“If the Joint Force does not change its approach to strategic competition, there is a significant risk that the United States will ‘lose without fighting.’” The newest Joint Concept for Competing offers a powerful explainer of the problem, yet fails to fully identify the solution. For an Army whose raison d’etre is to fight and win our nation’s wars, what does it mean to compete? Hostile forces already view themselves as at war with the United States. The Army has a critical role to play in defense of the nation and can contribute prior to conflict. However, to do so effectively some additional considerations must be addressed.
At present, the Army is expected to prepare for conflict during a time of strategic competition. The key term, however, is competition. Of the three phases of the conflict continuum, the most ambiguous for the role of the Army is competition. The Army is manned and equipped to fight. It prepares from home station and certifies at national or regional training centers. And yet, under multidomain operations doctrine and with wide-ranging current requirements, it is increasingly tasked to compete. How can an army deliver effects in competition without forward placement, authorities, or the organizational structure to do so? The competition phase is different than conflict and crisis and consequently should be executed and designed differently.
A one-size-fits-all solution does not work in this instance. The demands are too great and even the most creative leader will struggle to find the time or resources required. In short, the US Army must fundamentally reexamine how it operates in the competition phase. It must be prepared to win in competition so we don’t have to win by fighting. Better yet, it must be able to set conditions during competition so we can win in conflict. These are more than just catchphrases. They provide focus amid ambiguity—ambiguity about competitors, the strategic landscape, and even the fundamental nature of competition and the Army’s role in it.
Absent such focus, the Army and the joint force are perilously close to an identity crisis in which expectations of it do not align with its reason for being. The first step toward addressing the issue is acknowledging that the Army’s role isn’t just to prepare and win in conflict. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently leveraging a whole-of-government approach to compete and win without fighting. The CCP’s authoritarian government gives it an edge in directing all resources and tools toward a single goal of undermining the Western-backed order and the US hegemony that underwrites it. Beijing has been competing for a decade. Importantly, however, China does not use the term “competition,” but rather “struggle.” Competitions connote rules-based contests. A struggle can more closely imply a fight without limits. Terminology matters. It sets the framework and conceptual approach.
US policymakers have caught on to this threat and are focused on the China problem set. Naturally, they have called on the joint force to provide deterrence—and options in this competition. For the Army, the primary contradiction, as described above, is the Army’s mission statement and resourcing to accomplish it. The Army is simply not a competition Army. It fights wars and it fights to win. If our primary adversary’s goal is to win without fighting, then traditional deterrence options will be ineffective.
The Department of Defense use of the phrase “pacing threat” says it all. To pace something is to make progress at the same speed. Gone are the days of rapidly established dominance and complete overmatch. The US strategy is to keep pace with our adversary. In many instances, China has the advantage. In the Indo-Pacific region, China has interior lines, mass, and magazine depth. Further, China isn’t just competing—it is leveraging a whole-of-government, globally integrated plan to gain influence and redefine the international world order.
The US Army is only one portion of one of the DIME instruments of power. However, to compete it must perform elements of all four instruments without the resourcing, expertise, or authorities.
The US Army Pacific uses a different term for competition. The command defines this phase as “campaigning.” DoD joint publications state that when done correctly campaigning through competition below armed conflict “creates strategic opportunities for the US and its partners.” Time is the critical variable for this method. Efforts will be protracted and require a long-term approach. The question for DoD then becomes this: How do we resource a protracted campaign below armed conflict? If the Army is the tool of choice, it needs to be equipped, manned, and trained for this mission. Requiring the same Army to maintain readiness for war will result in strain and suboptimal outcomes in both campaigning and warfighting. Evidence of an overstretched Army is obvious with current commitments spanning the globe. Ground forces provide national decision-makers options. Ongoing conventional regional conflicts in Ukraine and Israel highlight the necessity of a trained and ready land force. However, the gray-zone activities of adversaries and other hostile actors also require a deliberate approach.
All warfighting functions must be considered as part of any revision to US Army force structure or operating concept alterations. For example, military intelligence collection is different prior to hostilities. In the competition phase, setting the theater and providing early warning are paramount. During crisis or conflict, a shift to targeting becomes necessary. While targeting is also possible during competition, it is heavily if not exclusively weighted toward nonkinetic effects. In competition, countering malign influences, information operations, and deception are more immediate and important than weaponeering a tomahawk solution. Additionally, during this phase a humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief event or an engineering operation to improve seaport capacity might be more critical than a show-of-force operation. While all options should be maintained, their prioritization and resource allocation should necessarily vary based on the phase of the conflict continuum. How the Army is currently structured matters when balancing winning in competition versus traditional, kinetic warfighting.
The new Army chief of staff, General Randy George, is recalibrating the force. His message and guidance to focus on warfighting and to do so efficiently is a crucial first step in winning in competition. His strategy provides greater flexibility and surge capacity by eliminating wasteful practices. However, without a fundamental reorganization of Army forces or a wholesale philosophical shift the US Army will continue to react to the pacing threat.
