It should not be a controversial statement to say that soldiers are expected to follow orders. It is one of the fundamental characteristics of a military professional. But what if obedience, as a matter of principle, is not as common a character trait among soldiers as we assume it to be? Recent events suggest that perhaps it is not—and that has serious implications for the Army. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that obedience is one of the foundations upon which an effective and professional military force is built. It is also a fundamental requirement—but one whose presence and permanence is too often taken for granted—in order for the nation and its leaders to trust that the Army can and will fulfill its core function of providing land forces to implement the policies of the United States.
The COVID-19 pandemic response has been as contentious an issue within the military as it has been anywhere else in the United States. In recent months, there has been a great deal of consternation about vaccine mandates in the armed forces. As the first servicemembers have been discharged for refusing vaccination, arguments of varying credibility have continued to fly back and forth, as have justifications for exemptions. Better minds than mine will have to resolve that issue. When it comes to mandating the wearing of masks, however, there can be no such debate within the military.
No amount of mere controversy is sufficient for soldiers to justify disobeying an order. Lawful disobedience requires that the order be “palpably illegal.” Masks have been a recognized protective measure against chemical and biological threats for over a century. How to wear and use masks is taught to every servicemember within weeks of joining the military. Therefore, any argument questioning the legality of an order to wear masks is ridiculous.
Yet many soldiers of all ranks have decided to ignore masking orders. When the Department of Defense published updated mask guidance in July 2021, I was a student in my branch’s captain’s career course. My classmates and instructors had all come from a variety of backgrounds and previous assignments within the military. However, when this order was published I watched dozens of commissioned officers choose open defiance. Most were confident that their peers would see no issue, and that their immediate superiors would not enforce the policy. To an unfortunate extent, they have been correct. Insubordination had become acceptable—and in the case of masks, seemingly expected.
The behaviors of soldiers who are resistant to a military order fall into one of four categories recently described by Eric Hundman: grudging obedience, refinement, exiting service, and defiance. For a military service that requires obedience, the first three of those are acceptable. I did not expect that a masking order would get a positive reception, but I also did not expect that so many of my fellow officers would choose defiance. Many servicemembers and external observers questioned the necessity of the order. This is normal and healthy professional discussion. However, once the order has been issued, questioning whether it should be followed is antithetical to military effectiveness. Barring any legal or ethical concerns (which they must raise with their superiors rather than keep to themselves) servicemembers are duty bound to comply. Failure to do so violates the Uniform Code of Military Justice—and more abstractly but no less importantly, it breaks professional trust.
In the case of masking specifically, there is another dimension to be considered: the appearance of political partisanship. An apolitical military must maintain a nonpartisan appearance, and mask wearing (or not wearing) has become a symbol of partisan allegiance throughout the country. I do not believe that partisan signaling is necessarily the major motivator behind refusal to follow masking orders, but the resulting appearance of partisanship exists nevertheless. The reverse case, however, is not true: soldiers wearing masks cannot be sending a partisan signal, since they are merely obeying a lawful order.
As the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded us at the start of 2021, the United States military was founded on a bedrock principle of subordination to a civilian authority. Certainly, refusing to wear a mask is a relatively trivial infraction. However, history—including history within our own service—shows us that an organization’s ethics are not abandoned in an instant, but slowly discarded over time. I witnessed officers receive orders published by both civilian and uniformed superiors and elect to ignore them. This is a disturbing precedent. As soldiers we must obey lawful orders, even those that are unpleasant or with which we disagree. Otherwise, we cease to be a professional military force, and there is little left to distinguish us from an extremely well-armed mob.
What about Mission Command?
The philosophy and principles of mission command give subordinate leaders room to implement their superiors’ intent using disciplined initiative. This is the resistant behavior that Hundman characterizes as refinement. Leaders at lower echelons are best able to understand the practical ramifications of any policy implementation. General Mark Milley, the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went so far as to say that subordinates needed to exercise “disciplined disobedience” and ignore specific orders to achieve their higher commanders’ intent. On the battlefield, this enables subordinate leaders to react to changing situations and take advantage of new opportunities as they arise, without needing to seek approval from their superiors. Historically the Army has made great use of mission command, enabling victories from the defense of Little Round Top to the thunder runs into Baghdad.
Masking and other COVID-19 policies have been no different. The intent behind these orders is clear: ensure the health and safety of our force. Certain exemptions were bound to come into play. A speaker might remove his or her mask to ensure that every member of a large audience can clearly hear and understand the message. We see examples of this regularly, including in military settings, where it is not an explicitly authorized exemption. Instead, it is an example of mission command in practice. The speaker accomplishes the task at hand effectively, while remaining within the intent of the order by utilizing other mitigation measures, such as distancing. Mission accomplished, intent achieved, and the Army goes rolling along.
