In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
— Sun Tzu, The Art of War
The plan on paper was that the indirect actions were primary, and that direct action was only meant to buy space and time. But in practice, direct action came to rule the day.
—Admiral Eric Olson, former commander of US Special Operations Command, October 8, 2020
After two decades of waging irregular warfare the United States remains ineffective at influencing populations. Rather than using its power to achieve legitimacy through persuasion and influence, the United States relies on two coercive approaches to irregular warfare: directly attacking enemy forces and training partner forces to directly attack enemy forces. The military refers to these as “direct” and “indirect” approaches, descriptions that differ according to narrow means, the who, rather than broader ways, the how. As a former Special Forces officer describes it, “both [approaches] come to the same place: killing somebody. The question then becomes who pulls the trigger.” This poor conceptualization leads the US military to overly focus on units and capabilities that employ coercion and neglect those that influence populations.
Why has the US military’s understanding of irregular warfare converged on the use of coercive force over the last two decades? In 1989, retired Colonel Arthur Lykke published a renowned article in Military Review defining strategy as the sum of ends, ways, and means. The reductionist formula has led to “an overemphasis on simplistically applying resources” while failing to develop creative ideas for how to employ them. The tendency to focus on means plagued the United States as it waged counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns around the world after 9/11. Options focused too narrowly on the exact size and composition of US forces to the exclusion of how those forces should be employed. Instead, irregular warfare must be understood according to the ways, such as the type of power employed and the intended effect of that power. Alternative ways of population influence include information operations (persuasion) and defense institution building (inducement); though they have played a supporting role to coercive force in the post-9/11 era, they have not been considered independent approaches. State adversaries have taken note, adapting their own strategies to capitalize on America’s inability to conduct successful information and influence operations.
Both special operations and conventional forces have misused conceptions of indirect and direct approaches, with negative implications for how the United States views its options in irregular warfare. As the United States faces increasingly difficult challenges from great power rivals, as well as continued threats from nonstate actors, it needs to invest in capabilities built for noncoercive influence and stop overapplying coercive force to address irregular warfare problem sets.
Direct and Indirect Approaches
Western militaries’ conception of the “indirect approach” emerged from British soldier and military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart, who, in response to what he believed was the avoidable disaster of World War I, argued that militaries should avoid the main strengths of their adversaries and instead attack their physical and psychological vulnerabilities. US doctrine combines Hart’s argument with Clausewitz’s concept of a “center of gravity” to describe direct and indirect approaches. According to Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, direct approaches apply combat power against an enemy’s center of gravity, whereas indirect approaches attack an enemy’s center of gravity through critical vulnerabilities while avoiding its strengths.
The delineation of direct and indirect approaches makes sense when planning conventional operations against a known adversary in a defined battlespace such as cutting supply lines along the Western Front. These concepts do not easily translate to irregular warfare, which the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy defines as “a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy.” Problematically, the next sentence declares that irregular warfare “favors indirect and asymmetric approaches” without defining the indirect approach. The actions of special operations forces in America’s post-9/11 wars reveal the military’s definition of direct and indirect approaches: directly targeting non-state enemies unilaterally or targeting them indirectly through partner forces.
Special Operations Forces: Indirectly to Blame
The labels of direct and indirect approach go beyond semantics; they influence operational and institutional strategy across the military and affect how we conceptualize our options in irregular warfare. Early in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, special operations leaders described the indirect approach as addressing root causes and environmental factors that facilitate terrorism and instability, a holistic approach to conflict in line with Joint Publication 5-0. For example, the leadership of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) repeatedly told members of Congress that the indirect approach “will be decisive” and that the direct approach (i.e., the United States killing terrorists) was only a supporting effort. The indirect approach was then described as creating “an environment that is inhospitable to terrorism” and “eliminating underlying conditions” and “extremist ideologies.”