The coming decade will be one of increasing risk. The People’s Republic of China has declared its intentions. Beijing is assembling a military capable of challenging the world order. The US Army’s time to prepare for war is now. However, preparation for war isn’t sufficient. It must also start competing.
George Fust is an active duty Army officer currently serving in the INDOPACOM AOR. He is an intelligence officer and advisor to senior leaders within US Army Pacific. He is a graduate of Duke University and is currently an adjunct professor of political science. He previously taught at the US Military Academy in the Department of Social Sciences and served in the 75th Ranger Regiment. He has multiple deployments and experience in Europe, Africa, and Asia.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Sgt. David Resnick, US Army
Alot to unpack here. The DoD has been in the business of campaigning and competing since post WWII. Once the Department of War shifted to the DoD and National Security took the lead over National Defense we were locked.
Theater Security Cooperation now Theater Campaign Plans, incorporate competition activities. Any activity that the military executes sends a message and if it isn't warfighting it is in play during competition – even 'training' and 'exercising' for war. You mention a few others in your article as well. We build partnerships, we deploy forward to conduct exercises with Allies and Partners, we provide Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. That is the small m in the DImE paradigm. We are a diplomatic tool wielded through the Combatant Commanders for the nation to send signals while also being prepared (and showing it) for war.
Our primary purpose is to fight and win the nation's wars, however, to keep this capability in being is expensive. What else can we do with it? So – post WWII, to keep the big machine in play and training as a 'deterrent' and ready force, we found a bunch of other diplomatic aspects for activities we can perform. I'd argue that we have not declared war in a long time, the military has been used as a tool of diplomacy without having an future condition identified that it can realistically attain alone. Thus we get mired…. trying to compensate and execute DI and E tasks while we are engaged in M tasks. That is dialogue for another forum.
Hopefully this article opens more dialogue – I agree, the priorities are not optimally aligned, but are they ever? Sometimes knowing the tension and the application of the capability as a swiss army knife across the continuum can be important for all to understand.
thank you for the thoughtful article – this has been a struggle for us for some time now.
Sounds a lot like where we were post Vietnam. Except now we have defunct leadership devoid of grasping reality. Even our Allies are suffering from policies unbecoming of a nation. May God have mercy on us all…
Consider the "win without fighting" concept from the perspective of the New/Reverse Cold War of today; that is, a new cold war in which,
a. This time (post-the Old Cold War of yesterday), it has been the U.S./the West that has been the entity seeking to achieve revolutionary political, economic, social and/or value change more both here at home and there abroad — in our case today — so as to advance market-democracy more throughout the world. As to this such goal, the U.S./the West has, logically, sought to work more "by, with and through" the natural ALLIES of revolutionary change, to wit: the more liberal/the more modern/the more-pro-change elements of — not only our own states and societies — but those of the rest of the world also. And a new cold war in which:
b. This time (post-the Old Cold War of yesterday), it has been such entities as Russia and China — their regimes thus existentially threatened by the U.S./the West such post-Old Cold War "achieve revolutionary change" initiatives — who have sought to "contain" — and/or to "roll back" — these such revolutionary changes. As to this such goal, nations such as Russia and China have, logically, sought to work more "by, with and through" the natural ENEMIES of revolutionary change, to wit: the more conservative/the more traditional/the more-no change elements of — not only their own states and societies — but also our states and societies — and those of the rest of the world also.
If we can come to understand "competing" and/or "competition" from this such perspective, then the following (Sun Tzu?) guidance, I believe, may prove useful:
"The best approach in war is to first attack the enemy’s strategy."
If this is correct, then the best approach for the U.S./the West — in the New/Reverse Cold War of today — this would seem to be to:
a. Attack and defeat the "containment" and "roll back" strategies of such entities as Russia and China. And:
b. Attack and defeat Russia and China's ability to use the natural ENEMIES of revolutionary change — to wit: the more conservative/the more traditional/the more no-change elements of the states and societies of the world — in these such containment and roll back processes.
As to how U.S./Western militaries might become involved in these such "attack and defeat the enemies containment and roll back strategies" processes, consider the following from LTG (ret.) Cleveland and from GEN (ret.) Votel (et. al) below:
"The Achilles’ heel of our authoritarian adversaries is their inherent fear of their own people; the United States must be ready to capitalize on this fear. … An American way of irregular war will reflect who we are as a people, our diversity, our moral code, and our undying belief in freedom."
(See the "Conclusion" of the Rand paper "The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir" by Charles T. Cleveland and Daniel Egel.)
"Advocates of UW first recognize that, among a population of self-determination seekers, human interest in liberty trumps loyalty to a self-serving dictatorship, that those who aspire to freedom can succeed in deposing corrupt or authoritarian rulers, and that unfortunate population groups can and often do seek alternatives to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice. Second, advocates believe that there is a valid role for the U.S. Government in encouraging and empowering these freedom seekers when doing so helps to secure U.S. national security interests."