But that does not mean refusal is an option. Mission command has never given subordinates license to outright ignore the orders and intent of their superiors. To receive an order and directly contradict it while hiding behind the concept of subordinate initiative is to abuse mission command philosophy. Making daily life a little bit more comfortable is very far removed from achieving a commander’s intent (in this case, it was the direct opposite) and is not at all what is meant by mission command philosophy. Even as he was calling for disciplined disobedience, General Milley also emphasized that soldiers need to “be comfortable with being seriously miserable.” Mission command is an outstanding piece of doctrine, but defying an order does not fit into its philosophy. That behavior falls instead under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which clearly prohibits failure to obey a lawful order or regulation. Insubordination is not mission command, it is a crime.
How Did the Army Get to This Point?
Relying on military justice alone is not a long-term answer here. The number of officers I saw in violation and the diversity of their backgrounds leads me to conclude that this is a broader, more institutionalized problem. To solve it, the Army is going to have to examine how it got to this point and the psychological dynamics at play. As a cadet at the United States Military Academy and in my professional military education since commissioning, we spent a significant amount of time learning about the psychology of effective leadership. We studied emotional intelligence, bases of power, motivational theories, organizational culture, and more. For good reason, too. The techniques of building shared understanding and getting subordinate buy-in are more effective than simply relying on the authority of rank.
But the focus on leadership psychology in these educational settings came at a cost. We did not spend nearly as much time and effort teaching about the need for subordination and why we must rapidly execute an order, even one we may not fully understand. We did not emphasize that we must drill this practice as part of our normal routines. We did not explore the practical and ethical implications of failing to do so. As a result, leaders took away an implicit lesson that if they had to rely on their rank to force an order through, they were bad at their job. Both the significance of rank and the lawful authority implicit in it are consequently diminished. In extreme cases, the risk that results is that orders are not obeyed solely because they are lawfully given, but analyzed based on perceptions of quality. Simultaneously, the same processes result in leaders who are unwilling to enforce obedience among their subordinates. If resorting to the Uniform Code of Military Justice is tantamount to admitting that you are a bad leader, then it is no wonder that leaders would choose to brush insubordination aside rather than take it to their commanders for resolution.
Certainly, this did not happen at once. These traits bear many similarities to those described by Dr. Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen Gerras in Lying to Ourselves, where they highlighted systemic dishonesty in the Army. As part of that, they outlined the concept of ethical fading, and how it “allows Army officers to transform morally wrong behavior into socially acceptable conduct.” Many of the organizational characteristics that they identified as promoting a culture of dishonesty are likely also responsible for a culture of willful insubordination. But there has been no attempt to counter this shift. The Army presumes that the subordinate attitudes developed during initial entry training will last throughout a full career and makes no effort to reinforce them afterwards. Despite character development being part of the mission statement of every military educational institution I have attended, and despite fulfilling obligations being a stated part of the Army Values, this was never a topic of instruction or discussion.
Rebuilding Subordinate Culture
Subordination is a key component to an effective military force. In order for commanders to maximize their units’ effectiveness on the battlefield, their subordinates must execute their orders fully and without delay. When subordinates fail in that regard, the best-case scenario is that higher commanders will have no choice other than increased supervision and micromanagement. This bites back in two ways: the higher commanders cannot devote their full attention to operating properly at their own echelon, and the subordinates cannot exercise disciplined initiative and bring about the benefits of mission command. The worst-case scenario is far more grim: one or more lethally trained and equipped soldiers deciding to outright refuse orders can come with life or death consequences.
Insubordinate attitudes are a problem that extends beyond training and education, and into the Army ethos and culture. A professional military cannot leave this problem unsolved. Like so many other issues, the Army cannot address this with just a stand-down and a slideshow. Leaders at all levels must commit to the unique military ethic, setting the standard and demonstrating its necessity. The Army must also do the much harder work of identifying those who do not subordinate themselves to lawful authority and holding them publicly accountable. Insubordinate conduct is often in public view. If the repercussions are not widely known, soldiers receive a message that insubordination is tolerated or quietly condoned. For those in the Army who do not believe that insubordination is in fact problematic behavior, only two of Hundman’s behavioral categories remain available: correct yourself and obey orders, or exit the Army. Soldiers who do not follow orders have no place in the military.
Ignoring orders always comes with consequences. In the case of my own organization, the insubordinate officers in positions of authority corrected themselves relatively swiftly—after one of their subordinates tested positive for COVID-19. Rather than closing the barn door when they were told to do so, they waited until the horse had bolted. Their negligence was not without ramifications. Here, it meant that additional servicemembers were exposed to COVID-19. In other circumstances, the costs of insubordination will be far graver.
