The current battlefield is riddled with multiple forms of contact. The combination of indirect fires, efficient and increasingly shortened kill chains, electromagnetic interference, the proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—including, one-way attack UAS, thermal optics, mines, and antitank guided missile favor the defender and impose considerable risk to offensive operations. In May 2023, it is estimated that the Ukrainian Army expended around ten thousand UAS a month to conduct reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and shaping operations. The US Army is working to adapt to these operational realities with, for instance, expanding its transformation in contact initiative to include new organizations and move into transformation in contact 2.0. But much of what that the Army envisions under that initiative—including its emphasis on short-, medium-, and long-range reconnaissance UAS—falls well short of what current battlefield conditions demand. Even if it could muster a more robust magazine of UAS platforms, the Army has not refined its offensive framework to account for the changing paradigm of ground combat. This paradigm favors the defender; it punishes decisive battle and humbles tactical leaders who believe they can simply suppress, breach, and seize their way to victory. The previous paradigm of maneuver-centric activity massed combat power, massed fires and effects, and required extensive rehearsals and synchronization. The current paradigm requires a framework that accounts for layered, multidomain threats, finite resources, tactical innovation and expedited decision making.
The characteristics of this new paradigm will require tactical leaders to employ a framework that extensively isolates enemy objectives, mutually suppresses key frontline positions and nodes, and selectively disintegrates or destroys enemy formations. To produce battlefield success, this framework must provide a governing logic to UAS employment and fires allocation, and it must fundamentally seek to preserve our most precious resource—our soldiers. The crucible of combat in today’s operational environment will expend resources and lives that the US Army, and the American people, have not experienced since the Korean War. As leaders, we owe it to our soldiers and families to assess the palatability, sustainability, and efficacy of offensive operations in today’s environment.
Ukraine and the Shattering of the Legacy Paradigm
The current tactical revolution of UAS—and its operational consequences—is illustrated by the attempted large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023. This episode in the Russia-Ukraine War deserves its own series of monographs and deeper analysis; however, even a brief description of what occurred highlights the doctrinal gaps and tactical limitations presented to mechanized formations conducting a deliberate breach in today’s environment—like the US Army’s armored brigade combat teams. To paraphrase the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, we must do more than retell the actions between belligerents—we must apply critical analysis of Ukrainian tactical leaders and their thought processes as they negotiated challenging strategic and political constraints.
Prior to Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, Russian occupiers constructed one of the “largest and most fortified [defensive lines] in Europe since World War Two.” This defensive line consisted of approximately two thousand miles of obstacle effects, layers of antitank ditches, defensive positions, mines, and layered direct and indirect weapon systems. These robust defensive measures led Western advisors to encourage a counteroffensive along a single axis—in the area of Zaporizhzhia—as opposed to the broad, three-prong attack that the Ukraine Army adopted by adding axes of attack in Berdiansk and Bakhmut, as well. (See here for a graphic representation of the two counteroffensive plans.)
Within each axis, Ukrainian forces encountered deliberate, layered, and integrated resistance. Despite Western material assistance and advising, Ukrainian forces did not achieve operational shock or substantial territorial gains. In fact, Ukrainian advancements did not advance more than approximately 7.5 kilometers along any front.
The Russian defenders, despite arguably poorer quality of troops and training, created a hellish landscape that would challenge any Western force. The tactical dilemma presented was a combined arms nightmare that required droves of platforms, resources, and time. Ultimately this tactical dilemma punished the attacker’s attempts at executing exactly what US doctrine calls for—the massing of combat power to penetrate and then exploit the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses. The tactical environment nullified the strengths of a maneuver-centric approach that centered on finite mounted assets.
It is difficult to convey the countless variables that informed Ukrainian decision-making; however, what is certain is that the Ukrainian Army applied a combined arms breach into the problem set described. The combined arms breach—which doctrinally requires a framework to suppress, breach, and seize at a desired point of penetration—failed. Not only did the framework fail to achieve tactical success, but it failed operationally along three distinct axes of advance.
Would the US Army Do Better?
