Authors’ note: This primer reflects the discussion of an expert panel on resistance as a deliberate strategy featuring Major General Patrick Roberson, Dr. Ulrica Pettersson, Dr. Byron Harper, and Dr. James Kiras.
The war in Ukraine has produced many acts of notable resistance. Ukrainian civilians have defied Russian occupation forces and, through thousands of seemingly minor actions, sabotaged Russia’s efforts from behind enemy lines. Simply spray-painting traffic signs in the early days of the war, for example, denied easy navigation to Russian soldiers and introduced a source of friction. More recently, Ukrainians collaborating with Russia have been violently targeted. The war has sparked renewed interest in concepts and activities related to resistance, but what exactly is resistance and what can we learn from Ukraine?
What is Resistance?
Dr. Pettersson introduced the concept of resistance, which the Resistance Operating Concept as
a nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.
Key within this definition is the idea of a “whole-of-society” effort. Some nations have used the term “total defense” to describe their resistance strategy, as it draws attention to a comprehensive military and societal resilience effort led by a whole-of-government approach. Dr. Harper noted that a mere 2 percent of society is part of the government, with an inherent obligation to participate in defense. The remaining 98 percent could be an ambivalent majority, as David Galula might say, and the rebel’s dilemma is how to mobilize collective action in the face of potentially high costs. What defines resistance, then, is understanding how the 2 percent might motivate, support, and mobilize segments of the 98 percent to engage in nonviolent and violent actions in defense of the nation.
Resistance also includes a broad range of methods. In fact, nonviolent approaches are often more effective, particularly against authoritarian regimes. As a result, resistance—whether in Paris in 1944 or Kyiv in 2022—is not just a military task, but a societal task that requires organization and leadership. Resistance is most effective when prepared in peacetime and underpinned by operations that emphasize resilience, so that society can cope with foreign-imposed crises.
Historical Examples of Resistance
Throughout the panel discussion, participants highlighted examples of resistance in World War II, the Cold War, and beyond. The World War II cases focused primarily on the European front, including the Baltic region’s “Forest Brothers,” the French Resistance, Norway, Denmark, and elsewhere. These cases were presented with the context of supporting efforts from the British Special Operations Executive. In the Cold War era, Sweden and Switzerland were key examples of nations that adopted a resistance strategy, yet these remained planned and hypothetical efforts that were never tested against an invader, so analysts cannot be confident in their assessments of how effective they might have been. In the modern era, the panel noted that the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 sparked a renaissance of interest in resistance, building upon the lessons of earlier eras. Major General Roberson offered lessons from both the Kurdish resistance to Saddam Hussein and efforts to foment resistance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
Participants also discussed the unique moral and ethical questions associated with resistance operations, citing a number of case studies including the Dutch Resistance, the heroic efforts of the Polish Home Army, and Operation Anthropoid in Czechoslovakia. These cases all highlight the ethical concerns inherent in supporting resistance movements against regimes that might conduct reprisals against local populations and violate the laws of armed conflict.
Analyzing case studies from these historical eras demonstrates the importance of understanding the nature of the occupying regime, its capacity to operate as a police state, and the capacity for local resistance. These lessons, alongside other vignettes, were noted in the scholarly efforts of Will Irwin, including Support to Resistance, Decision-Making Considerations in Support to Resistance, and How Civil Resistance Works. The panelists also noted the efforts of Otto Heilbrunn, Gene Sharp, Erica Chenoweth, and Richard Shultz.
What is Today’s Model of Resistance?
Estonia, Sweden, Finland, and other states have made resistance preparations based on the model of the “indigestible hedgehog”: the hedgehog that displays its defenses to both deter attacks from predators and demonstrate the difficulty of digesting it. Likewise, Resistance strategies aim to deter through denial and then impose costs—both moral and material—if deterrence fails. Moreover, successful resistance relies on a preplanned strategy, rather than an emergent response to a foreign invasion. This is because grassroots movements do not have comparable levels of organization, legitimacy, and resilience in the face of repression.
In addition, resistance movements often benefit from external state support, but foreign powers typically have less skin in the game, leading to lower levels of commitment. This problem holds especially true when resistance movements face an authoritarian opponent willing to employ indiscriminate violence. For example, Russian tactics of terrorism and long-term attrition may weaken Ukrainian resistance and diminish NATO’s support. Maintaining internal and external resolve is therefore critical, and it requires a shared understanding among Ukraine’s supporters. The panel noted that a community of interest has formed in response to Russia, which integrates lessons from today’s conflicts. This “intellectual interoperability” strengthens resistance concepts and practice.
Resistance in Ukraine and Future Research
Much of Ukraine’s unlikely success against a much larger and stronger invader flows from its diligent preparations starting in 2014, following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The panel cited three factors that have led to the successful use of resistance. First, Ukraine leveraged wide-scale participation in national defense through legislation passed in July 2021. Second, external allies exhibited impressive unity of effort in coordinating support to Ukraine. Third, foreign special operations forces advising Ukrainian counterparts were invested in understanding the Ukrainian perspective; as Dr. Harper noted, they had gone “49 percent native” which allowed them to masterfully understand how to support Ukraine.