Capt. Eoghan Matthews is officer in the United States Army. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Spc. Denice Lopez, US Army
I FULLY agree with this:
"Everyone is aware that mask mandates are controversial. But when defiance of them occurs in the military, it amounts to insubordination. That's clearly problematic, and something we need to discuss openly."
Corona/COVID is an *airborne* killer, after all, and the Chinese were warning us as of 9 March 2020 that facemasks were vital:
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3074351/coronavirus-can-travel-twice-far-official-safe-distance-and-stay
And in 2013, a Cambridge published study indicated even homemade masks could help greatly,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7108646/
and SecDef Mark Esper – now at MWI – even innovatively had our personnel making them out of t-shirts and then had research done as to the best mask material.
I trust he will speak out in support of SecDef Austin about this now.
Anti-mask mutiny is not just medically and mililtarily … and legally … intolerable, it is just flat STUPID.
To a point, vaccination may be a different matter – remembering Americans' trust in thalidomide and Agent Orange – guys of the Class of 1968 are still dying from AO – but I've had my first 2 (and last?) Pfizer vaccinations and have my Norway/EU COVID passport if I can go visit my first grandchild this year.
Any officer or non-commissioned officer (who are PAID to set the example) — and/or any junior soldier (who must be effectively TRAINED by his/her officers and noncommissioned officers to obey orders) — should:
a. Receive immediate disciplinary action; this,
b. For disobeying the masking order.
Period.
(If not, then you have, effectively, opened Pandora's Box as relates to [a] obeying orders generally and [b] achieving and maintaining good order and discipline specifically.)
In addition:
From the perspective I offer above, this pandemic provides our officers and noncommission officers with a unique and special challenge and opportunity — not to shirk their duties and responsibilities (for example, as relates to obeying order) — but also to teach and train their soldiers regarding same.
Accordingly, how well (or poorly) our officers and non-commissioned officers respond to this such unique and special challenge and opportunity — to teach and train their soldiers regarding such things as obeying orders — this should be reflected:
a. In these officers and noncommissioned officers efficiency reports. And, likewise,
b. In decisions made relating to whether they should be allowed to remain in the Service.
Wearing masks is just theater, and everyone knows it. In my unit every person is vaccinated, most have already had COVID, and all are fairly young and healthy. When combined with the fact that most senior leaders are ignoring it (O-5+ level) the mask mandate as well it's hard to justify enforcement. This is in a National Guard unit where many of those junior Soldiers are sharing an open-bay barracks and having meals together.
Vaccination reduces symptoms, but you can still get COVID and pass it on to others even if you have been vaccinated. The primary value of masks is preventing an infected person … who may not know they're infected for up to 10 days … from spreading it out … not so much protecting the mask wearer. And even some vaccinated still die from it. Did you look at the links supporting facemasking I listed above?
And there are new strains evolving for which there are not yet specific vaccines, and the spread of those must be curtailed from the get-go.
Facemasking is external and is the first line of defense against an *airborne* disease … logically and obviously.
Masks do not stop the spread of Covid. No location or organization has ever caused a drop in Covid transmission via a mask mandate. And the few Randomized Clinical Trials that have been done on it have shown a slight INCREASE not decrease in transmission.
I agree with the general principle of obedience to direct orders. But when the civilian authorities repeatedly beclown themselves, first stating the masks don't help, then stating that they do help, then stating that while they probably help, they shouldn't be mandatory, then finally announcing that they are mandatory, it's incredibly dispiritiing to be forced to partake in their silly theater performance.
The day the emperor showed up naked, I presume all the military members pretended that he was well-dressed, since they were ordered to do so. But none of them liked it, and military members are societal role models as well, so a few of them felt morally obligated not to participate in the mass psychosis.
If I remember that fable correctly, it took a child to point out the emperor’s nakedness.
Unquestioning obedience, reflexively, and without thought or consideration.
A place called 'Nuremberg' put paid to that philosophy a few decades ago….
Leadership flows both ways. As officers, we have a responsibility to give orders and implement policy that advances the mission. If we cannot convince our subordinates that our orders make sense and advance our objectives, we lose credibility. That said, we also need to model good subordinate behavior. If a legal order is given, we have a duty to obey it (and/or modify it to meet commander's intent).
Where and how much modification still meets intent is sometimes hard to define. I don't wear a mask when I'm by myself, because it doesn't advance any objectives for health and welfare. What happens when the same people are working in close proximity all day (including activities where wearing masks is impossible/impractical)? That's a tougher one, as the medical objectives of masking are pretty much defeated by other requirements. Do you still enforce the order when common sense tells you it will not advance any goal other than unthinking compliance?
