In 2016, RAND ran a series of wargames examining a contingency in the Baltics. NATO did not do well. Russia often gained control of the Baltic states before NATO could respond, creating a fait accompli and dealing a severe blow to the alliance.
At the time, US forces in Europe had atrophied. Both ground and air forces had been drawn down to respond to threats elsewhere. US forces were still largely postured in Germany, a relic of the Cold War. This posed vulnerabilities to NATO’s new borders in both the northeast and the southeast. While under the NATO deterrence umbrella, the Baltic states in particular were viewed as defenseless to Russian aggression. Though NATO began to improve its posture with a tripwire force, it remained far from completely deterring Russian forces.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine fundamentally changed Europe’s security environment. Finland and Sweden—both longtime neutral states—decided to join NATO. This in turn drastically changed Europe’s airpower from its mid-2010s levels. What do these new alliance members bring to the air fight, and how does this impact the wargame scenario in the Baltics?
New NATO Capabilities
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO brings significant additional airpower contributions. In the case of Finland, those contributions are a function of its fleet of aircraft. Finland has ordered sixty-four F-35s, the largest order in Europe after the United Kingdom. These orders represent the equivalent of multiple squadrons, either fighter or electronic attack—capabilities that offer a significant contribution for penetrating and rolling back Russian air defenses.
In Sweden’s case, NATO also gains valuable airpower in the form of its operational aircraft. Swedish forces operate around seventy-five JAS 39 Gripens. The Gripen has modern electric warfare capabilities and high readiness that can perform expeditionary operations—limiting Russia’s ability to target aircraft on the ground. Moreover, Sweden has an active defense aerospace industrial base. Few other NATO nations have active production lines capable of producing modern fighter aircraft.
And in both cases, geography matters. Both Finland’s and Sweden’s proximity allows NATO air forces to stage closer to the Baltics. This reduces logistical constraints and better enables the alliance to sustain air operations, while also increasing aircraft persistence.
Implications for NATO and US Forces
To better defend the Baltics after the wargames, RAND proposed a series of initiatives. NATO air forces would serve as the hammer to counter Russian advances, while ground forces would be the anvil to regain territory. The issue was amassing sufficient aircraft and armor in time for NATO to respond. These new allies, however, help to address that issue in two ways.
First, Finland and Sweden increase NATO’s high-end airpower capacity. This means that the United States would not have to flow its own airpower capabilities—many of which are based back in the United States—into theater as quickly and enables it to deter aggression elsewhere in the world. Finland’s F-35s allow it reach into Russian-defended airspace from the outset of hostilities, while Sweden’s Gripen fleet can quickly support ground forces by performing strike missions.
Second, Finish and Swedish bases are closer to the Baltics than most other NATO bases from which aircraft would operate in the event of a conflict, offering shorter transit times and more time to support ground forces. For instance, Finland’s accession imposes a dilemma on Russian military planners, forcing them to consider balancing offensive plans in, say, Estonia while considering defensive operations to protect their own borders. Sweden, on the other hand, offers expeditionary basing options on Gotland Island; though it was assumed as available to NATO forces during the wargame, its certain participation in the fight today allows military planners a greater set of choices. Together, both nations also provide valuable transit routes for NATO aircraft to reinforce the battlespace, while avoiding Kaliningrad’s air defenses. Forward basing also reduces the reliance on NATO tankers—which proved a limiting factor in wargames—while increasing on-station time, thus allowing additional time to counterattack adversary forces.
Should a protracted conflict emerge, Sweden’s industrial capacity would be critical for NATO to recapitalize attrition. Of course, this industrial infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to Russian attack in the event of a conflict. But from a Russian perspective, that poses an enhanced dilemma, as commanders must select from a wider range of targets in any initial salvo. Sweden’s industrial capacity also becomes an important bedrock for aircraft regeneration, which Russia would need to attack to sustain its Baltic offensive. Saab’s increasing footprint in US and European markets allows it to seamlessly integrate with NATO forces.
Nordic Checkmate Against Russia?
New basing, increased capacity, and improved industrial resiliency all improve NATO and US military’s planners’ options in response to a Russian contingency.
More flexibility to the West’s response is a game-changer not just in the Baltics but overall planning in airpower. Less ambiguity in the Baltic region allows US air forces to commit some capability to deter adversaries from aggression in other theaters—like an opportunistic invasion of Taiwan. These new members also bring NATO closer to the fight and make it better able to support ground forces. And integrating industrial capacity into the alliance—like Saab’s entry into the NATO market—also allows more options and competition in Europe’s defense industrial base, generating new opportunities for collaboration.
Thanks to its renewed airpower, NATO’s hammer can further deter Russia from going on the offensive. This, combined with more flexible NATO defenses, leaves Moscow with few good options in the Baltics.
Editor’s note: This article originally stated that Finland had ordered F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and E/A-18G Growlers in addition to the sixty-four F-35s it ordered. In fact, the F-35s were selected instead of the Super Hornets and Growlers. The text has been updated to reflect this.
Paul Cormarie is a policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a former researcher with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
John Hoehn is an associate policy researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and former military analyst with the Congressional Research Service.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Sgt. Patrik Orcutt, US Army
You might want to fix or retract this article, because Finland has no Superhornets and has no intention of buying any, and the same goes for the Growlers. US approved a potential sale of those planes to Finland, but they came second in the HX competition while F-35 won. Thus Finland will be receiving 64 f-35s in this decade and no other combat aircraft.
Finland most certainly did NOT order Superhornets and Growlers. It was an option, the bidding was won by the F-35. PLEASE pay attention to actualities when writing articles with interesting headings.
The Super Hornet+Growler combo was offered in the HX competition to replace Finland's C/D Hornet fleet, but in the end the F-35 was chosen. So Finland will not operate both systems, only the F-35. But Finland and Sweden will still be a great addition to NATO air power.
Fact check your article. This is untrue "Finland ordered fifty-eight F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and an additional fourteen E/A-18G Growlers"
We did though order sixty-four F-35s,
What do you expect Virtaava? News goup's don't exactly put much resources into any sort of investigative budgets when they'd get more views with purely click bait headlines. I'm more impressed this was as accurate it was AND issued a correction
Please check the parameters on the war game and while you at it on your gen AI research tools. There is no Super hornets coming to Finland, only 64 F-35.
The US senator Tom Cotton said it well: "Finland has a 900,000-man reserve it can draw on in time of crisis and can field an army of 280,000 when fully mobilized; which means Finland’s reserves are larger than the reserves of France, Germany, and Italy—combined. According to scholars at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Finland has one of the strongest artillery forces in Europe, with more rocket launchers and howitzers than France, Germany, or the United Kingdom. It has a strong fleet of fighter jets and plans to buy sixty-four American-made F-35s by the end of the decade"
With respect to all the technical expertise offered by the RAND Corporation, I'm pretty sure the US will be bankrupt, aka known as being in the position no other country is going to buy US Treasuries to finance US debt, long before ROOOssia is going to invade.