Why do states engage in proxy warfare? How does what scholars call principal-agent theory explain the way proxy warfare actually plays out—particularly the challenges that arise when the interests of a principal and a proxy diverge? And as the US military continues to prepare for large-scale combat operations, how should the ability to leverage proxies factor into planning? Particularly as US planners seek to conceptualize how proxy warfare should be accounted for in an era characterized by strategic competition, these questions are vital.
This episode addresses features a wide-ranging discussing on the subject of proxy warfare with three guests. Dr. Nakissa Jahanbani is an assistant professor in West Point’s Department of Social Sciences and a researcher at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Dr. Vladimir Rauta is a lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Reading and the editor of the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars. And retired Lieutenant General Ken Tovo served for almost forty years in the Army, including as commanding general of US Army Special Operations Command.
You can hear the full episode hosted by Kyle Atwell below. And be sure to subscribe to the Irregular Warfare Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app so you don’t miss an episode!
Note: This episode was originally recorded and released by the Social Science of War podcast, a coproduction between the Modern War Institute at West Point and West Point’s Department of Social Sciences.
Image credit: Sgt. 1st Class Jared N. Gehmann, US Army
Consider what may be an important — similar/common feature — of (a) "proxies" in the religious wars of the seventeenth century, of (b) "proxies" in the Old Cold War of yesterday and of (c) "proxies" in the New/Reverse Cold War of today; this being, that the "beliefs" of individuals and groups may cause certain individuals and groups to become available for use as one's — or as one's enemies' — proxy.
From Hans Morgenthau's, 1960s, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene:"
"The United States and the Soviet Union face each other not only as two great powers which in the traditional ways compete for advantage. They also face each other as the fountain heads of two hostile and incompatible ideologies, systems of government and ways of life, each trying to expand the reach of its respective political values and institutions and to prevent the expansion of the other. Thus the cold war has not only been a conflict between two world powers but also a context between two secular religions. And, like the religious wars of the seventeenth century, the war between communism and democracy does not respect national boundaries. It finds enemies and allies in all countries, opposing the one and supporting the other regardless of the niceties of international law. Here is the dynamic force which has led the two superpowers to intervene all over the global, sometimes surreptitiously, sometimes openly, sometimes with the accepted methods of domestic pressure and propaganda, sometimes with the frowned-upon instruments of covert subversion and open force."
Thought — Based on the Above:
In the Old Cold War of yesterday, such things as "proxy wars", these were understood from the perspective of (a) the Soviets/the communists, post-World War II, being engaged in "expansionist"/"revolutionary"/"modernist" activities and (b) the U.S./the West (and indeed conservatives/traditionalists everywhere to include even in the communist countries themselves), thus being threatened, being engaged in "anti-expansionist"/"containment"/"roll back"/"anti-modernist" activities.
In the New/Reverse Cold War of today, however, now such things as "proxy wars," these must be understood from the perspective of (a) the U.S./the West, post-the Old Cold War, being engaged in "expansionist"/"revolutionary"/"modernist" activities and (b) such diverse entities as Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists (and indeed conservatives/traditionalists everywhere to include even here in the U.S./the West), thus being threatened, being engaged in "anti-expansionist"/"containment"/"roll back"/"anti-modernist activities:
"Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past." (See "The American Interest" article "The Reality of Russian Soft Power" by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
Proxy wars, thus in the New/Reverse Cold War of today, to be seen from this such (a) "we are the revolutionaries now" and (b) "they are the conservatives now" perspective?
(From this such perspective, and as Hans Morgenthau notes above, one can find "enemies and allies in all countries" [to include within one's own country] who can be used as "proxies.")
Consider these two items as the problems that proxy wars — and the use of proxies more generally — were/are expected to help various countries overcome — yesterday as compared to today:
a. In the Old Cold War of yesterday, the use of proxies by the U.S./the West, this was expected to help the U.S./the West overcome the threat that the Soviets and communism posed to our (and numerous others') ways of life, ways of governance, values, etc. This, while in this Old Cold War of yesterday, the use of proxies by the Soviets/the communists, this was expected to help the Soviets/the communists achieve "revolutionary change" (more along Soviet/communist political, economic, social and value lines) more throughout the world. (This, in spite of the U.S./the West's containment and roll back measures noted immediately above.) In stark contrast,
b. In the New/Reverse Cold War of today, the use of proxies by such diverse entities as Russia, China, N. Korea and Iran, this is expected to help these such entities overcome the threat that the U.S./the West poses to their (and numerous others') ways of life, ways of governance, values, etc. This, while in the New/Reverse Cold War of today, the use of proxies by the U.S./the West, this is expected to help the U.S./the West achieve "revolutionary change" (more along market-democracy political, economic, social and value lines) more throughout the world. (This, in spite of Russia, China, etc.,'s containment and roll back measures addressed immediately above.)
Re: the New/Reverse Cold War of today — that I immediately discussed above — to gain a "feel" for the overall political objectives of both sides — that I describe at my item "b" here — consider the following from a June 1, 2023 "The Diplomat" article entitled "The Trouble With China’s Global Civilization Initiative" by R. Evan Ellis:
"The appeal of the GCI (China's "Global Civilization Initiative") is enabled by its ambiguity. Xi’s address presenting it spoke of “common aspirations” (not rights) of humanity of “peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom.” At the same time, the GCI advocates against a world in which those concepts can have meaning through united efforts to call out and collectively act against those who violate them. Under the GCI, perceptions of such “common aspirations” are “relative” and thus countries must “refrain from imposing their own values or models on others.”
As a rhetorical tool, such language arguably plays to resentment in many parts of the world that the West has often been overbearing in promoting its concept of democracy and universal human rights, as well as its economic models and belief systems."
Question — and Potential Answer — Based on the Above:
Q: In New/Reverse Cold War of today circumstances that I describe above, how is the U.S./the West supposed to pursue its "achieve revolutionary change more along market-democracy lines" proxy wars — and supposed to defeat the "prevent revolutionary change more along market-democracy lines" proxy wars of our enemies?
A: Possibly as retired LTG Cleveland and retired GEN Votel describe below:
"In the same way that the conventionally focused American way of war is defined by America's technical and industrial capacity and technological edge, the American way of irregular war is tied to our notions of religious pluralism, democracy, and, above all, human rights. And although the American way of war protects us against near-peer powers and guarantees the lanes of global commerce, the American way of irregular war protects our way of life by both promoting our worldview and giving people the tools to realize the same opportunities that we have had. … "
(See beginning at the last paragraph of Page 5 of the Introduction chapter to Rand paper by LTG [ret.] Charles Cleveland entitled: "The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir.")
"The Achilles’ heel of our authoritarian adversaries is their inherent fear of their own people; the United States must be ready to capitalize on this fear. … An American way of irregular war will reflect who we are as a people, our diversity, our moral code, and our undying belief in freedom."
(See the "Conclusion" of the Rand paper "The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir" by Charles T. Cleveland and Daniel Egel.)
"Advocates of UW first recognize that, among a population of self-determination seekers, human interest in liberty trumps loyalty to a self-serving dictatorship, that those who aspire to freedom can succeed in deposing corrupt or authoritarian rulers, and that unfortunate population groups can and often do seek alternatives to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice. Second, advocates believe that there is a valid role for the U.S. Government in encouraging and empowering these freedom seekers when doing so helps to secure U.S. national security interests."
(See the National Defense University Press paper "Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone" by Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin)