Almost exactly three years ago, on February 24, 2022, Russian forces launched the invasion of Ukraine that had been anticipated for weeks. The thirty-six months of grinding, attritional war that has occurred since the invasion was not in Russia’s design. The Kremlin sought a rapid victory in the form of an assault on Kyiv that would have served as a coup de main, after which the entire country’s defenses would have crumbled and Russia would have been able to declare victory.

Russian forces sought to accomplish this with an air assault to seize Hostomel Airport, just outside Kyiv, combined with a ground attack by forces approaching the capital from the Belarusian border to the north of the city. To defend against these moves, Ukraine had extremely limited military resources. And yet, the Ukrainian defenders managed to thwart both Russia’s designs on the airport and the ground attack. How they managed to do so offers a source of invaluable lessons on urban warfare.

Read the twelfth case study in the Urban Warfare Project Case Study Series, on the Battle of Kyiv.

The twelfth installment of the Urban Warfare Project Case Study Series examines the Battle of Kyiv and those lessons. In the first days of the invasion, Ukraine’s ability to overcome the odds against it and continue the war was far from certain. Through deep research and firsthand access to participants in the defense of Kyiv, this case study explains how Ukraine avoided an early defeat and extracts insights from the Battle of Kyiv at all three levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic. You can read it here, and be sure to follow the Urban Warfare Project for future case studies and regular examination of the challenges faced by military forces operating in cities.

Liam Collins, PhD was the founding director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and a Distinguished Military Fellow with the Middle East institute. He is a retired Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America, with multiple combat operations in Fallujah in 2004. He is coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare and author of Leadership & Innovation During Crisis: Lessons from the Iraq War.

John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image: Map compiled by a Ukrainian researcher detailing many of the Ukrainian and Russian positions during the 2022 Battle of Kyiv (photo taken by John Spencer during a July 2023 research trip).