Anyone remember the days, back in the 1980s, when we were required to wear the gas mask for two hours — on Thursdays of each week, if I remember correctly?
Herein, on each of those Thursdays — and for those two hours — while we (a) certainly were not getting gassed, we were (b) still required to wear the gas mask anyway.
(And some people got in trouble back then, to include some 0-5's, when the general came around checking "masking.")
The example set by senior officers who politically posture, ignore the requirements of Article 88, UCMJ, prohibiting contemptuous or disdainful words about the President, and then go to work for the news networks must have sunk down into the ranks, as the example of leaders always does. But then again, selective obedience has been growing since 2001 and seems like it is in full bloom these days. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be an end to it unless the attention of the military and its leaders is forcibly reoriented to fighting and winning the nation's wars, a job we have been only erratically successful in performing since 1945 or so.
This is no different than the timeless arguments over wearing white socks, glow belts, shaving, or other appearance codes.
The overall problem remains the same. The desired end state is unity of effort in combat. If a leader says, "seize that bunker!" combat effectiveness demands instant obedience, even if the leader doesn't have time to elaborate, "in order to prevent them from firing on the main effort."
The way militaries achieved that end state changed over time. The answer used to be to instill blind obedience and submission to authority based on rank. However, as Anthony Kellet's Combat Motivation (1982), Norman Dixon's Psychology of Military Incompetence (1976), Tad Tuleja's Different Drummers (2020), and others observed, teaching blind obedience in garrison through strict uniform regulations actually stifles critical thinking, initiative, and creativity – characteristics necessary for modern combat.
In order to preserve these necessary characteristics, these authors argued that modern troops should obey orders because of trust, respect, and understanding. This requires leaders to always explain the "why" (see Simon Sinek's Start With Why (2009)) behind their orders when time allows. This builds trust and respect between leaders and their troops. When a situation arises where the leader does not have time to explain "why," the troops obey because of their trust and respect for the leader.
Regarding the masking order – politics and medical reasons aside – the failure of such a large and diverse body of troops to obey this order signifies a failure on the part of leadership to adequately explain the reasoning behind the order. Plenty of civilian businesses do not have mask mandates but have successfully convinced employees to wear masks and their employees do so willingly because they came to understand the mission and intent.
To demand obedience "just because" is an outdated relic of eighteenth-century militarism. To continue to demand it is an insult to the intelligence of modern soldiers and a detriment to training a modern military.
Invoking the Nuremburg Trails or claiming the troops don't understand the intent or reason behind the order is nothing but smoke and mirrors. Nuremburg put paid to using obedience to orders as a defense against illegal, immoral, or unethical actions. Within the U.S. military, everyone's trained on the basics of the Law of Armed Conflict and professional ethics and provided procedures to follow in the event there's a question. Nor is there inadequate explanation of the reasoning behind this particular order: public health and combating the spread of disease within the force. Whether individuals may agree or disagree with the reason is immaterial — failure to comply is akin into showing up for duty in shorts and flip-flops because it's just too danged hot to wear a uniform today.
The failure of so many to obey this order is indeed a failure of leadership because the troops are savvy enough to figure out that the chain of command is unwilling to enforce this order. If a platoon showed up for duty in shorts and flip-flops instead of the UOD, consequences would follow, and no one would debate whether the troops understood the reason for wearing a uniform or complain about unquestioning obedience. But because masks have become a social battleground that commanders don't want to deal with within the ranks, everyone from the SecDef on down has abdicated. At that point, it's not an order — it's suggestion. Either enforce it — starting at the top with service chiefs and combatant commanders — or rescind it. Anything in the middle simply tells troops it's whitewash.
If Milley wants his orders obeyed, he should set the example by following height/weight standards. And if this author wants to be taken seriously, he shouldn't invoke Little Round Top or suggest soldiers who don't wear masks are an armed mob.
Stupid and unenforceable orders invite insubordination, this falls squarely on higher leadership. It's long past time for mask mandates to be lifted.
"Masks have been a recognized protective measure against chemical and biological threats for over a century. How to wear and use masks is taught to every servicemember within weeks of joining the military. Therefore, any argument questioning the legality of an order to wear masks is ridiculous."
And yet we have the fact that even the CDC has publicly acknowledged that masks to stop the transmission of COVID – or any other virus – do not work. We have thousands of reputable – as opposed to those who have trashed their reputations – doctors, biologists, physicists, and other non-emotional disciplines who also elaborate on the stupidity of such requirements.
[1971]
"Sir, the War in Vietnam is not going well and morale is at an all-time low. What do we do?"
"Well, this is obviously due to the pot-smokers and fraggers and has nothing to do with how the war was prosecuted from a strategic standpoint, the fact the American public is utterly divided on a way forward, and the lack of clear victory conditions."
