Editor’s note: This report is the third in a three-part series that examines the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the ongoing fentanyl crisis in the United States. The first report traced the origins of the fentanyl crisis and its consequences for national security. The second report provided evidence of the PRC’s complicity in the fentanyl crisis by describing how its domestic policy and law enforcement efforts fail to adequately undermine fentanyl production and sometimes even facilitate it. This final report draws parallels between the PRC’s actions and asymmetric warfare, arguing that the United States must take a more concerted, whole-of-government approach to addressing the crisis that recognizes the PRC’s role in perpetuating it.
The concept of “asymmetric warfare” itself remains controversial and variably declined. Andrew J. R. Mack introduced the term in his 1975 article “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” describing a significant power disparity between conflict participants. Despite its earlier origins, the term did not make its explicit debut in US joint military doctrine until 1995, marking a shift in formal military strategic thinking. Initially defined narrowly as engagements between dissimilar forces, it expanded in the 1995 National Military Strategy to include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and information warfare. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review forewarned that US conventional military supremacy might drive adversaries toward asymmetric tactics. Mack’s analysis gained renewed relevance in the post–Cold War era, with scholarly interest intensifying during the early 2000s. The Global War on Terrorism period saw a proliferation of terminology centered on asymmetry in academic discourse and the concept of asymmetric warfare had expanded significantly, encompassing a diverse spectrum of threats. This broadened perspective included nonstate actors and the specter of catastrophic terrorism and expanded to encompass guerrilla warfare and insurgency. Asymmetric warfare has ignited sustained debate within academic and military circles evolving to subsume a range of related strategies, variously termed “new generation warfare,” “competition short of conflict,” “active measures,” and “gray zone” activities. Asymmetric tactics, as outlined by US military doctrine, include disinformation, deception, sabotage, economic coercion, proxies, guerrilla warfare, and covert operations. US special operations forces commonly refer to these actions as “gray zone” tactics.
Nicholas Dockery is a White House Fellow, Special Forces officer, United States Military Academy graduate, and Wayne Downing scholar. Dockery holds a master of public policy from Yale’s Jackson School of Global Affairs and previously served as a research fellow at the Modern War Institute.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Kris Grogan, US Customs and Border Protection