In the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act, the committee directed the secretary of the Army to submit a report, “not later than March 1, 2023,” assessing the viability of a Ranger battalion in the Army National Guard. This report was to include information on the required resources and a timeline for activating such a unit. It is not clear that this report was ever submitted. Of course, not all reports submitted to Congress are required to be sent to the US Government Publishing Office for publication. So even if it was submitted, it hasn’t spurred formal discussion about the potential unit, though interest in the topic has surged on platforms like YouTube and Reddit. This is unfortunate. It’s a discussion that should happen not just on social media, but at the highest levels of government.
The primary reason the committee proposed the idea of a National Guard Ranger battalion was to increase the dwell time—the time spent at home between deployments—for the 75th Ranger Regiment. More dwell time would mean not only more training time for active duty Rangers but also more time with their families and to manage their lives stateside. Increasing dwell time is a compelling reason to establish a Ranger battalion, or multiple battalions, in the National Guard, not least because it could have a significant positive impact on retention and mental health for active duty Rangers, which are primary underlying ideas with dwell time.
While it’s appropriate that the House Armed Services Committee addressed dwell time, other factors illustrate why the United States needs Rangers in the National Guard. A primary concern with part-time Rangers is whether the same high standards and effectiveness of existing Ranger units can be maintained in the reserve component. This is a fair question, but evidence that these standards are maintainable can be seen elsewhere in the special operations community. The Army National Guard is already home to the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups, just as the Navy Reserve is home to SEAL Teams 17 and 18.
In the Army, there is a direct pipeline to Special Forces through the 18X program, whereas SEALs must serve on an active duty team before joining SEAL Team 17 or 18. Each of these offers a distinct recruitment model that a National Guard Ranger battalion could follow, but a pathway for non–prior service members to join, like that of the 19th and 20th Groups’ model, is likely to be more beneficial for recruitment numbers. These Special Forces groups are highly capable units. Units from 19th Group have deployed multiple times since 2001, including during the invasion of Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom. 20th Group’s units have similarly contributed to major US operations—Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Inherent Resolve. Both groups have extensive experience, demonstrating that it is feasible for the Army National Guard to support special operations units administratively and organizationally. The SEAL teams, operating under Naval Special Warfare Group 11, validate this concept from an operational standpoint. Like the Rangers, the SEALs specialize in direct action, showing that a direct action unit can effectively operate within a reserve component. In fact, using training time as a justification, a case can be made that it’s easier to maintain the direct action skillset than all of the skills that fall under the purview of Army Special Forces.
The recruitment crisis is arguably the biggest challenge facing the military today. A National Guard Ranger battalion could help address this problem in at least two ways. First, just as there are service-inclined members of the population who thrive in reserve components because their lifestyle isn’t conducive to active duty, there are those whose attributes and interests make them ideal candidates for the specific type of missions Ranger units excel in. A National Guard Ranger battalion would enable the Army to recruit and retain more of this segment of the population—action-oriented individuals who might already be working as SWAT officers or firefighters, but could equally be working in an office or a factory. This diversity is a strength of the entire reserve component and would be a strength of a National Guard Ranger battalion, as well. Offering more options to the public can only benefit recruitment.
Second, this unit could help retain Rangers leaving active duty. Just as SEALs and Special Forces have the option to continue serving in the reserves, Rangers should have the same opportunity. As noted earlier in this article, increasing dwell time would increase retention in the active component. The reserve component Ranger battalion would also encourage Rangers who are leaving active duty to transition to the Army National Guard, which effectively further increases retention for the Army as a total force. The National Guard allows them to continue serving even as they transition to the civilian world. Additionally, it would be an opportunity for the Army to bolster the return on its substantial investment in these elite soldiers.
In his book The New Rules of War, Dr. Sean McFate holds that the military is fielding too many obsolete conventional weapons and needs to grow its investment in special operations forces. He notes that one aircraft carrier costs more than all of those forces—a vast enterprise of tens of thousands of service members—combined. By divesting number of big-ticket legacy items that he believes to be obsolete, he argues, we can triple the budget of special operations forces and still have money left over.
If we do want to invest in our special operations capabilities but disagree with the idea that we can safely dispense with expensive, advanced systems, however, McFate’s book makes another point that indirectly advocates for a National Guard Ranger battalion. He asserts that the arrangement of the active duty and reserve components is exactly backwards—that reserve support units are over deployed and active duty combat arms units rarely even perform their jobs during peacetime. New special operations units in the reserve component are a logical way of addressing this imbalance. This could mean simply adding units, sure, but it could also mean restructuring. The Army could do this concurrently with, or without the divestiture of expensive platforms. Either way, a National Guard Ranger battalion is a step in the right direction for addressing our overreliance on technology and the underrepresentation of our combat arms units in the reserve components.
Special operations forces cannot be mass produced. Competent special operations forces cannot be created in the aftermath of emergencies. And humans are more important than hardware. These are three of the five “truths” of special operations forces. The United States can leverage these truths to find a cost-effective solution to expand and diversify its special operations capability, enhance recruitment and retention, and build readiness. We need to expand our pool of skilled special operators before conflicts with near peers arise, not after.
Ray Vawter is a national security commentator who has experience in the think tank space, counterterrorism analysis, tactical conditioning for operators, and higher education. He currently works as a civilian for Army Research Laboratory and in human intelligence in the Washington, DC Army National Guard. Follow him on X (@rayvawter).
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: New York National Guard