……………………..
"Tell CPT Matthews to prepare a patrol. I need him to go fortify a village in that pocket in the middle of Charlie-held countryside."
"Sir, that certainly won't be popular, is most likely incredibly dangerous, and will hardly make a dent in their efforts in the area."
"Well, we need a victory. Don't worry. We've have new orders only allowing MAJORs and above to carry GRENADES, so he should be fine from the troops."
………………………
Is this analogy an oversimplification? It certainly is, but so is boiling down an issue like insubordination to resistance to an asinine and political directive. Calling the loyalty of Soldiers into question is missing the forest for the trees when the vast majority who "disobey" do so *because* they want to do their jobs well and be left alone. They have no other outlet. We should be grateful getting off with such insignificant displays only.
How many training events have been cancelled? How much leave has been disrupted? How many games have been played about "six feet this" and "only when eating that"? How many young and healthy people have been afflicted with suffering more by the response than the virus itself?
The COVID mortality rate [~80 total deaths as of December] is 0.03% for the military. At what point should we return to normal? 0.02%? 0.01%? [ https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2021/12/15/military-covid-19-deaths-on-upswing-as-vaccination-deadlines-pass/ ]
For comparison, the number of suicides on ACTIVE DUTY was 242 for the first 9 months of 2021 *only*. [ https://www.dspo.mil/Portals/113/Documents/TAB%20A_20211230_OFR_Rpt_Q3_CY2021.pdf?ver=GDK03pwWqkz1-OLGo_qlxg%3d%3d ]
As more and more countries dissolve their restrictions, the writing is made ever clearer on the wall. Continuing to prosecute this from a leadership standpoint only alienates junior troops more and more, and the diehard COVID leaders *will* lose this war. They will lose when embarrassment haunts their aggressiveness in hindsight. They will lose when the Army bleeds principled troops. They will lose when people forever question whether they enforce rules *they believe* are right or because they are *told* they are right.
Finally, not every issue is viewable through moral, ethical, or legal lens. Not every policy is "good" just because it is "moral," and vice versa. Is forcing an entire brigade to be dry due to *one* drunk driving incident legal? Yes. Is it good policy? No. Do I, as the supposed brigade commander, honestly expect for 100% of the brigade to 100% abide by that rule? If I thought so, I would have no understanding of human (or Soldier) nature whatsoever and would probably waste hundreds of man hours for diminishing returns to arrest a molehill issue. Individual Soldiers are smarter than we give them credit for, and there is no reason to expect them not to see cracks in good policy, let alone atrocious policy. There is no need to respond to *every* issue as either a storm-trooper or revolutionary—–there are times to do nothing and keep a steady hand.
This article fundamentally represents a lack of self-reflection, hosts a dearth of nuance, and embodies an astonishing sense of leadership arrogance. Quite frankly, it is an embarrassing display of the issues normal troops have with "well-educated," or, rather "well-institutionalized," leaders.
An Army that was organized, ordered, oriented and led by officers and NCOs who think like the above — I could expect this Army to do nothing — except debate, from a contemporary and currently "fashionable" perspective, every issue, and every order given, until the end of time.
I agree with you, sir. An Army that did debate *every* issue would be ineffective, but, if I understand your retort, you may have misunderstood what I wrote. The masks are *one* issue, and not the hill to die defending with arguments like these.
If anything, you have written my analogy for me with your gas masks example. Why does the Army not continue to do that? For that matter, why do grade schools not continue to teach kids to "duck and cover" to avoid nuclear fallout? Is it because we determined that these actions, these policies, were not worth the investment at some point?
To use a pointed example, why in Band of Brothers do we disdain CPT Sobel and hail MAJ Winters when the latter so obviously resisted orders that were "moral, ethical, and legal?" Ah, yes, it must be because MAJ Winters so obviously wished to do nothing except debate "every order given" and had no motivation to fight effectively. The men obviously made a bad choice in picking MAJ Winters to back because they did not realize CPT Sobel's position of authority made all of his decisions inherently correct.
Loyalty and unquestioning obedience are two separate concepts, and there is a reason only one is an Army Value. Loyalty to a higher ideal [like holistic organizational effectiveness] demands questioning lower ideals [like enforcing a policy that has no significant benefit and did not exist in any form before two years ago].
Apologies if I and my associates in our conscientiousness do not meet your standards for "organizing, orienting, and leading." I was in CPT Matthews' ECCC class, and I assure you that, if you gentlemen had your way, you would be dismissing at least 60 captains in a class of 63 that would prefer to see Winters as a role model above Sobel.
Debate, debate, debate, debate, debate ….
Such an Army existed, in fact. It was the Army of the Provisional Russian Republic in 1917. Any casual student of history knows what happened to it. Voting on orders is tantamount to annihilation.