This case study requires careful future analysis; however, as stewards of our profession and resources, we should consider the efficacy of the offensive frameworks the US Army currently has in the context of the tactical environment Ukrainian forces found in 2023. Our discussion leads us to ask whether the task organization and material solutions updated based on transformation in contact 2.0, applied by US Army armored formations, would yield measurably more successful outcomes in this environment. Simply stated—could the US Army do any better than the Ukrainian armed forces given the same operational environment?
The current paradigm of ground combat, made explicit by Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, suggests seven variables that will inform the future construct of offensive operations:
1. Battlefield Transparency. UAS and precision fires enable all belligerents to see, sense, and deliver effects well beyond the FLET/FLOT (forward line of enemy troops and forward line of own troops). This new tactical revolution and changing characteristic of war imposes a grave threat to massed formations. If we cannot mass, how we will breach? And if we cannot breach, how will we seize terrain?
2. Mobility. Mines have resurfaced as a major obstacle to offensive maneuver. Our current inventory of plows, rollers, mobile bridges, mine-clearing line charges, and other mobility platforms are not sufficient to reduce the density of mines employed by Russian defensive positions.
3. Combat Power Preservation. Military forces require meaningful ways to generate mass without expending high volumes of mounted platforms and lives. This observation lends further credence to the need for small, plentiful, and distributed drones that could serve as a contact layer across the tactical FLET/FLOT. This could be a way to preserve combat power until conditions are met to seize terrain—but only if the United States invests in the required number of stockpiles required to make this a reality.
4. Changes to the Operations Process. Tactical formations need methods to distribute orders and execute the operations process in faster planning cycles and across dispersed locations. The operations process must keep pace with the modern battlefield. Our current training paradigm conditions us to execute deliberate planning and troop-leading procedures across multiple hours or even days. We then rehearse the plan on a static terrain model before disseminating updates to static command posts. The current operational environment requires formations to execute the operations process through distributed locations and under constant observation. We must not allow the operations process to prevent us from gaining and maintaining the initiative.
5. Battlefield Geometry. UAS, including one-way attack UAS, along with electronic warfare capabilities, a variety of sensors, and weapons standoff will change the scope and scale of division, brigade, battalion, and company responsibilities. Legacy planning considerations for unit frontages and depths must account for extended sensing and strike ranges.
6. Resourcing at the Decisive Echelon. The Army’s transformation in contact initiative seeks to improve the lethality of brigade combat teams; however, as a force, we have not defined which echelon will be the decisive command. US Army divisions and brigades of the future will still lack the appropriate mass, resources, logistics, and communications to act independently of their higher headquarters within the emergent operational environment.
7. Information Flow and Decision-Making. We have yet to understand the impact UAS will have on the relationship between information flow and decision-making. Our Army employs a quality noncommissioned officer corps and demands calculated risk taking and initiative; however, an empowered tactical formation assuming independent action may unknowingly maneuver toward its own demise. Future offensive frameworks should define conditions in which tactical formations exercise prudent risk and initiative under the umbrella of a deliberate offensive framework.
Based on observations of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, and informed by an understanding of these seven variables, we can establish a problem statement:
Given the high efficacy of enemy UAS, mines, and precision fires, how does the US Army manage high volumes of data across distributed locations, and then aggregate combat power in a method that enables operational endurance for follow-on operations while managing risk and preserving combat power?
Toward a Framework for the New Paradigm of Ground Combat
Again, this inquiry deserves a dedicated study supported by the tremendous resources from the Combined Arms Center, Army Futures Command, and the Maneuver Center of Excellence; however, available (unclassified) information suggests that the modern battlefield requires the US Army to reevaluate offensive frameworks if it chooses to maintain operational endurance against a prepared enemy or within a protracted campaign. Based on the variables and problem statement described above, we propose a framework, designed principally for armored brigade combat teams, that respects the defensive layers of the enemy, acknowledges the tactical revolution of UAS, and preserves our most valuable assets until conditions are set: Isolate, Suppress, Destroy.
Isolate
This phase requires the brigade to isolate battalion and company objectives. This phase does not attrit enemy formations, but degrades, dislocates, disintegrates, and disrupts key enemy systems (e.g., command-and-control nodes, electronic warfare platforms, fuel and ammunition stocks, and radar and other sensors). This phase requires the brigade to stabilize the FLET/FLOT and cover a frontage of over one hundred kilometers, compared to the legacy planning factors of three to eight kilometers. In this scenario, the brigade synchronizes and orchestrates a collection plan that leverages its organic assets as well as medium-range reconnaissance UAS and the family of UAS that reside at the squadron and battalion level. The brigade, concurrent with squadron security operations, will build the digital common operational picture of the isolated area. Simultaneously, the brigade dynamically retasks the squadron and battalions to deliver collection and fires tasks.