(See the National Defense University Press paper "Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone" by Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin)
This would be great but LTG (ret.) Cleveland and from GEN (ret.) Votel are behind the times or stuck in some way. American freedoms are slowly erroding. As citizens we have far less freedoms then in 2001 and a signifcant change in freedoms beyond that to now 2024. This is due to corporate greed and politcal agendas which are slowly stripping away freedom in the United States. How is this any different then an authoritative regime?
I feel we are not quite there yest but in the next 20 years I fear for our future and that of our children. America has more laws and regulations then most countries that is not freedom.
An interesting article that examines an area that has been a concern for some time. I note relative to discussing the Army's capabilities and role in an aspect of the ever present demands of sustained security of the United States use of the term "competition" or the "competition phase." The discussion centers on the Army's, and for that matter, the country's ability to operate effectively in the competition phase (understood to be sustained operations short of war) stating that such failure may place the country in such situation that before any active operations developed it would have already lost its position before firing a shot. Specifically noted is one competitor's, the CCP's, "whole of government approach" that lends itself to already providing an advantage over the U.S. in the competition phase.
Essentially, this view squares with the sense I've gotten over the last decade and a half of gray zone operations by such competitors as the CCP, Russia, and Iran. The sense is that we may not be adapting and optimizing our forces and all levels of government to conduct sustained operations in the gray zone or as the article states, the competitive phase. There do appear to be initiatives in motion but they do not seem as focused on the larger strategic objective of sustaining necessary position to prevent fait accompli that defeats the entire U.S. enterprise before the threshold of active operations is reached.
If the country and Army are not as optimized as possible in the competition phase, noting the potential implied by the author to in a sense be defeated in detail before operations of forces occurs, we would be wise as a country to do what is necessary to improve our situation. It may be that initiatives have been and are in motion to address the need. But if not, or with the necessary sense of urgency to obtain needed ability and operate effectively in the competition phase, then the author's warning and observations should be heeded by leadership.
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All for imported smartphone recording…. Soldiers can't build better railway or device for America…
Time for an image change. We need to go back to the strong, fierce and violent but fair images and videos. Nothing pushed by media anymore makes us intimidating.
As long as the military is just another government job with benefits in perpetuity, it will harder to fight.
Diasabilty payments for all are the norm.
Well, after reading this plain spoken strategy for continued US imperialism, I get a clearer picture of why most of the world hates us.
I was never military I just saw this post on google main page
When I read this I wondered if the constant involvement in conflict was to stay prepared to fight a war when necessary which is a very thin line. The nature always gravitates to conflict.
Great article. It seems like modern war is using the same tactics as old wars, but with different names. Sherman's March To The Sea, burning crops grown for cash and to feed and clothe the army? A war with China will involve a march to the semiconductor fab!
The ability to have robust supply lines not just in logistics, as has been the operating mode of the US DOD since the end of WWII, but also robust production and repair, will be of the upmost importance.
For this, we need an educated workforce, as well as an intentionally resilient domestic manufacturing industry, as well as scalability. We need to be able to sustain what we need right now, as well as being able to recruit a new workforce when needed, to get Rosie the Riveter to pump out 10,000 planes a week when this new cold war turns hot. We need people who can do depot repair, not just swapping whole modules, but individual chips. We need people who can train new people at the drop of a hat.
The modern war is going to be about maintaining the supply lines, not with logistics, but with robust manufacturing and repair. That needs work NOW, with action within and outside of the military. 50 billion dollars for chip fabs matters, it needs continued commitment. I'd also like to see some pushes towards encouraging higher education. Right now there is a political faction who is trying to sabotage higher education. That must end if we want to remain competitive.
Okay, in the modern war Rosie will be making semiconductor wafers, not planes, but you get the point…
I agree 100%. When another entity shows a question to the point where they're stealing our goods or firing rockets near our bases we need to retaliate.
Somebody has been reading too much Sun Tzu and thinking they actually understand that nonsense. Decision to compete or pace or struggle are not made at the level of authority you are promoted or selected to. Those decisions come from people who are elected. Democracies are terrible at preemption and fantastic at retribution. We have rarely in history picked the right area and the right side to engage in to ward off conflict. Given our recent strategic missteps on where and what means to apply to the task, I have little confidence our leaders will get it right given how bad it has gone in the GWOT.
the Deterrence factor of a hyper-competant military is the only effective way to influence the bad guys.
I believe the article's main point is how the Chinese approach the issue. They have an "all-in" attitude, a top-to-bottom commitment to doing what they can to undermine the US around the world. Whether it's digital or economic warfare is immaterial. They have a shared vision and act in concert to accomplish their goal—something we do not see here at home. Instead, our politicians hold congressional hearings to discuss the validity of UFO/UAP videos presented by some of the shadiest characters to grace Capital Hill (which is saying a lot) or hold kangaroo courts to distract and dissuade people in an attempt to gain/retain power.