A British officer attached as an observer to an American unit … in Normandy, I believe … was appalled! Operational orders came down from division and regiment, and battalion and company commanders examined them and just tore them APART. Absolutely, abjectly STUPID. What REMF came up with THIS?
Would NEVER happen in the *British* Army, the observer thought.
So then the chagrined officers tried to come up with better, viable alternatives and after exhausting all of them and debating the given operational orders further, they decided that the orders as given were the best possible.
But the thing was, that from all this dissension came unity for – and thorough knowledge of – the Mission … and those officers' own personal ownership of it.
Debating facemasking is one thing, but its logic as a first line of defense against *airborne* disease is irrefutably obvious after fair, objective consideration … not distorted by outside political ideology and demagogues … so as far as facemasking anyway, the ranks should have closed FOR it by now.
Bad science. Research better.
Analysis is not knowledge, but how one deciphers the known and assumed reality. Art is the application of such.
Neither the science nor in-depth analysis support the idea that masking is a viable “first line of defense” against this virus.
Sir, if I may, I concede that the CDC says masks are effective. I do not dispute this.
In fact, here is the CDC study from today supporting it:
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/mm7106e1.htm
I have no fear in bringing it up because that is *not* what is at issue.
What is the point of the mask? It is to prevent contamination. Why do we even want to prevent contamination? We prevent it to avoid death, purportedly.
Masks are effective, yes, but this contamination poses no significant threat to the vast majority of people who experience it. My point is that mortality for the military is 0.03% presently. First, one would even have to get COVID, *then* he would have a 1 in 3333 chance of succumbing to it.
Would you wear earmuffs your entire life if it meant that in one instance of hearing a loud noise you had a 1 in 3000 chance of going deaf and thereafter, if you did not go deaf, you were at no risk of hearing another loud noise regardless? Again, you would never get to remove the ear muffs because of how fervently you wish to avoid the noise. To add insult to injury, the ear muffs are not even fully effective.
Yes, older people [the order originators] are at a higher risk of loud noises, and they could choose to wear ear muffs. For those on the lower part of the average [as in, 91% of the military being under the age of 40 as of 2015*], however, who really have closer to a 1 in 10000 chance of "deafness," the theater is meaningless. *[https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/13/6-facts-about-the-u-s-military-and-its-changing-demographics/ ]
Finally, if there is an overarching point to subordination and this policy, we must remember that every policy requires force. There is nothing to gain by forcing this policy now; any point evaporated as our understanding grew and the vaccines were forced as well.
Forcing it, especially by the low-level mask Gestapo, will not "close the ranks" any more than rooting out and punishing every barracks drinker at the Academy would increase test scores. If anything, it will blow the troops apart trying. Discretion is the better part of valor.
If you desire a case in point, look no further than our merciful author, who filed an I.G. complaint against his well-respected captain instructor in CCC before approaching either him or any of his other teammates individually. He succeeded in derailing the class with a substitute for months while that instructor was under investigation. Such tactics, to paraphrase a friend in that group, did not just break the chain of trust but ground it to dust. Attempts at enforcing this policy in a lunatic fashion undermined the sense of team cohesion more than any of the acts of "insubordination." Lumping these together with such acts as a squad leader literally telling me to f*** off, threatening me, and garnering a field grade Article 15 for his efforts is wrong. Mask "insubordination" is not just out of the same field; it is not even playing the same sport.
"Discretion is the better part of valor."
Perhaps you should follow your own counsel the next time you want to make your case through ad hominem attacks on a contributor. Single-sided (and probably selective) presentation of something that happened at ECCC … anonymously, no less … is a cheap and unprofessional tactic.
With respect, sir, I do follow my own counsel; that retort was quite limp.
By the definition of the Oxford English Dictionary:
Ad hominem — [adjective] (of an argument or reaction) directed against a person rather than the position they are maintaining.
I did not say, "Do not listen to CPT Matthews because *he* is a bad person." I concede that it was heavily implied with the sarcastic "merciful," but I attacked the actions that this thinking begets. Moreover, the implication relies on the idea that this nature of thinking will probably beget other bad ideas.
To put my counterargument into plain English and simple parameters: "His position is to punish mask insubordination. Punishing mask insubordination requires drastic action. Drastic action is much more detrimental [proven in point] than the accused subordination. Ergo, it is more beneficial to *not* punish mask insubordination." Since the Army does not work that way, we should remove the conditions that would compel leaders to punish.
Perhaps you should attack *my* argument. Insert Captain X into the position, and it would have had the same result, but you probably would not believe it because it's a "hypothetical." Oh, ye stiff-necked people, no amount of evidence would actually meet the threshold.
If you really have a problem with anonymity, please feel free to find me on Global. My name is correct, and you know I am an Engineer Captain. Apologies if I do not wish to make it *too* easy in an organization notorious for destroying dissenters by virtue of their existence and promoting bootlickers by virtue of their obsequiousness.
That study you cite, while not without merit, is hardly definitive.
Self-reporting studies are notoriously unreliable; the sample size is very small and drawn from a deeply partisan community; and it demonstrates a correlation more than any definitive causal relationship between masking and susceptibility to infection (for example, those who are more anal about masking are also much more likely to take other mitigating measures, such as distancing, avoiding crowds/strangers, etc.).
I’m not saying it’s without merit or that it doesn’t add to the knowledge pool regarding this (and future) pandemic response. You are correct in stating that the “CDC says masks are effective” based on this study – that’s simply not the same as the study irrefutably proving masks to be effective.
As are we all, I’m biased. I’ll admit that I don’t always wear a mask in every situation in which I’m ordered to. I do try to wear one in situations where someone might call me out for not doing so, but that’s more about not getting in trouble than actually believing in the order. Whether masks are effective at preventing SARS-CoV-2 infection or not, I personally don’t believe that the inconvenience is worth the reward. I recognize that bias, and orders are orders – but it does get difficult to maintain faith and trust in leadership that seems unwilling to justify their decisions.
Only a fool issues an order he knows his men won’t obey.
More than anything else, in their refusal to wear a mask (as ordered to do so by their superiors during a pandemic), this would seem to need to be viewed:
a. More from the perspective of these disobedient soldiers making a — currently fashionable — political statement and
b. Less from any perspective that suggests these soldiers have either (a) researched the masking issue to some significant degree and/or that they have, otherwise, (a) gained a sufficient understanding of these matters, so that they might adequately address same in some scientific conference on such matters.
Accordingly, if my "statement of the case" is correct above, then how should leadership handle such matters?
(Remember: In the manner in which you handle this — you may be setting a precedent — which would allow soldiers of many other — and probably decidedly different political persuasions — to decide what orders they will follow.)
Given my thought immediately above, might we say that — if leadership handles this masking issue incorrectly — then we might find our soldiers — today and in the future — AND BASED PRIMARILY ON THEIR POLITICAL PERSUASIONS — deciding if they will follow various orders; this, based on their determination of whether such orders:
a. Might be viewed as "dem" orders?
b. Might be viewed as "rep" orders?
c. Might be viewed as being "OK" with former President Trump?
d. Might be viewed as being "OK" with current President Biden?
(Ad infinitum.)
I cannot speak for every soldier who takes issue with the masking order. I imagine many do do so for partisan reasoning.
Many, however, have researched and have viewed what scientific studies they can find. Generally speaking, while the average soldier isn’t going to be considered for MENSA, he tends to be better educated than the average citizen.
What’s your take on the opposite, that your “statement of the case” is wrong and those servicemen are not just parroting conservative pundits?
Simply stamping one’s foot and demanding the orders be followed does little but undermine one’s position as a leader worthy of his men. Pushing cherry-picked, inconclusive studies that tend to lean toward your bias (and assuming your joes either not read or not question them) also undermine one’s standing. Telling those who disagree in good faith (regardless of the soundness of their disagreement) to just shut up and color risks turning that good faith toward bad.
Given that nearly everything is "politicized" today, should we believe that — if not currently then sometime in the near future — soldiers, when given an order, will first take the time to process this such order through their "political persuasion" filter and, thereafter, based on whether they believe that these such orders might be "Dem" orders or might be "Rep" orders (etc., etc., etc.) will then:
a. Determine if they are going to obey these orders or:
b. Apply for a "political persuasion" exemption. (Much like they might apply for a religious exemption today?)
Again, this is the point that I am trying to make. Thus:
a. How leadership handles the masking order,
b. This, potentially, has rather significant and (as illustrated by me above?) rather far-reaching ramifications. Yes?
Given your parameters, of course it’s a disturbing precedent.
You haven’t addressed the alternative: What if the joes aren’t parroting partisan talking points, what if the orders given simply don’t pass the sniff test?
We can (are bound to) refuse unlawful orders. Unlawful isn’t the same as immoral, nor is either the same as nonsensical or pointless.
My concern is that these refusals are not related to whether the order is considered to be "nonsensical and/or pointless."
(From that such perspective, of course, we would expect that see somewhat equal numbers of individuals — on both sides of the "political persuasion" aisle — standing up to ask that these such orders be reconsidered. Yes?)
B.C.
I know from an n=1 sample, at least a portion of the disagreement with (not necessarily refusal of) the order is entirely based on it being “nonsensical and/or pointless.”
From that perspective, no, I don’t believe we should expect to see “somewhat equal numbers” from both sides (nor do I see a way in which we could measure such). In any scientific debate, the dominant elements should be reason, logic, and empirical evidence – not vote count. Especially in such a politically-motivated realm as the military and around such a politically-biased topic as COVID-19.
Let’s review: the current top general in the army said he’d give a dangerous adversary advance warning if we were about to attack them. That, despite the possible consequences of such blatant treason, including the deaths of tens of millions of Americans or outright defeat in the worst war in history.
After that ranking general has renounced duty, honor, and country, apparently due to reasons of politics and personal animus, and then remains in his post to represent the Army officer corps, then what? Is the result instant obedience from all subordinates? Or do principled Soldiers begin wondering just who comprises “all enemies, foreign and domestic”?
I wish the situation wasn’t what it is, but the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (at best) acts as the embodiment of the politicization of the US military, so we should realize the effect is pervasive. And after that genie’s out of the bottle, it would be better to accept or confront that situation as it exists. The author’s assertion that not wearing a mask has a political component, but wearing a mask does not, is simply untrue. In fact, any claim that political polarization has only one pole is a ridiculous non sequitur. So an attempt to analyze this subject should first include the ability to form a better appreciation of reality.
How do we fix this mess? I simply don’t know. But we have to be smarter about dealing with it.
As odd as this may seem, might we look at these issues from the perspective I offer below? Here goes:
If we consider that, indeed throughout the world and even here in the U.S./the West today:
a. The "counter-insurgent" is, in fact, any government that represents and promotes "revolutionary change" — and/or what we might call "modernization" — this, so as to position their states and societies so that same might be made to adequately compete and win, today and in the future, on the world stage. (The beliefs and efforts of the "establishment" Democratic and the before-Trump Republican parties; these, in fact, seem to fit this description?) And, thus, in these such circumstances,
b. The "insurgent" is, in fact, any individual or group that seeks to prevent such "revolutionary"/such "modernization" change — and/or seeks to return to a status quo anti — this latter, if too much unwanted political, economic, social and/or value change is thought to have already taken place. (On the foreign front, the Islamists might be viewed from this such "insurgent" perspective? And, on the domestic front, the Trump Republican party, and those who follow same today, these might be viewed in this such "insurgent" manner?)
In this regard, let's consider the following (as relates to Islamist insurgents in this case) from David Kilcullen's "Counter-Insurgency Redux:"
"Politically, in many cases today, the counter-insurgent represents revolutionary change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier – a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counter-insurgency. Pakistan's campaign in Waziristan since 2003 exemplifies this. The enemy includes al-Qaeda-linked extremists and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture against twenty-first-century encroachment. The problem of weaning these fighters away from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernisation, does somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counter-insurgency. But it also echoes colonial campaigns, and includes entirely new elements arising from the effects of globalisation."
"Battles" like this — between those pressing for "modernization" — and those seeking to "preserve traditional culture" — as one might except, these such "battles" appear to have occurred routinely throughout history. Here, for example, appears to be such a case in President Andrew Jackson's time:
"Jacksonians drew their support from Northern laborers and yeoman farmers in the South and in the West. These groups, which Jackson dubbed the ‘bone and sinew of America,’ worried that the market economy would force them into the dependent class. The Jacksonians told the farmers and the laborers that they would do everything in their power to prevent this from taking place. In essence, the men and their rank and file voting allies, along with Jackson, fought a rear-guard action against encroaching industrialization and market economy. Although they won the pivotal battles, they lost the war, because their notion of a pre-capitalist agrarian society succumbed to the industrial economy after the Civil War."
(See the ‘Encyclopedia of U.S. Political History’ by Andrew Robertson, et al., and, therein, the section entitled ‘Jacksonian Democracy,' at Page 194.)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
What constitutes a "principled Solder" (and whether the current top general in the Army represents same?) — thus to be considered; this, with some thought given to the matters that I present above?
Mask wearing is a facade and political theater foisted upon the military by woke civilian leaders and general officers. This is a common, if not majority held view, among the ranks. Please utilize resources to study the detrimental impacts of COVID restrictions, mask wearing, and vaccinating the force with an untested "vaccine", not on defending the indefensible.
Mask wearing was a facade and the early advertised cloth masks were almost completely useless (and known) from the beginning. Unless it was advocated to wear N95 masks then the intelligence behind a 'cloth mask' mandage was as incompetent as the people behind the 2003 Iraq invasion and subsequent loss.
You're correct that obedience is required, but don't overlook that the superior bears responsibility for not issuing arbitrary and foundationless orders. Doing so erodes faith in leadership and undermines command at least as much as disobedience. Also, consider George Washington's observation that free men will not be driven…they must be led.