Recently, the Moscow Times reported that Russia would coordinate a deal with China and North Korea to allow Chinese ships to navigate through a seventeen-kilometer stretch of the Tumen River to the Rason Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on the Pacific coast. The Tumen forms the border between China and North Korea, but its final section marks the border between North Korea and Russia. This stretch of the river runs alongside the Rason SEZ, with the port city of Rason situated a few miles down the coast from the river’s mouth, where it empties into the Sea of Japan. The initiation of this deal took place following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in May and as Putin met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in June. It comes against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine that Russia has been engaged in for over two years. As a result of the protracted conflict, Russia has drawn closer to North Korea in recent months, importing weapons from North Korea to fill its own depleted caches. And in fact, the Rason SEZ has evolved into a significant point of North Korea–Russia cooperation, recently implicated in North Korean arms shipments to Russia for use in Ukraine.
But the deal also has implications for a region far beyond Rason, and indeed beyond Ukraine. Isolated from the international community due to its aggressive war, Russian Arctic development has stagnated. Foreign capital investment proved inaccessible, with China being the only viable source of support left. With limited options to access the materiel it needs to continue its war, Putin was prompted to explore areas of cooperation with North Korea and extend long desired economic concessions to China in order to keep supply lines open for his military operations in Ukraine. This in turn offers China an opportunity to strengthen its position in the Arctic, as Russia’s military needs and its deepening military ties with North Korea can be leveraged by China to take steps toward its objective of becoming a “near-Arctic state.” Long excluded from substantive involvement in the Arctic by Russia, China is now poised to take advantage of the geopolitical exigencies that its neighbor faces.
The Rason SEZ is central to China’s Arctic strategy, frequently featured in Chinese academic and government studies. For instance, Sun Wei of China’s National Development and Reform Commission highlights Rason’s pivotal role as a key node for China’s Arctic strategy in his article on “the Construction of the Northeast Asia Arctic Corridor.” The trilateral negotiations for river access, Rason’s role in supplying munitions to Russia, and increased investments in infrastructure all combine to support China’s Arctic ambitions and warrant a deeper analysis of the three states’ coordination in this field.
China’s Strategic Objectives
Given Rason’s historical role in trilateral cooperation involving Russia, North Korea, and China, recent developments there may reignite Chinese interest in Arctic shipping and security. Understanding both the original intentions and future strategic goals of the SEZ is crucial for assessing its implications on regional stability.
China’s strategic interest in Rason is rooted in its perception of the Arctic as a pivotal frontier for interstate competition. Authoritative scholars from state and military institutions in China foresee the melting of the Arctic as bringing significant changes to global energy, trade dynamics, and political power, and thus advocate for China’s strategic positioning in this region. As the Arctic has become more traversable in recent years due to climate change, the role it plays in global competition is still relatively new and dynamic. Much like China’s initiatives in space and the deep sea, China’s Arctic ventures seek to make its presence regular and definite in an environment that is relatively unexplored, and so sets the stage for future claims when opportunities arise for China to extract resources or serve as a leader in the Arctic region.
As a more immediate consideration, the primary objective of North Korea’s Rason SEZ initially centered on significant cost savings in global trade and shipping. Chinese scholars have underscored the potential cost efficiencies of the Northeast Arctic Passage, which could reduce the distance from China’s coastal ports to the East Coast of North America from 5,500 to 3,500 nautical miles annually, resulting in estimated savings of $53.3 billion to $127.4 billion in international shipping costs, while also mitigating piracy risks.
Beyond global trade considerations, scholars emphasize natural resources and energy reserves as pivotal factors influencing Chinese policy toward Rason and the Arctic. According to Gang Chen, “The melting of the ice in the Arctic Ocean attracts China because an ice-free Arctic environment will not only provide shorter shipping routes but also access to untapped energy and mineral resources.” China has actively pursued agreements with other nations to secure access to these resources, exemplified by bilateral accords with Iceland aimed at developing Arctic energy resources and acquiring geothermal technology and expertise. Additionally, China has played a significant role in Russian energy extraction and shipping initiatives in the region, despite Russia’s attempts to exclude Chinese partners from cooperation. Now, with the war in Ukraine significantly hampering Russian economic and military activity, Chinese assistance in the Arctic has become an absolute necessity, one that Beijing is sure to use to its advantage.
Trilateral relations between China, Russia, and North Korea are critical in this regard. To further one of Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiatives, the “Polar Silk Road,” China invested in Russia’s Zarubino port, which is connected to the Russian Far Eastern Railway and sits near the border with North Korea. China has invested in liquid natural gas infrastructure—both the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects—in Russia. China’s state-owned oil and gas firm, China National Petroleum Corporation, purchased 20 percent of Yamal LNG’s shares in 2013, and the project’s completion was aided by China’s Silk Road Fund, which purchased an additional 9.9 percent share. The Rason SEZ could figure prominently in China’s Arctic energy plans as the first and last node in China’s Arctic strategy. Rason can act as a gateway for energy to flow from these locations back to China without traversing traditional maritime routes. These investments necessitated the building of railways and highways linking Rason to China’s Jilin province, making the port a key node for China’s Arctic strategy. The negotiations to secure China’s access to the last stretch of the Tumen River would enhance the strategic value of the Rason SEZ by providing a direct, cost-efficient waterway that can handle larger volumes of material, complementing the rail and highway infrastructure and boosting China’s resource extraction, trade potential, and access to the Arctic.