Over time, the way special operations leaders spoke about the indirect approach shifted and narrowed. Though training foreign forces was always a subcomponent of the indirect approach, it has come to be the single emphasis. For example, a decade after the war in Afghanistan began, Admiral William McRaven described the indirect approach as “focused on advising, assisting, and training our global partners.” Building partner capacity and operating “by, with, and through” foreign forces allows the United States to minimize risk and achieve economy of force. However, conflating this line of effort with the indirect approach is problematic for two reasons. First, there are other important components to irregular warfare that are neither direct action nor building partner capacity, such as information operations. Second, conflating train, advise, and assist missions with the indirect approach only distinguishes the means, limiting thinking about other possible applications of military power. Training and assisting foreign forces to militarily defeat an enemy is the direct approach through a proxy; it fundamentally does not change the commander’s underlying theory of how to defeat the adversary. In fact, working through partner forces can become a mechanism for US units to directly engage in combat themselves, using their training mission as the justification to conduct otherwise kinetically oriented operations.
The conflation of the indirect approach with training missions is vividly captured in Jessica Donati’s book Eagle Down. She describes how Special Forces teams in Afghanistan from 2015 to 2018 were frequently tasked with recapturing territory lost to the Taliban. The teams were effectively operating as conventional infantry units, except they mostly (and sometimes reluctantly) fought alongside Afghan counterparts. Despite the conventional and direct nature of these engagements, military leaders insisted that Special Forces units were only conducting train, advise, and assist missions. In other words, though the teams were fighting pitched battles and had little engagement with local populations, they were employing the indirect approach. Conflating the indirect approach with advisory missions offers civilian policymakers politically expedient solutions but precludes more meaningful discussions about how the military can best be used in the conflict or whether it should be used at all. The approach has not yielded strategic success, as the Taliban is currently poised to retake the same cities Special Forces helped Afghans recapture several times.
Limiting the indirect approach to train, advise, assist or by, with, and through operations has a detrimental impact on the military’s institutional strategy as well. US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) formalized the distinction of direct and indirect in its doctrine under the labels of “surgical strike” and “special warfare.” Special warfare is undertaken by a force specially trained in foreign languages and culture with “proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations.” Based on this definition, civil affairs and psychological operations are doctrinally unable to conduct special warfare. Given these observations, it is unsurprising that the psychological operations force structure and capabilities have failed to keep pace with USSOCOM’s tremendous growth. From 2001 to 2015, the number of active duty psychological operations soldiers actually shrank from roughly 1,200 to 1,050, while a dataset built by the author found the percentage of civil affairs and psychological operations soldiers fell from over 20% of USSOCOM’s military force structure to less than 5%. The sharp decline was largely the result of shifting all reserve civil affairs and psychological operations soldiers (roughly 9,000 at the time) out of USSOCOM in 2006, but that simply made it easier for special operations leaders to marginalize the remaining forces and the operations they conduct. Psychological operations units also have significant shortfalls in their ability to conduct sophisticated operations on the internet and social media, which are becoming more important in irregular warfare. The military needs to redefine its approaches to irregular warfare to fully leverage forces and capabilities that influence populations, such as those that operate in the information environment.
The Direct Impact on Conventional Doctrine
The misuse of direct and indirect approaches in irregular warfare has not been limited to special operations forces. For example, the current version of Field Manual 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies applies the means-based descriptions of direct and indirect approaches rather than an understanding based on the enemy’s center of gravity. FM 3-24 describes one approach to counterinsurgency, the population-centric approach, based on two different sets of means. The direct approach is “resource intensive” and primarily uses American forces, whereas the indirect approach uses fewer American resources by working through host-nation forces. The direct approach uses the framework of “shape-clear-hold-build-transition,” which is designed to provide security and win support from the population. The indirect approach describes a similar framework to win popular support, but US forces are mostly replaced with host-nation forces and the words “shape-clear-hold-build-transition” are replaced with “identify-separate-isolate-influence-reintegrate.” The primary difference between the two approaches is the scale of US force commitment and the emphasis on host-nation forces, both of which are means rather than ways to defeat an insurgency.
This means-based approach to population-centric counterinsurgency fails to consider alternative centers of gravity. Chapter seven of FM 3-24, “Planning and Operational Considerations,” states that the center of gravity for an insurgency could include elements like external support from another country or the group’s core leadership. However, the chapters describing direct and indirect approaches only fit with the population-centric framework of winning support from the population. The doctrine is inadequate for addressing counterinsurgency problems the United States currently faces. For example, a population-centric approach failed to defeat the Taliban insurgency because external support from Pakistan, not the Afghan population, was arguably the center of gravity. No amount of force, either direct or indirect, thrown to a population-centric approach in Afghanistan will lead to a successful theory of victory if it is focused on the wrong center of gravity.