Despite the success of resistance in Ukraine, many questions remain unanswered and provide avenues for future research. First, why was the Ukrainian resistance strategy unable to deter a Russian invasion? Moreover, how can a state know if it is deterring a threat? Resolving these questions may help analysts and policymakers measure and define success in peacetime.
Another outstanding question will be the implications of substantial, overt international assistance. The international community has significantly contributed to the Ukrainian government’s ability to enhance, support, and maintain resistance. How well do international interests overlap with local interests, and how does this impact internal resolve to resist and external resolve to support resistance?
Finally, analysts do not fully understand the impacts of modern technology on resistance. Everyone with a smartphone is a potential resistance fighter. This lowers the barrier to entry for participation in armed conflict and enables a host of functions like intelligence reporting, fire coordination, and rapid information sharing.
The topics covered in this discussion and outlined above offer an avenue for research to expand the existing body of knowledge on resistance—a topic that, given the contemporary security environment, demands further investigation by practitioners and scholars alike.
Dr. Martijn Kitzen is a senior nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative and a professor at the Netherlands Defence Academy where he holds the chair of irregular warfare and special operations.
Andrew Maher is the engagements director for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, an Australian Army officer, and a lecturer with the University of New South Wales Canberra on irregular warfare.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: President of Ukraine
Let's consider "resistance" from a different point of view; this being, from the point of view of those states and societies — and those individuals and groups — who believe that:
a. Such political, economic, social and/or value changes,
b. As the U.S./the West has sought to achieve both here at home and there abroad post-the Old Cold War,
c. These such political, economic, social and/or value changes threaten their ways of life, their ways of governance and their values, attitudes and beliefs. (A basis for "resistance" — if their ever was one?)
In this regard, let's start with (from 1993) then-National Security Advisor Anthony Lake’s “From Containment to Enlargement" document; which served as a precursor/an introduction to President Bill Clinton’s signature “Engagement and Enlargement” national security strategy. (Herein, note the U.S.'s — very straight forward — grand "change" initiative re: other countries.)
“Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement — enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies. During the Cold War, even children understood America’s security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob. Today, at great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the ‘blue areas’ of market democracies. The difference, of course, is that we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression.”
Next, let's look at how both Russia and China have (a) embraced such things as traditional social values, beliefs and institutions and indeed has (b) "weaponized" same; this, (c) in their "resistance to unwanted change" efforts:
Russia in resistance mode:
“In his annual appeal to the Federal Assembly in December 2013, Putin formulated this ‘independent path’ ideology by contrasting Russia’s ‘traditional values’ with the liberal values of the West. He said: ‘We know that there are more and more people in the world who support our position on defending traditional values that have made up the spiritual and moral foundation of civilization in every nation for thousands of years: the values of traditional families, real human life, including religious life, not just material existence but also spirituality, the values of humanism and global diversity.’ He proclaimed that Russia would defend and advance these traditional values in order to ‘prevent movement backward and downward, into chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state.’ …
As Putin passes his 20th year as Russia’s president, his domestic and foreign policy appears intended to contrast his country’s ‘independent path’ with the liberal and decadent regimes in the West. The invented battle of Western values versus Russia’s ‘traditional values’ is part of a Kremlin effort to justify its broader actions in the eyes of Russian citizens, placing them in the context of a global struggle in which Russia is the target of aggression. Ignoring and violating the provisions of international organizations to which it is a party thus becomes a demonstration of defending its conservative values from European liberalism."
(See the Wilson Center publication “Kennan Cable No. 53” and, therein, the article “Russia’s Traditional Values and Domestic Violence,” by Olimpiada Usanova, dated 1 June 2020.).
China in resistance mode:
“This may, in fact, be the missing explanatory element. Ideologies regularly define themselves against a perceived ‘other,’ and in this case there was quite plausibly a common and powerful ‘other’ (to wit: Western liberalism) that both (Chinese) cultural conservatism and (Chinese) political leftism defined themselves against. This also explains why leftists have, since the 1990s, become considerably more tolerant, even accepting, of cultural conservatism than they were for virtually the entire 20th century. The need to accumulate additional ideological resources to combat a perceived Western liberal ‘other’ is a powerful one, and it seems perfectly possible that this could have overridden whatever historical antagonism, or even substantive disagreement, existed between the two positions.” (Items in parenthesis above are mine.)
(See the April 24, 2015 Foreign Policy article “What it Means to Be ‘Liberal’ or ‘Conservative’ in China: Putting the Country's Most Significant Political Divide in Context" by Taisu Zhang.)
Last, let's see how the U.S./the West's "change" initiatives have caused individuals and groups — even here in the U.S./the West — to go into "resistance" mode — this extending, in this case, even to conservative elements in the U.S./the West now seeing Russia as their "natural ally" today:
"Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past."
(See "The American Interest" article "The Reality of Russian Soft Power" by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
In the Old Cold War of yesterday, the Soviets/the communist sought to achieve "revolutionary" political, economic, social and value changes; this, both in their own home countries and throughout the world. This (a) fostered a worldwide "resistance to change" effort, which, (b) leaned heavily on such things as traditional social values, beliefs and institutions.
In the New/Reverse Cold War of today, it has been the U.S./the West that has sought to achieve "revolutionary" political, economic, social and value changes — both in our own home countries and throughout the world. This such effort, likewise, has (a) fostered a worldwide "resistance to change" effort which, once again, has (b) leaned heavily on such things as traditional social values, beliefs and institutions.
Accordingly, should not "resistance" — today — be viewed from this such perspective also?
Perhaps I missed it in the hot links but there appears to be no loinage to the ARIS Project at USASOC. (Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies)
Here: https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html. and here: https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/arisbooks.html
There are a wide range of resources and references at the project thanks to the hard work and vision of Paul Tompkins in partnership with the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab National Security Division.
Resistance is the foundation of Unconventional Warfare, irregular warfare, political warfare, revolution, and insurgency.
"Activities to enable a resistance or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area."
Scholars, analysts, officers, critics, and students of the Ukraine War history should note that Ukraine is a "special case war." Very few nations in the world are "gifted" high-tech arms that are free and functional to a level of trust that NATO is willing to commit to. Also, Ukraine is often considered one race…would resistance work in the USA with its diversity and many foreign Green Card workers?
Ukraine called for all able men to defend the Homeland, essentially a draft. But Ukraine has shown that attacking in the form of ATGMs, light infantry, captured tanks, drones, and artillery is the best form of resistance. One can't resist with just trenches, tank traps, barbed wire and small arms and expect to win with such static and passive forms of defensive resistance—one has to attack. One has to have the means to conduct LRPFs to resist in such a fashion as to make the enemy think again. And that form of resistance with LRPF is what made the difference compared to VBIEDs and IEDs in the GWOT. Close fighting in the GWOT was often the form of resistance, but in Ukraine, the ATGM can reach out to a few miles. The insurgency was a constant form of attacking resistance that wore down on Coalition troops. When mortars and RPGs were used in the GWOT, it made a difference.
Morale, attitude, support, logistics, propaganda, revenge, money, love, time, sweat, blood, sacrifice, charisma, effort, and esprit de corps are all factors in resistance of a nation being invaded, even against overwhelming odds. The chances of survival, combined with luck and lots of prayers, can win the day if the odds tilt in the defenders' favor. Technology has definitely played a role.
But why then did Ukraine resistance seem so surprising and the insurgencies not? In terms of "good vs. bad," I think the battle lines were drawn and the moral and social aspects are clearer compared to the GWOT. The GWOT certainly has other nations contributing on both sides, but one thing is clear is that when destroyed, the tanks and IFVs litter the area. In the GWOT, the Taliban dragged away their wounded and dead. One can SEE the resistance level in the Ukraine War by the burnt-out hunks of AFVs. One CAN'T see the resistance level in the GWOT because like in Vietnam, the enemy hauled away their dead so the body count was uncertain. "Big sticks" are used in Ukraine, but not the GWOT by the insurgency outside of small arms and technical pickups.
When videos circulate of massive explosions and "breaking things and killing people," that lifts the morale of the defenders if the results are shown of the successful defense and attacks. If the news covers mistakes made by the Coalition, then that is a depressing downer. The media can play a huge role in telling the story of resistance. If troops whine that they didn't know what to do, and missions are told of Elmer Fudds bumbling around, then that's no way to organize a resistance. If the stories are such that the defenders are competent and "kick some real good," then that is a success story. Video facts have to back up the claims as video can expose the lies also. The TV is the best weapon sometimes.
Outpourings of support, love, and emotion work in favor of the leader who shows it. A stoic leader will not garner the same support as one who has appeal to and of the masses.
"Resistance is futile." No one likes or cares for the stoic robotic emotionless Borgs in Star Trek compared to the Jedi in Star Wars that were wiped away down to the last Jedi. So does anyone want to be a suffering Jedi armed with just a lightsaber to perhaps be cut down by blasters? –SPOILER–Grogu sure doesn't—SPOILER—he went back to the Mandalorian instead of being a Padawan. The Jedi are a symbol of futile resistance that people cheer and yet they lost whereas the Borg are a symbol of resistance that people fear, hate, and loathe and yet they rise into success and prosper. Borg have high tech weapons and ships and Jedis often do not. Borg are a team community and Jedis are lone rangers of resistance. A tale of two Sci-Fi sagas of resistance told on TV for decades should be an example of Real World resistance, even if fictional.
Once again, the TV and media can be the best weapon in the world. All wars seem to prove this.