Will Washington abandon its rebel proxies in Syria? Outsourcing ground operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to Syrian rebels has become the preferred option to secure national security objectives in the country. But it carries the weight of significant moral hazard and has already created a series of political embarrassments for President Obama’s administration. Continued rebel setbacks and volatile political dynamics may lead to a fate similar to Tibet’s U.S.-backed insurgency during the Cold War. Or we can learn from past mistakes and maximize the effectiveness of our proxy engagements in Syria.
Read more here at War on the Rocks.
[Photo source: New York Times]
Superb analysis here from MAJ Ferenz at WOTR! For more on Tibet and US policy see https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34445.pdf and more on Syria see https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf
As with many USG-centric discussions on unconventional warfare, this article fails to adequately consider the interests and motivations of the proxy force. While it is certainly fine and good for the USG to consider scaling its commitments and objectives, our proxy force does not have any such luxury. For USG proxies engaged in the Syrian conflict, there are two possible outcomes: win or die.
To quote Machiavelli, “If one is striking out at an opponent, one should make sure that the fatal blow is struck, successfully ending the confrontation… the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.”
We may temper our objectives in Syria to more realistically reflect the capabilities of our proxies, but anything short of the complete overthrow of Assad will likely result in widespread and bloody revenge against our proxies. And while the morality of using proxies if we do not intend to overthrow Assad is certainly debatable, any effort to “scale back” our objectives will be clearly seen by our proxies as an abandonment of them to their enemies.
Syria is another example of the USG committing to a war without truly appreciating the potential cost in treasure, blood, and national credibility. I fear that, like with many past USG proxies, our Syrian and Kurdish allies will be abandoned to their fates once the US is no longer willing to expend capital in supporting their struggle.