Reconceptualizing Approaches to Irregular Warfare for Great Power Competition
Irregular warfare is likely to become even more important in great power competition than it has been since the end of the Cold War. As the United States prosecuted irregular warfare against weaker adversaries in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations around the globe, it relied primarily on military overmatch to succeed. This method was far from optimal, though limited capabilities among US adversaries prevented them from severely harming US national interests. Proxy wars and gray zone competition with near-peer adversaries will not be as forgiving. States like China and Russia have already adapted their strategies to capitalize on the capabilities the US military has marginalized over the past thirty years. As the line between direct and indirect approaches blurred and indirect approaches became conflated with training missions, these states moved to fill the void of all other operations meant to “influence populations,” especially in the information environment. Competing effectively against near-peer states will require a revision of its approach to irregular warfare.
One way the military can do so is to recast the direct and indirect approach according to existing doctrinal definitions previously described. The direct approach would be the application of all resources applied to the population, such as civil affairs and psychological operations, and the indirect approach would be any effort to influence populations and build legitimacy not directed at the population, including both training missions and direct action. While this solution brings the terminology in line with doctrine, it does not fundamentally solve the problem of uncreative and poorly conceived approaches to irregular warfare.
A better way to improve our approaches to irregular warfare would be to abandon the idea of direct and indirect approaches altogether. Though they still have utility in planning for conventional warfare, the simplistic division has limited our creativity and strategy in irregular warfare. Instead of creating a single division between irregular warfare approaches, the military should consider a more nuanced typology of irregular warfare. The typology should primarily focus on forms of power applied, such as coercion, inducement, or persuasion, and the intended effect, such as to enable, assure, compel, deter, or destroy. A more complicated typology could add additional variables, such as the primary and secondary audiences affected by US actions. More complicated typologies sacrifice the ability to describe an approach in simple and abstract terms, but they would force more creativity and place more focus on how to apply power rather than which means should be applied.
The United States has not learned how to effectively influence populations or affect legitimacy even though it has been waging irregular warfare continuously for the past two decades. The US military underinvests in forces and capabilities built for noncoercive influence, such as information and psychological operations. At the same time, it overapplies coercive force, falsely believing that defeating armed adversaries, either unilaterally or with a partner, is the same as building legitimacy. The US military needs to completely reconceptualize its approaches to irregular warfare by focusing on the type of power employed and its intended effect rather than the means used to apply power. China, Russia, and Iran are destabilizing threats not because they can apply coercive force more successfully than the United States, but because they do not have to in order to advance their agendas. To effectively influence populations and build US legitimacy in competition with these adversaries, the United States military needs to ask which levers should be pulled rather than who should pull the trigger.
Cole Livieratos is an Army strategist and term member in the Council on Foreign Relations. He teaches in West Point’s Defense and Strategic Studies Program and is the course director for two courses, “Insurgency & Counterinsurgency” and “Leadership in Future War.” He is a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University completing his dissertation on special operations institutions and strategy in irregular warfare.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jesse B. Awalt, US Navy
This piece is curious. First, the author misconnects irregular warfare with special operations. While irregular warfare is conducted by special operations, it is not their monopoly. Second and more concerning is that the author decries that two decades of war failed to achieve irregular warfare tenets. That of course is misplaced, because two decades of war achieved national objectives. Third – the author view on irregular warfare is myopic and does not credit the contributions by departments and agencies besides the Department of Defense. Fourth, demonizing Special Operations is harsh, and linking SOF to the greater Train, Advise and Assist effort conducted by conventional forces is uninformed. Fifth, describing the Afghan counterinsurgency campaign as terrain based is archaic. The entire campaign shifted to a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign in 2004 and has stayed there since. Finally, the author has misconnected direct with kinetic action and indirect with non-kinetic. Indirection methods, as defined by the Joint Staff, includes physical and psychological attacks, influencing, as well as employing partners.