The squadron and battalions will contribute to the digital common operational picture, collect on the enemy, dynamically task companies and troops to deploy medium- and short-range reconnaissance UAS, and rapidly execute the operations process.
The new paradigm will demand much of companies and troops. These tactical formations will cover extended frontages within the brigade FLOT, maintain dispersion, maximize physical and digital concealment, contribute to the digital common operational picture, and be prepared to dynamically deploy UAS or ground combat power. Of note, this phase will require squadron troops to extend their legacy frontages to account for long- and medium-range reconnaissance UAS, as well as the ranges of commercial, off-the-shelf UAS. In the aggregate, these platforms will solidify the brigade FLET/FLOT as isolation occurs.
At the end state of this phase, enemy battle positions are isolated from higher or adjacent communication, are unable to synchronize fires, collection, or effects, and are unable to orchestrate a responsive counterattack or coordinated defense. These activities set the conditions for mutual suppression in zone.
Mutually Suppress
This phase masses the effects of direct, indirect, UAS, and all forms of contact onto select enemy battle positions. The brigade and battalions continue isolation measures; however, this phase should see a commitment of brigade- and battalion-level assets against enemy objectives. The brigade will continue its effects against enemy command-and-control nodes, fire direction centers, and sensors while prioritizing enemy positions. This phase requires battalions to mutually mass on select objectives.
The squadron and battalions will continue to collect on the enemy and disintegrate enemy formations, maintain a digital common operational picture, direct troop- and company-level collection, and mass lethal effects against enemy battle positions.
Companies and troops will continue to cover a frontage of extended distances, maintain dispersion, conduct survivability, contribute to the brigade common operational picture, conduct troop-leading procedures from disaggregated positions, and prepare to rapidly seize terrain.
At the end state of this phase, enemy command-and-control nodes are dislocated from subordinate units and frontline formations, and subordinate units are dislodged from each other. Select enemy battle positions receive massed fires and are severely attrited. Lastly, aggregated effects create the conditions for ground maneuver and selective destruction of critical enemy command-and-control nodes and sensors.
Selectively Destroy
This phase facilitates the point of penetration and offensive seizure. This phase also commits ground combat power—which incurs the greatest risk for the attacker. The brigade will continue to collect, disintegrate enemy counterattacks, destroy enemy command-and-control nodes and sensors, deny the enemy from reinforcing, and dynamically retask subordinate elements.
The squadron and battalions continue to collect on the enemy, mass effects, and synchronize ground maneuver. They could also dynamically retask subordinates in the event of enemy collapse, withdrawal, or consolidation.
Companies and troops should lead with metal on metal—with ground unmanned ground systems including robotic breaching assets. These platforms will shape ground objectives through direct fire and will likely absorb enemy direct and indirect responses. Ground maneuver will then quickly aggregate to conduct breaching operations and ground seizure. Formations will continue to contribute to the brigade common operational picture and be prepared to respond to emergent conditions, conduct resupply, and consolidate.
At the end state of this phase, enemy command-and-control nodes are dislocated from their subordinates and unable to orchestrate a coherent response. Select enemy positions are cleared and terrain is seized. Lastly, the brigade FLOT advances while retaining sufficient combat power for follow-on operations.
The Way Ahead
What is required for the Army to truly be prepared for the new paradigm of ground combat and its many inherent challenges—challenges like those Russia presented to attacking Ukrainian forces in 2023?
First, as stewards of the profession we should encourage healthy discourse to address these challenges and emergent threats. We should leverage the work already being done by Army Futures Command, the Maneuver Center of Excellence, and the Maneuver Capability Development Integration Directorate; however, as tactical leaders, battalion and brigade leadership who are implementing emerging capabilities owe bottom-up feedback to employ new material solutions and integrate them into a coherent framework that is palatable to our political leaders, sustainable with Army fiscal resources, and effective against our enemies. We can ill afford an operational setback like the one Ukrainian forces met with during their 2023 counteroffensive.
Second, the Army should consider experimentation with 3D printing to complement the functions of short-, medium-, and long-range reconnaissance UAS. According to a white paper produced by the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, this new formation successfully 3D printed a series of drones while supporting an exercise in the Philippines. Army leaders and logisticians across the Pacific are beginning to see the merits of harnessing 3D printing and commercial, off-the-shelf acquisitions, which can compound advantages as 3D printing alleviates the burden of push-and-pull logistics, and could serve as an asymmetric advantage. Alongside this effort, the Army should leverage commercial, off-the-shelf small to medium UAS and components. The 1st Multi-Domain Task Force has experimented with and validated both of these modular concepts in the First Island Chain. For example, an experimental fixed-wing UAS—3d printed and built with commercial, off-the-shelf components—was built by members of the formation at a cost of just $7,000 per copy, dramatically less than the purchase prices of the Raven ($60,000) or Puma ($250,000). Future experimentation by the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force will modularize the payload of UAVs to account for evolving electromagnetic threats and operational requirements. Achieving localized mass will require the force to seek similar cost-effective measures.
Third, future dialogue should account for other novel initiatives, such as those explored in the Army Future Command’s Project Convergence capstone events. These experiments aggressively seek to advance concepts of combined joint all domain operations. It also ensures that Army future capabilities can integrate with effects from the joint force. In this extended campaign of learning, experiments should dive into the tactical level as we prepare maneuver formations to operate in a new paradigm. The Army’s recent willingness to experiment with new capabilities at CTCs (combat training centers) is commendable; however, we must still determine the cognitive direction of maneuver formations as we work to refine our operational approach to fight in the new paradigm.
Fourth, the Army should consider experimenting with tactical offensive frameworks that account for short-, medium-, and long-range reconnaissance UAS, as well as commercial, off-the-shelf systems, in support of brigade and battalion objectives. It should also consider the implications of task organization during breaching, security operations, and all offensive operations given the dynamic revolution of tactical UAS.
Fifth, the Army must refine the geographical scope, scale, and tactical responsibilities of brigade, battalion, and company formations. If a battalion has the capacity to sense 20–40 kilometers beyond the FLOT, then it absorbs a responsibility to deconflict with higher headquarters and other organizations. In turn, the brigade owes targeting priority, routes, timing, and synchronization to multiple battalions to deliver effects in an era of extended sensing and ranging. Lack of a central orchestrator risks target overkill, or worse, a desynchronized offensive effort. Past Army doctrine anticipated that an enemy “tank or motorized rifle company’s attack frontage is 500 to 800 meters” and that an attacking enemy battalion’s frontage is “1 to 2 kilometers.” The current paradigm, based on observations from the Russia-Ukraine War, suggests that battalions will sense, deliver, and synchronize activity well beyond this legacy range. We must update our offensive planning factors once we firmly establish the governing logic of our offensive framework. We must also account for the added requirements we are placing on our tactical commanders—and find creative ways to enable them to execute what this new environment requires of them.
Lastly, if the Army considers adapting its offensive frameworks, then it must also update unit training requirements; however, the challenge of doctrinal, organizational, and tactical renovation is not new to our service. As an analysis of a major division reorganization that began in the 1970s described it, “the brigaded 4-regiment division of World War I, the 3-regiment division of World War II, the five-sided battle group division of the ‘pentomic era,’ and the flexible ROAD division introduced in the 1960s [all] resulted from a recognition of obsolescence.” If the Army identifies a similar obsolescence in its organization and doctrine today—if they are not optimally suited to the current operational environment—it should take steps toward change similar to those of its past.
The US Army must be prepared for the greatest challenges presented to our nation. And as leaders and stewards of the profession, we have an obligation to play our roles and explore methods to employ emergent technology and develop a framework that will yield battlefield success.
Colonel Bryan J. Bonnema is currently the future operations chief at V Corps. He will take command of 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division in June 2025.
Lieutenant Colonel Moises Jimenez is an exercise planner and exchange officer at Pacific Fleet headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii. He will take command of 2-5 CAV, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division in May 2025.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Pfc. Frederick Poirier, US Army