In 1571, at the Battle of Lepanto, Ali Pasha, the commander of Ottoman forces, was struck in the head by an arquebusier’s bullet. When he died, his hands were still holding a composite bow. Nearly thirty thousand Ottomans were lost that day, compared to the Holy League’s roughly ten thousand. Historians give several reasons why the seemingly invincible Ottomans suffered such a lopsided defeat, but one reason stands above the rest. The Holy League brought 1,815 guns, the Ottomans 750. Ali Pasha still believed the composite bow would bring them victory, but instead his fleet was literally blown out of the water. The Ottomans had failed to capitalize on the firearm revolution that had started five hundred years before. The Ottoman Empire would never truly recover from Lepanto, and Western Europeans began their ascent into global hegemony that would last well into the twentieth century.

At the time of the battle, the composite bow had a longer range and faster firing rate than the arquebus. Did Ali Pasha believe the firearm had reached its zenith and therefore had no need to equip more of his troops with a capability whose future was very much in question, or did he think that the weapon could simply not replace the tried-and-true bow? Did his lack of creativity prevent him from seeing its potential uses? If so, his error resulted with his head on a pike and his fleet at the bottom of the Mediterranean.

Despite the passage of four and a half centuries, this episode carries lessons for the United States today—not in the decisions it must make between military capabilities, but in the way it conceptualizes, plans, and conducts information operations. The US government must not underestimate the potential of rapid and revolutionary change, exemplified by focused modern information operations supported by artificial intelligence and other disruptive technologies, lest we too suffer a similarly disastrous fate as that of the Ottoman commander.

Information operations is nothing new to the conduct of war and competition between states. The Trojan Horse is a classic use of deception. Genghis Khan utilized psychological operations to induce defection and disseminate surrender appeals before his horde razed the next town. More recently, World War II contained all the elements of propaganda, double agents, decoys, radio broadcasts, and electronic warfare. Does its long history mean that information operations has reached its zenith and that there is nothing more to be discovered? Surely not, Ali Pasha.

In fact, we have barely scratched the surface of what is possible with information operations. Our current Information Age has brought us new opportunities to design the reality of our adversaries and competitors. This assertion rests on a twist on what is known in military deception literature as “Jones’s Lemma”. Professor R. V. Jones, one of Winston Churchill’s “boffins” during World War II, found that “deception becomes more difficult as the number of channels of information available to the [target] increases, but also that “the greater the number of controlled channels the greater the likelihood of the deception believed.” The twist on this finding is that what is true of deception in this regard is equally true of information operations more broadly.

We all conceive reality from the myriad of information sources available to us. Our five senses send what we observe through the filters of our culture, biases, language, and traumas (to name a few), our brain takes this information and comes to certain conclusions, and we behave accordingly. If someone were to emphasize, deemphasize, distort, or clarify aspects of that information, then our brain would come to different conclusions, and we would behave differently. This is the fundamental premise behind Jones’s Lemma. You can affect behavior by affecting the sources of information—the more the better. However, if you cannot affect enough sources, at scale, then your operation may be doomed to fail.

Opportunities for Information Operations

How does this mean we have barely scratched the surface of information operations? More sources of information are available to us than ever before, and we have only begun to understand how we can affect them. For example, the internet has radically changed how the world operates, and we would do well to remember we are only thirty years into its widespread adoption. Before the internet people would perceive the world around them by information consumed from radio, newspapers, and later television—all relatively controlled information sources, using Professor Jones’s theory. Now, the internet has given us a kaleidoscope of information conduits, including social media, which turns individuals themselves into public sources of information in a previously unimagined way.

Artificial intelligence and the evolution of automation also present opportunities for designing reality, primarily in our ability to affect conduits of information at speed and scale. Artificial intelligence works well as a productivity multiplier, and can be used in information operations for simulation, emulation, assessment, and much more, especially in a field that is notoriously short on personnel. Imagine a Potemkin Village, generated either virtually or in real life with the use of an artificial intelligence tool. Artificial intelligence can also help us with the scale of information operations, bringing attention to escalation or de-escalation messages as needed.

Another opportunity for information operations is to employ them in the fight against foreign malign influence. While the US government is currently using public statements to name and shame adversary misinformation and election interference efforts, and should continue to do so, there is much more that could be done, primarily using information operations to disrupt and defeat adversary organizations who are conducting malign campaigns. Fighting misinformation on social media is only part of a comprehensive approach to defending our democracy. Disrupting the source is more effective. This approach, akin to attacking the archer and not just the arrow, is the specialty of information operations. As a tool of competition, information operations are the scalpel to precisely and effectively counter foreign malign influence.

One might balk at the notion of the US government investing in resources to lie, deceive, or otherwise manipulate reality, especially considering previous infamous efforts. This is a valid concern, but rather serves to reinforce the point. Resources must be prioritized to developing new information operations policies, tactics, and capabilities that can be used in an ethical manner, commensurate with the values of the American people, including by continuing to enforce prohibitions against misleading the US media, Congress, and US persons. The Department of Defense has massive potential for lethal force, yet it only employs those capabilities in accordance with law and policy. In the same way, information operations should be utilized as a primary tool of competition according to refreshed laws and policy that account for new technologies, lest we cede the ground to adversaries who have no issue employing information operations contrary to both international law and norms.

An Information Operations Arsenal

The Holy League did not decide on the day of the battle to simply bring more guns. Rather, the Venetian Arsenal was world renowned due to Venice’s deliberate efforts to obtain battlefield advantages in spite of being only a fraction of the size of most of its competitors. Likewise, the time to invest in research and development of information operations is now, not after our adversaries interfere in another election or continue tarnishing our reputation with our allies and partners. This includes diverting funding from industrial-age, multi-billion-dollar money pits to information operations forces.

Furthermore, the Department of Defense must allocate more personnel billets to information operations planning and assessment, particularly at combatant command and service component command staffs. Most combatant commands lack enough trained planners, and the ones they do have often wear multiple hats and are not able to focus on one capability, drastically reducing efficiency and effectiveness. Assessment, often the bane of information operations, suffers not from a lack of methodology, but rather from a lack of intelligence personnel who are focused on measuring the operation’s effectiveness. Too often command intelligence staffs prioritize collection and production requirements of operation plans, which tend to be focused on major combat operations, instead of information operations, which can achieve objectives during competition.

Lastly, the White House should establish an information operations working group within the National Security Council staff and empower it to provide policy, guidance, and authorities for information operations across the whole of government. While centers of excellence like the Foreign Malign Influence Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of Information Operations Policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Global Engagement Center in the Department of State (which did not receive a funding extension in December 2024) are all steps in the right direction, a whole-of-government approach is needed. Establishing an information operations working group within the National Security Council staff would greatly enable the creation of an American information operations arsenal.

We hold the arquebus in our hands. Will we see the potential for its evolution toward a machine gun, or will we set it aside in favor of the composite bow? We have barely scratched the surface of what is possible with information operations. Allocating more resources to research and development, increasing personnel for planning and assessment, and modernizing policy, organization, and authorities would ensure the United States wins in competition and defends democracy. Without a strong effort to reinvigorate how we think about information operations, we risk becoming like the Ottomans, eclipsed by our competitors.

Jeffrey Hill is the owner and CEO of Columbia Hill Consulting Group. He previously served as the military deception officer for the Joint Staff and Headquarters Marine Corps. He is currently serving within the Office of Information Operations Policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.