044/ajil_-_roberts_on_tr…
The title of the article by Sir Adam Roberts — to which I point to and provide an excerpt above — is:
"TRANSFORMATIVE MILITARY OCCUPATION: APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR AND HUMAN RIGHTS"
Re: "peacebuilding," given the "respect the existing law and economic arrangements within the occupied territory" requirements of the laws of war/international humanitarian law/jus in bello — outlined by Sir Adam Roberts above — for comparison, should we:
a. Look at how Putin operated in Chechnya (see "Islamization" in the quoted item I provide below) and then:
b. Compare this to how the U.S./the West operated in Afghanistan (think "advancing market-democracy?"):
"In spite of the destruction caused by the Russians, Putin appears to have adopted Colin Powell’s famous Pottery Barn rule – ‘you break it, you buy it’. Between 2000 and 2010 the Russian government has spent 27 billion dollars on reconstruction in Chechnya (Shaefer 2011, p. 281), with a further $80 billion pledged to the North Caucasus region as a whole by 2025 (Judah 2013). When Ramzan became President of Chechnya in 2007 significant funds were given over to the republic and Grozny was rebuilt quickly. Kadyrov has undertaken a campaign of ‘Islamization’, building the largest mosque in Europe, enforcing the wearing of headscarves and limiting alcohol sales (Ucko 2016, p. 51). Whether this was a genuine drive to make Chechnya more pious, or simply a ploy to steal ground from the radicals, Kadyrov has consolidated control. After years of devastating war, peace is a high priority for many in Chechnya."
(See the Small Wars Journal article entitled: "The Other Side of the COIN: The Russians in Chechnya" by Joss Meakins)
Thus, re: such things as "peacebuilding," only now are we coming to fully understand the reasoning/the logic behind the laws of war/international humanitarian law/jus in bello; laws/guidelines which, if followed:
a. Obviously stood directly in the way of the "advancing market-democracy" mission that we had embarked upon, post-the Cold War, throughout the world but which:
2. Clearly provided a/the means for achieving/restoring peace — in various locales throughout the world?
Is there a way to access the linked RUSI Journal article without paying $44.00? Perhaps a common library or military portal that has access to this journal?
Greetings to all in this thread and to those at MWI:
May I repeat and endorse the good question posted above by Michael:
Is there some way to access the hyperlink to that cited RUSI Journal article without paying $44.00? Perhaps a common library or military portal that has access to this journal?
This situation of a paywall seems a self-defeating approach by MWI to inform and support those of us in the DOD community involved and engaged in the success of the (ahem) "SFA Enterprise."