All in all, I believe the author would have been better served this piece as offering a conceptual piece on how irregular warfare can contribute to strategic competition with Nation-States, rather than a critique of the great sacrifices this Nation has made to ensure that another 9/11 attacked has not occurred again. I’d rather see that dialogue on the levers of modern warfare than a narrow critic of the military aspect of a broader interagency counter-terrorism campaign which has worked.
Thank you for reading my personal opinion.
Absolutely "spot-on" in your comments, but that's the way of theorists. The axiom "No plan survives first contact" while intended to describe the smaller scope of actual combat also applies to strategic planning. Of course, where would we be without a plan from which to deviate ? Folks writing their doctorial thesis sometimes let the need for words outweigh the accuracy of those words and they "mix-n-match" terms without regard to their true and intended meanings. Thank you posting your opinion.
Have you read Captain Liddell Hart's book, "Strategy"? I think what this article reveals is the failure to understand what is truly meant by the indirect approach. I believe this is the most important failure of the United States Military. What is brought forth in this article is but one narrow aspect to the failure to understand the indirect approach. The big picture is much more scary. If you are a military professional please do yourself and your nation a favor and buy a copy of "Strategy", read it and reread it. Also, do the same with two other books, "On War" and "The Art of War".
With all due respect, I don't think you understand the point the author was trying to make. I would suggest that you read the book, "Strategy: The Indirect Approach" by Captain Liddell Hart in order to gain insight into the point the author is trying to make.
Was great presentation and discussion by Global SOF Foundation and Gen Wurster on "Joint Task Force (JTF)-510 was activated by PACOM to plan and prepare to implement the first phase of Operation Freedom Eagle as part of Exercise Balikatan 02-1 in 2002. " https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51AzSAv47WM
They do a good job of discussing population influence during that mission, but also IMHO shows actions that could be employed with a more whole of government approach vs DoD taking all the actions.
Discussions such as these seem to miss an important point; this being that:
a. Given that our enduring strategic objective, has been and is, transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines.
b. Then can we really say, accordingly, that what we have been engaged in these past decades, this has been "irregular warfare;" this, rather than "revolutionary warfare?"
David Kilcullen, in his "Counterinsurgency Redux" (for example see Pages 3 and 4) says that — given our grand objective of political, economic, social and value "transformation"/"change" of other states and societies post-the Old Cold War:
a. What we have been engaged in, of late, this has been "revolutionary warfare;" this,
b. With our opponents, accordingly, being engaged in "resistance warfare."
For a possible example of a proper way to conduct revolutionary warfare, consider the following from then-Special Forces Colonel Slavko N. Bjelajac, in his 1962 paper "Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches:"
"It must be understood that the success of the revolutionary is not due to the application of new principles of warfare, or to the technical efficiency of revolutionary forces and their tactics or the terrain; in spite of their importance, these factors, no matter how favorable, would not be sufficient for success. The numbers of warriors armed with rifles and hand grenades is not the decisive factor. The decisive factor is more in the nature of power. And the success of the revolutionaries can primarily be assigned to two extraordinarily powerful factors, namely, their closeness and appeal to the people — that is their ability to win over the population — and their ideological conviction. …
Among the techniques used to implement revolutionary warfare strategy and to attain their goals, the selection of cadre, organization, deification of the masses and psychological impregnation are the most important. Leaders, speakers, propagandists, activities, organizers, officers, volunteers and others are trained. Revolutionary cells are established to control different circles and organized groups in all sections of society. Parallel communists hierarchies are organized starting with the cell of a local committee to the central communist party. This becomes the party's invisible machine by which unions, sport, and cultural associations, veteran societies and others are controlled. The conflict embraces all segments and groups of society and, in fact, is concerned with every single aspect of social activity. It is and must be a fight for the minds of the people. That side which is victorious in this aspect of the struggle is virtually assured ultimate victory."
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
The idea of "effectively influencing populations" — and/or of "affecting legitimacy" — these such matters cannot, it would seem, be discussed without first addressing one's political objective. (Effectively influencing populations/affecting legitimacy toward what strategic ends?)
And in cases in which one's political objective is clearly "revolutionary" in nature, discussing same, it would seem, requires thinking more along the lines addressed by COL Bjelajac above?
Understanding the indirect approach verses the direct approach to warfare is the most important understanding any military commander can have. Unfortunately, I don't think that most American military commanders have read the book "Strategy: The Indirect Approach" by Captain Liddell Hart or at least if they have, they haven't pushed in the proper manner to build forces capable of engaging in the indirect approach in my opinion. I don't see weapons systems designed for indirect approach fighting and that may be a good thing as secrecy is certainly part of the indirect approach. I do see however, Chinese weapons systems designed to engage in indirect military operations, specifically long range conventional, hypersonic, ballistic missiles, and I don't get a warm fuzzy about America's failure to at least match the capability of the Chinese indirect weapon systems.
If anyone has ever engaged in a bout of Judo as a strapping, muscle bound man and found yourself on your ass without any understanding of how you got there nor what actually happened to put you there, then you have a very personal understanding of the indirect approach.
How we think about military actions goes to the root of how we understand things in my opinion. We understand living things through analogy and we understand inanimate things through mathematics. Captain Liddell Hart's book does the job of showing us the analogies of history concerning behaviors that, although in many cases were not conventional and seemed statistically improbable for achieving victory from an inductive reasoning standpoint, did achieve remarkable victories.
So how specifically do we define the indirect approach? My reading leads me to interpret its meaning as; the use of the elements of war: mass, maneuver, speed, secrecy, surprise, flexibility (basically those elements we learn from Sun Tzu's ancient classic "The Art of War") to develop and or attack vulnerabilities presented by the enemy. A simplistic metaphor would be, once again, a muscle bound brawler finding himself on his ass following a bout with a Judo expert and not knowing how he got to that position.
I am always amazed every time I read accounts of the three battles of the hundred years war, Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt. The ability of the English to drop fast, precise, large volumes of missiles on the heads of the French at Crecy did nothing to change their approach at Poitiers or Agincourt. No, the French didn't take the advise of Sun Tzu and attack the English in an indirect manner. Following the unbelievable carnage and barbarity at Agincourt, the French did change and started to become successful in their use of an indirect approach. The French, with a 4 to 1 numerical superiority at the battle of Agincourt felt certain that a direct attack would secure them the win but the longbow experts of Henry used indirect approach weapons to ensure mass, maneuver, speed, surprise and flexibility would deliver them the victory. Henry understood and developed the vulnerabilities of his enemy.
France, whose country created one of the greatest artisans of the indirect approach in military history, Napoleon, once again put military excellence on the back burner while striving to create an egalitarian utopia following WWI. The result was a crushing defeat in two weeks during1940. The Maginot Line was certainly not a weapons system that embraced the conceptual framework Captain Liddell Hart tried to convey. Captain Hart's book was available in 1929 titled, "The Decisive Wars of History". Too bad the French military leadership was not interested.
I believe the author of this article is correct when he points out the seeming failure of Admiral McCraven to appreciate the fine points of the indirect approach. When Admiral William McRaven described the indirect approach as “focused on advising, assisting, and training our global partners” he completely misinterpreted the concept of the indirect approach in my opinion.
I believe the indirect approach can be used in all aspects of war to include kinetic and subversive actions in war. An example of how an enemy could use an indirect approach to develop and attack vulnerabilities in a subversive context would be an enemy state using recombinant technology to develop a bacteria or virus that would spread all over the world and attack the enemies people and economies with ferocity but would have little effect on the attacker. This is really a form of information warfare as DNA is a form of chemical information and cyber attacks are a form of electromagnetic information.
For those who have read the "Ultra Secret", you will see the analogies present in today's cyber attacks. Nothing is new under the sun.
We must understand Sun Tzu's exhortation that "All War is Based on Deception". Developing a military philosophy that identifies the enemies development and exploitation of our vulnerabilities is not being accomplished vis a vis China in my opinion.
President Kennedy called Liddell Hart "the Captain who teaches Generals". I think that is a fair statement and I hope our Generals start reading and digesting Captain Hart's exhortations. As a side note, Captain Hart used his rank as his title following retirement which was against military tradition as only Colonels and above were allowed to use their ranks as title.
At this time I believe America is at such a deficit in the China Sea that our thinking must adopt an indirect "Fabian Strategy". I see the Army has developed some kind of Island hopping force but other things must be done in an indirect manner. As Crassus learned at Carrhae, you can have the best soldiers but they will be incapable of action while they are constantly being impacted with missiles.
Certainly Trojan horses fit very nicely into the framework of an indirect approach as put forth by Captain Hart but I see no military leaders calling the southern border situation a national security threat. Could America have fallen into the same egalitarian mindset that France fell into during the interwar years that produced a failed military and a Maginot Line? More needs to be done to educate the American people on military issues.
A final interesting fact is that Captain Hart was put under surveillance by MI5 as his writings deduced so many of the aspects of the Normandy Invasion, many were scared that he had somehow received the plans.
The author hit the nail on the head in describing the overwhelming shortcomings of our military in the past few decades. In the 'hangover' of the Cold War Era, the United States has maintained the idea of all warfare/competition as armed conflict. While the use of proxies, UW, SFA, FID etc. – all of which are armed missions – was the most prevalent form of IW conducted throughout the Cold War, it is essential that we continue to adapt in a world where our greatest adversaries have begun to implement nonviolent strategies to influence populations and undermine US efforts. What is most important in this change is informing both policymakers and top military leaders of the true capabilities of IW – outside of the well-known violent capacities – which may or may not be well understood. For leaders to be able to use a tool they must be aware that they have it, and as the author pointed out, there is clearly a paucity of understanding for other than direct/combat capabilities in the military.
I agree. With this transition of focus to great power competition, policymakers might lose sight on the continued importance of IW. If they are educated on its true capabilities, they will be better able to both continue its use in the future and ensure that IW is better applied.
The author makes a good point about the need of the US to recognize its over reliance on kinetic solutions. He articulates this need by looking at the improper usage of direct and indirect action operations. I would have to agree with the overall theme of the article and with the authors assertion that we need to utilize more MISO. Additionally, the author brings up how FM 3-24 has room to improve in how it defines an enemies center of gravity, and that right now it's too means centered. I think this is a very important point. FM 3-24 replaced a gaping hole in US doctrine, but needs to be improved in order to address the challenges that GPC will present us. One point to address may be to take MAJ Livieratos suggestion to focus more on what the goal is, then look at the means necessary to achieve it, instead of just deciding on the means we will use up front.
Livieratos brings to light a huge problem with the current misuse of irregular warfare. He not only highlights the problem, but also states a possible correction for future military options. IW is not meant to take the place of conventional forces advising foreign militants and engaging terrorist threats, but that's what they are currently used for. In this new great power competition, indirect approaches will be necessary to prevent asymmetric escalation against a near peer threat. The reality is that Special Forces need to be incorporated to effect these new threats. This is no longer conventional power, but unconventional tactics to destabilize foreign governments and regimes. How the US will acknowledge this fact and incorporate it is yet to be seen.
The idea that we should be asking "which levers should be pulled" as opposed to "who should pull the trigger," is an interesting take on the current irregular warfare approach, and one that I personally agree with; however, I do not agree with the author that we should abandon the direct and indirect approach altogther. Instead, I favor the former proposition e provides, that the direct and indirect approach must be modified according to existing doctrinal definitions.
I think that the author is mostly correct. Army Special Operations Forces can be used in a more diverse set of missions. Unconventional warfare, which Special Forces almost exclusively performs, is not always the solution to defeat certain adversaries, and Psychological Operations can definitely be expanded to have a greater influence. It seems to me that policy makers determine which mission should be conducted, and this often seems to be Unconventional Warfare. If more missions are directed towards Psy Ops, we may be able to see different and longer lasting results.
Maj. Livieratos provides a very realist solution to a recurring issue of twenty years. A shift from kinetic operations through and with partner forces to a more manipulative "lever" pulling strategy, behind the scenes, may have been a more beneficial strategy in Afghanistan. Focus on the wrong centers of gravity seems to have been a major fault in U.S. strategy, and maybe could have been improved through less "population-centric counterinsurgency" and territorial fighting.