If conflict were to break out in the Indo-Pacific region, geography and the tyranny of distance would combine with the capabilities of the region’s militaries to produce a very different kind of war than anything the US military is accustomed to. Prognosticators think it will be a war fought with missiles and drones, at long range, with victory turning on informed and timely decisions—blind the enemy before he can blind you. The tools needed to sense and strike at the enemy’s critical systems rely on the network known as the reconnaissance-strike complex. This complex is composed of an abundance of joint sensors, shooters, and command-and-control nodes dispersed geographically across the Indo-Pacific. Its effectiveness rests on the ability to converge these assets to deliver effects and open windows of opportunity when faced with a first-strike operation from an adversary like China. These systems’ interoperability must be validated through exercises and rehearsals on key maritime terrain, with all relevant components of the joint force. The United States Army and Marine Corps conducted one such rehearsal during Artillery Relocation Training Program (ARTP) 23.4 in Hokkaido, Japan this year. The exercise highlighted the friction involved in planning and executing a joint exercise without preexisting relationships. However, once the task force was established, it brought to bear the full spectrum of communications, fires, and multidomain reconnaissance capabilities, illustrating what only an integrated joint force can accomplish in the first island chain.
ARTP is a historically unilateral United States Marine Corps rehearsal conducted in Japan four times a year. The program exercises the rapid deployment of cannon and rocket artillery from 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines to key locations in the Pacific. In March 2024, for the first time ever, the United States Army’s 25th Infantry Division sent a reconnaissance troop to enhance the exercise. The unit, operating as a multidomain reconnaissance company (MRC), conducted reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance and cross-domain sensing for the artillery battalion. Exercise objectives included validation of joint sensor-to-shooter linkages, integration of digital communications architectures, and reconnaissance in a challenging subarctic environment. Breaking down the traditional barriers to joint force integration was key to success and required significant planning and communication in advance of the operational rehearsal. Many of these hurdles, including communications-security sharing agreements and frequency authorizations, can be eliminated with the creation of standing policies at the combatant command level. The Marine battalion and MRC had to overcome them on their own, but once they did, and once the task force deployed from Okinawa, the preestablished command relationship allowed for seamless integration on the ground in Hokkaido and set a precedent for how a joint reconnaissance-strike complex might work in practice.
The test of any fires system lies in the flexibility, redundancy, and survivability of the network of sensors and shooters. Whether in space or under the ocean, sensors in theater provide the ability to sense and make sense in every domain. This information, synthesized in a variety of ways, can be sent to a menu of shooters to converge effects on a target. While this is done at the operational level by units like the Army’s multidomain task forces, in any future conflict tactical integration will be just as important. During ARTP 23.4 the Army MRC used cross-domain effects including small unmanned aircraft systems and electronic warfare to identify littoral threats in Hokkaido. They passed targeting data over the horizon to HIMARS (High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System) launchers in Iwo Jima and Korea to strike the targets, delivering a concentrated effect using systems dispersed across the first island chain. The kill web used service-organic equipment, while operating with minimal electromagnetic signature. The ability for land-based forces to integrate with maritime elements to achieve sea denial is key to the US Indo-Pacific Command campaigning strategy. Every unit west of the international date line is a potential sensor that can be leveraged, given the ability to communicate and feed data into the network. However, not all sensors are created equal.
Dr. Jack Watling, in his book Arms of the Future, makes a distinction between “stand-in” and “standoff” sensors. Stand-in sensors provide more precision and detail, though remaining vulnerable to counterreconnaissance efforts in ways standoff sensors are not. The MRC serves as a stand-in sensor that can leverage standoff sensor capabilities if properly resourced. Utilizing cross-domain effects to pinpoint targets allows for the cueing of further capabilities to acquire useful targeting data. In this way, the MRC operates as the hub of the kill web, connecting the various sensors and shooters digitally to converge effects on enemy systems. During ARTP 23.4, the MRC blended electronic warfare, small unmanned aircraft systems, and traditional ground-based reconnaissance techniques to eliminate numerous enemy multiple-launch rocket systems. Survivability moves, camouflage, and emissions control can provide a deterrent against standoff sensors, but they proved ineffective against an all-weather reconnaissance unit in close contact. On an increasingly sensor-saturated battlefield, the ability to blind hostile stand-in sensors while maximizing friendly assets will be key. This type of warfare, traditionally described as the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance fight, is best contested by stand-in forces. Elements like the MRC serve as eyes of the joint reconnaissance-strike complex, enhancing accuracy and lethality. The best way to leverage the MRC is through codified and habitual partnerships.
Establishing a joint reconnaissance-fires complex will take a concerted effort from all branches of service to maintain these habitual relationships and thereby mitigate the inherent friction that will arise during conflict. A quicker joint targeting cycle will lend itself to more efficient bilateral integration in a region where allies are the ultimate arbiter of authorities for US forces. The complexity of a jointly networked fires system invites many questions about authorities and command relationships. A traditional unilateral fires complex has access to fewer targeting assets but needs less deconfliction in each zone of fire. A joint reconnaissance-strike complex provides maximum targeting assets but with more complex deconfliction requirements. What must be rehearsed on a consistent basis is how to incorporate the entirety of joint force sensors and shooters, while maintaining the shortest possible kill chain. Additionally, procedures and techniques for shifting the kill chain between centralized and decentralized control in an efficient manner must be developed. The political and military situation will be fluid and demand an equally flexible fires process.
During ARTP 23.4, the MRC and 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines were able to validate the feasibility of the joint fires complex, albeit at the lowest tactical echelon. Scaling this capability will raise issues of asset management, target engagement authority, and prioritization of targets in the first island chain. To manage these issues, the fires coordination cells at each echelon will need to be more robust than what exists currently. The sliding spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict needs to be interconnected with the targeting cycle; as the situation shifts from competition to conflict the timely engagement of targets cannot be bogged down by a centralized target engagement authority. Assets that might belong to multiple services will be needed to effectively sense and destroy critical threats. The efficiency gained in sliding authorities can only be accomplished through consistent and realistic rehearsals with the joint force. Preeminent units like the Marine Littoral Regiment and the Army’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force must rehearse the joint targeting cycle in all available exercises, codifying how they want to tackle this problem in a future conflict. There are numerous exercises in the Indo-Pacific region that are already executed annually yet are often unilateral among the services. The few integrated exercises tend to involve parallel play, with each service conducting its own part without a unified command structure. Liaisons should be present to serve as any part of the joint targeting cycle to practice this as they did in ARTP 23.4. This lateral and vertical integration is already being utilized by the United States’ pacing threat: China has put increased emphasis on its own joint fires integration, necessitating adaptation from US forces.
Campaigning requires not just deploying combat-credible forces into the first island chain, but also the demonstration of meaningful capability. Hopefully the first of many future experiments, ARTP 23.4 showcased the ability of Army reconnaissance to provide a stand-in sensing capability to Marine firing assets in service of the maritime component’s sea-denial strategy. A standing fires-based joint task force is the ideal solution to managing assets effectively, but adding a joint component to existing exercises is a good jumping off point. US Indo-Pacific Command’s area of responsibility is a truly joint theater where the maritime component rightfully claims primacy but can be sensed and struck from the land. Service parochialism threatens an opportunity to build an integrated and effective deterrent to malign actors in the region. Breaking down these barriers requires time, trust, and familiarity. Interoperability is often aspirational or assumed, but the benefit of rehearsals and exercises is clear. The urgency of the theater demands it.
Captain Sean Parrott is a US Army officer serving in 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He most recently commanded the cross-domain effects company.
Captain AJ Vitanza is a US Marine Corps field artillery officer currently serving in 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines as the assistant operations officer.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Cpl. Jaylen Davis, US Marine Corps
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