Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our weekly War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We invite a participant to recommend five books and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.
This week’s installment comes from the War Books archives. It features a set of books to help readers better understand a topic that has only grown in importance since we first published this list: Russian information warfare.
In 2011, a Russian Ministry of Defense white paper defined information warfare “as the ability to . . . undermine political, economic, and social systems; carry out mass psychological campaigns against the population of a state in order to destabilize society and the government; and force a state to make decisions in the interest of their opponents.” Russian information warfare is the subject of extensive debate among policymakers, soldiers, and scholars—as well as a tremendous amount of hype, confusion, and international finger-pointing. This is because, as I have discussed elsewhere, Russia’s own definition of the term is a neat summary of Kremlin paranoia over how a foreign power could subvert the government with a “color revolution,” as well as a description of what many Westerners fear Russia is doing to undermine democracies around the world.
The following books have helped me understand why information warfare has a unique place in Russian strategic culture.
Generation П, by Victor Pelevin (translated into English by Andrew Bromfield as Homo Zapiens)
To understand the role of information in Russian statecraft, you must understand Russian attitudes toward the role of information in politics and decision making. In this hilarious 1999 novel, Pelevin addresses “fake news,” “deep fakes,” post–Cold War US-Russia tensions, and even international conflict over information technology. While the plot runs parallel to ancient Mesopotamian prophecy (one of its many similarities to Neal Stephenson’s brilliant Snow Crash), it touches on themes that are intensely relevant today. In Pelevin’s Russia, all politics is merely the techno-manipulation of populations by governments. “By his very nature,” a shadowy advertising executive explains at one point, “every politician is just a television broadcast.” This novel shows why Russian strategists think democracies can be manipulated—or, put another way, why they suspect all democracy is manipulation.
Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism, by Ion Mihai Pacepa and Ronald Rychlak
This book must be read with caution—but still shouldn’t be overlooked by students of Russian information warfare. Pacepa, a former chief of Romanian intelligence who worked closely with the KGB on disinformation operations during the Cold War, gets the theory behind Soviet disinformation right. “IF YOU ARE GOOD AT DISINFORMATION, YOU CAN GET AWAY WITH ANYTHING,” the KGB disinformation manual declared, in all caps, on its first page. Pacepa believes this too, and he probably overrates the impact of Soviet disinformation, especially when he unfairly accuses many Western politicians of being communist stooges. However, some of his other seemingly implausible claims, such as that the KGB pinned the Kennedy assassination on the CIA through an extensive disinformation campaign, have been corroborated by the work of historians. This book is a valuable introduction to the way former Cold Warriors on the other side of the former Iron Curtain still think about the value of deception.
The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB, by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan
The Russian intelligence services play a leading role in information warfare. Russian investigative journalists Soldatov and Borogan provide a valuable account of how the Russian intelligence services actually work. They see the weaknesses of those services more clearly than some Westerners, and in particular provide the most clear-eyed and accurate accounts of the 1999 Moscow apartment building bombings (which many suspect were a Russian false flag operation; Soldatov and Borogan argue they were not) and the disastrous 2002 Dubrovka Theater siege (which they observed in person).
The Red Web: The Kremlin’s War on the Internet, by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan
In this volume, Soldatov and Borogan examine the history of the Russian internet since the 1980s, and the Soviet and later Russian state’s obsessive attempts to censor it, which are driven in part by fears of foreign “hybrid warfare” and “color revolutions.” They see the limits of Russian censorship and information manipulation more clearly than many foreign commentators. While Russian efforts to disrupt free political discussion have been mostly effective, Soldatov and Borogan find that there is still room for free expression on parts of the Russian internet despite the Russian security organs’ best efforts.
Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia, by Peter Pomerantsev
Like Pelevin’s Generation П, this book helps the student of Russian information warfare understand how Russian leaders manipulate domestic politics—employing a toolkit they can adapt for international use. Pomerantsev argues that Russia is a “postmodern dictatorship” that is controlled through the manipulation of television and the media. This political system is both uniquely Russian and also a product of globalization. As a former producer of Russian TV, Pomerantsev is able to provide an intimate account of how it functions. He introduces the reader to gangsters, gold diggers, oligarchs, and servitors, notably the fascinating Kremlin ideologist and former Russian deputy prime minister Vladislav Surkov, who when he’s not collecting pop art has played a key role in Russia’s covert war in Ukraine.
The Invention of Russia: The Rise of Putin and the Age of Fake News, by Arkady Ostrokovsky
Ostrokovsky is a journalist and editor at The Economist. He provides a valuable and provocative account of the resurgence of Russian populist nationalism, and also provides a general account of Russian politics since 1991. Because, Ostrokovsky argues, Russia is an “idea-centric country,” the key to understanding Russian politics is understanding Russian ideas. While not every reader will agree with this thesis, his defense of it provides essential context about how Russia sees its place in the world and the narratives that the Russian government promotes internationally.
Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization, by Ofer Fridman
In a world where some see Russian conspiracies everywhere, it’s essential to understand what Russian information warfare is not. Information warfare is sometimes wrongly conflated with the Cold War practice of “active measures” or seen as part of a broader strategy of “hybrid warfare.” But the Russian concept of gibirdnaya voyna (the literal translation of hybrid warfare) is a very different thing from the hybrid warfare typically discussed in American staff colleges. To make matters worse, the West and Russia both claim hybrid warfare is an approach used by the other side. Fridman explains how Russia and the West got into such an insane blame-game in this fascinating volume, which is about the idea of hybrid warfare rather than its practice.
Red Army: A Novel of Tomorrow’s War, by Ralph Peters
Russian information warfare isn’t all about subversion; it has an important military-technical component that shapes how Russian leaders think about information technology. When Peters wrote this novel in 1989, he was a young intelligence officer in Europe. It imagines a Soviet ground invasion of West Germany. While the specific scenario is now implausible, his Soviet officers often sound like they’re at a contemporary conference on the future of war. One chief of staff is struggling with bandwidth issues, automated battle command systems, and general information overload. And in the most compelling subplot, a KGB officer, Colonel Shtein, is tasked with a key deception operation and has to convince maneuver commanders of the importance of informational objectives, while finding time to muse on the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. It’s worth revisiting today.
T.S. Allen is a former intelligence officer in the US Army. Follow him on Twitter @TS_Allen.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons
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Information warfare (etc., etc., etc.) — one might suggest — does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, information warfare (etc., etc., etc.) exists within a certain context, for example, within the context of:
a. One group of nations (exs: the Soviets/the communists and their partners and allies in the Old Cold War of yesterday; the U.S./the West and our partners and allies in the New/Reverse Cold War of today) seeking to achieve revolutionary political, economic, social and value change — both in their/our own home countries and abroad — and
b. One group of nations (exs: the U.S./the West and our partners and allies in the Old Cold War of yesterday; such nations as Russia and China and their partners and allies in the New/Reverse Cold War of today) (a) seeing these such revolutionary changes as an existential threat and (b) adopting containment and roll back strategies to counter same accordingly.
One of the ways that the "achieve revolutionary change" entities can — in their enthusiasm — make the job of the "containment and roll back" entities much easier, this is by (a) attempting to achieve too much revolutionary change and/or by (b) attempting to achieve to revolutionary change too quickly.
When the "achieve revolutionary change" entities fall into one or both of these such traps [see by "(a)" and "(b)" immediately above], then the entities doing "containment and roll back" can — rather easily — (a) join in and/or start civil wars; herein, (b) using those individuals and groups who are most adversely effected by these such — shoved down their throat — revolutionary changes.
"Narratives," thus — of the "containment and roll back" entities — these are developed and deployed so as achieve, and/or so as to support, these such civil wars.
As to the basic parts of my "context" discussion above, consider the following Old Cold War example of Nicaragua — as addressed by the famous Linda Robinson — in her New York times article "The Sandinista Decade" back in 1991:
“Blood of Brothers” is a graphic account of a country torn in half over the Sandinistas’ efforts to build a new political and economic order. Early on, Mr. Kinzer saw that Sandinista policies were alienating ordinary Nicaraguans. ‘In 1983 most Nicaraguans had still not fallen to the depths of deprivation and despair which they would reach in later years, but many were already unhappy and restive. . . . When the Sandinistas decreed that foreign trade was to be a state monopoly, they effectively declared war on these small-scale entrepreneurs. . . . [ And ] by trying to transform [ the existing system of food production ] so completely and so suddenly, they were underestimating the deeply ingrained conservatism of Nicaraguan peasants.’ …
Moreover, it was these policies that led to the Sandinistas’ crushing electoral defeat in February 1990. Until the day after the elections, most Americans believed that Nicaraguans blamed the United States, not their own Government, for their misfortunes. “Blood of Brothers” raises the unanswerable question of whether the Sandinistas might have moderated their rule had the United States not sponsored a war against them. ‘No one will ever be able to say what the comandantes would have done with their historic opportunity in Nicaragua if they had not been confronted with civil war,’ the author writes."
Conclusion:
In the "context" of the New/Reverse Cold War of today, such nations as China and Russia — and as per their containment and roll back strategies — are:
a. Using narratives, etc.; these, to:
b. Foster and/or support civil wars; this, with the intent of:
c. Preventing the U.S./the West — and our partners and allies — from being able to achieve — and/or being able to sustain — such revolutionary political, economic, social and/or value changes as we have sought to achieve at home and abroad post-the Old Cold War.
(What is it that they say about "payback?)
If democracies can be fooled, presumably quite easily and by relatively crude means, then this is something to worry about. If that is true though, then you are living in Chomsky's world described in Manufacturing Consent and the trappings of democracy are just a sham. Now, if on the other hand democracies are resilient, naturally, against such manipulation – this isn't anything to even worry about.
It is also worth considering that this whole line of belief in disinformation and manipulation comes from a country that believed they could create a New Soviet Man, but never did. That in fact the entire system of government that originated this doctrine no longer exists, having collapsed from its own detachment from reality.