Potential for Trilateral Cooperation
Chinese investments in Rason and the Arctic have more recently exemplified a strategic approach aimed at safeguarding established shipping routes and energy extraction points. This strategy is underpinned by significant technological investments, such as the deployment of advanced icebreakers like Xuelong 1 and Xuelong 2, which are crucial for navigating and ensuring access through Arctic waters. Furthermore, China’s commitment to scientific exploration, including deep-sea mapping and sonar testing, not only supports civilian research initiatives but also holds military implications by providing essential data for submarine operations. The attempted acquisition of an abandoned naval base in Greenland further underscores China’s strategic calculus, suggesting ambitions to establish logistical and potentially military infrastructure that could bolster its presence in the region.
Despite this confluence of factors—Rason’s role in supplying North Korean munitions to Russia, its strategic value vis-à-vis Arctic access, and China’s Arctic ambitions—the potential for trilateral strategic cooperation among China, Russia, and potentially North Korea has been somewhat overlooked. From a military standpoint, such realignment could foster significant technology sharing, especially between China and Russia. Russia’s extensive fleet of icebreakers, outnumbering that of the United States twenty to one, suggests promising avenues for collaboration and resource sharing in Arctic navigation. Moreover, Russia’s possession of Arctic-capable drones represents another valuable asset that could enhance joint reconnaissance and operational capabilities in polar regions if shared with China. Operationally, Russia has established a dedicated Arctic military command and conducted extensive Arctic exercises. Additionally, Russia’s substantial investment in constructing around five hundred military structures in the Arctic since 2014 presents tangible opportunities for its trilateral cooperation and combined operability.
The United States Needs Countermeasures
Russia, China, and North Korea’s cooperation is cause for concern as all three states have engaged in activities that threaten the rules-based liberal international order, with major strategic ramifications for the United States if it does not act upon this concern. The potential for adversary cooperation and projected ice-free summers by 2030 underscore the need for a permanent US special operations detachment in Alaska, serving as the core for an Arctic headquarters. Kodiak Island is an ideal location due to the existing Naval Special Warfare Command presence and a Coast Guard air station. The force will also need staging bases in remote Arctic Circle locations to exercise C4ISR capabilities (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), store supplies of specialized armaments and munitions, and maintain infrastructure for presence patrols and cyber operations in peacetime. Reactivation of special operations units is also a viable option.
US Army Special Forces teams are particularly well suited for austere operating environments in the Arctic due to their specialized skill sets, one of which is interacting with and learning from indigenous populations who have extensive experience living and working in the Arctic. Proposals to employ the Alaskan National Guard as enablers and recruit indigenous populations into its ranks would constitute a significant force multiplier as difficult weather and terrain conditions emphasize the importance of the human element in military operations. The Arctic’s extreme conditions will demand specialized capabilities for effective operations. For instance, equipment must be engineered to withstand extreme temperatures, as standard fuels and batteries fail in such conditions and protective equipment shatters during polar airborne operations. Proximity to Russia also necessitates robust operational security to mitigate risks from espionage, electronic warfare, and surveillance.
The military can effectively train a potential Arctic special operations force through a multifaceted approach. Domestically, leveraging existing cold-weather training facilities such as the Northern Warfare Training Center provides essential basic and advanced training in Arctic-specific tactics and operations. The US Army Mountain Warfare School is also another venue for receiving expert instruction relating to such environments, with ten members of the school recently traveling to the High North of Canada to conduct Arctic training exercises with the Canadian Army. Additionally, military analysts recommend international collaboration, such as establishing a combined special operations forces training center in extreme environments like India’s Himalayas. This initiative not only allows US operators to gain firsthand expertise in challenging terrain but also enhances bilateral partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.
The establishment of the Rason Special Economic Zone in the 1990s aimed initially to foster limited capitalism and attract foreign investment. However, recent developments underscore a growing strategic alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea. China’s critical involvement in the Rason SEZ could catalyze significant Arctic engagement as North Korea continues supplying Russia arms from the port. As China is the pacing threat for the United States, Chinese assertions of “near-Arctic state” status highlight strategic intent aimed at expanding influence in this vital region. Enhancing US Arctic capabilities and signaling unilateral and multilateral resolve in the region are imperative steps to mitigate emerging security risks.
Dr. Jake Rinaldi is a defense analyst in the China Landpower Studies Center within the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. Dr. Rinaldi holds a PhD and MPhil from the University of Cambridge, where his doctoral dissertation examined China–North Korea military relations, and his MPhil focused on China’s nuclear forces.
Brandon Tran is a cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point, majoring in international affairs (foreign policy and security studies) and Chinese studies. He hopes to commission as a military intelligence officer.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons
