I had the pleasure of listening to Eric Maddox describe his story behind finding the hiding location of Saddam Hussein (Operation Red Dawn) while he visited the United States Military Academy in January. One issue he discussed was his frustration with his initial failure in performing interrogations over his first two week period in Iraq. He described how he was following the military intelligence interrogation methods to a “T” but could not get any useful intelligence out of his detained persons.
Mr. Maddox stated to the effect that his training prepared him for enemy prisoners of war, who in the least would provide some basic information about themselves and that he was at a loss with how to deal with civilians. Mr. Maddox then went on to describe how he changed his method of interrogation to be more casual and conversational in nature in order to learn more about the detainee, his family, his likes and dislikes, and basic background information not contained in his capture report.
The issue is the divide between military police (law enforcement) and military intelligence (intelligence) and the lack of trust and understanding of how they mutually support one another as members of the strategic security community.
Upon his declaration of this new method he used, I immediately thought why did he not just use what law enforcement uses, in-direct conversation is a typically approach and is not a “new method.” It has hundreds of years of success behind its practice. One can turn on the television and watch COPS, or Alaska State Troopers and observe how law enforcement addresses persons and gains valuable intelligence from them. And to caveat this intelligence is often on a short time suspense of actionable intelligence to prevent further crimes.
The issue is the divide between military police (law enforcement) and military intelligence (intelligence) and the lack of trust and understanding of how they mutually support one another as members of the strategic security community. The 9/11 Commission Report hit on this issue with the civilian sector (who have made great strides in sharing best practices and information) but where does the military as a whole rate on this issue? Is there still this divide that lead to Mr. Maddox and future interrogators like himself of being deprived of the best techniques to be successful on a short timeline? Mr. Maddox ended his lecture with stating that the military intelligence school still relies on methods that he learned twenty years ago.
Doctrinally, military intelligence supports military operations while military police intelligence supports investigations. These investigations are of criminal activities and includes investigation of US persons in the military. Military intelligence is not authorized to investigate US persons suspected of criminal involvement whether passive or active support. But what is an insurgent or terrorist considered? The overwhelming amount of time these “insurgents” or “terrorists” are convicted in court of crimes under a legal code that criminalizes particular actions these individuals undertook. So why is there a line when it comes to these two communities of intelligence and military police sharing best practices? Are we purposely stove piping ourselves into being less efficient and effective?
The regulations regarding the military police interview and interrogation techniques are available to the general public, as are military intelligence. As a law enforcement professional through my academic exploration, I have taken several courses in intelligence analysis and I am surprised at how separated in literature these communities are. I keep thinking to myself why has someone not written a blended manual with both strategies? I will admit I used what I have read in law enforcement and intelligence manuals and found success in blending approach techniques from both communities. However, my base is built upon the philosophy of treating people with dignity and respect. And this underlying philosophy guides how military police interview or interrogate detained persons. I view this authority-detained person’s relationship as a negotiation. Negotiation preparation consists of interests, options, legitimacy, alternatives, commitments, relationship, and communication. What I believe Mr. Maddox unknowingly discovered was that by sharing shared interest using dignity and respect as an understood condition of the negotiation process produces actionable intelligence.
I am not trying to undermine what the intelligence community or the military police community teaches its young interrogators and police officers. But has there been a serious look from both sides of what techniques benefit both and can be incorporated into existing training and education systems? Why are we not cross training our strategic community professionals in multiple techniques? Is a combined publication between the branches not possible? Clearly, we all have to come together and stop stove piping best practices and allow the smoke from both chimneys to merge. At the end of the day it is about protecting national interests and removing more enemy from the equation is always a plus.
[Photo by Staff Sgt. Dennis J. Henry Jr]
It is my belief that the Army has been looking closely at this issue. I agree that interrogators need to use the best form that will draw the best intelligence.
I recently wrote an article about the Additional Skill Identifier 3Q and performed ample research. It seems that they are taught to use these methods, but I believe stress from leaders draws them back into techniques that do not work.
I hope that pride can be put to the side and we can learn from each other. The post I wrote is http://www.part-time-commander.com/army-asi-3q-strategic-debriefer-and-interrogator/
The reason the two fields are separate is the regulatory environment that each operate under. The law enforcement community has to follow US Constitution and UCMJ, as most of its suspects are US citizens. The Intelligence Community must adhere to the Geneva Conventions but cannot, because of EO 12333, investigate US citizens.
The typical purpose of a law enforcement interrogation is to elicit an admissible confession. This is why they learn the Reid technique. The purpose of an intelligence interrogation is to elicit honest and useful intelligence. They get the 17 approaches.
Intel interrogators have a larger box to operate in, but also have special challenges (using interpreters, lack of cultural knowledge, ect). CI specialists sometimes cross train in both Reid and the intel approaches.
I’d suspect that MPs don’t want their investigators cross training with intel folks who have that larger box. I’d also suspect that Intel folks don’t want anything to do with anything that might hint at a violation of EO12333.
Check out the book on the interrogators who found Zarqawi. The best tended to be intel reservists with a law background and had essentially read from both books.
If you want to dive very deep, look at the Key Leader Engagement training the USMC sends their people through from their Culture Center and compare that with the old Ethnographic Interviewing training from the old Human Terrain System.