When the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War began with an Azerbaijani offensive in late September, 2020, Armenia’s defensive plan centered on the Ohanyan Barrier. This complex and formidable system sat along the line of contact that had separated Armenian and Azerbaijani forces since the end of th4e First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994 and consisted of trench lines, minefields, antitank ditches, and other obstacles. But when Azerbaijani forces breached the line, the war took on a character far different from the static defense Armenian forces had prepared for.
Just ten days after the first shots were fired, Azerbaijani forces had the city of Hadrut in their sites. If it was taken, a route into the heart of Nagorno-Karabakh would be secured. Armenia, however, held considerable advantages. Urban terrain favors defenders. Buildings can be fortified, strongpoints and obstacles established, and mouseholes created to move between buildings without exposure to enemy fire. Moreover, once the fighting in the city began, the Armenians enjoyed a substantial numerical superiority. The defenders failed to exploit these advantages, however. That they did so—and that the attacking Azerbaijani forces adeptly employed unmanned aerial vehicles, combined arms, and a combination of conventional and special operations forces—directly influenced the outcome of the battle and shaped the remainder of the war.
This installment of the Urban Warfare Project Case Study Series examines the Battle of Hadrut and extracts its lessons on urban warfare at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. You can read it here, and be sure to follow the Urban Warfare Project for future case studies and continuing exploration of the challenges faced by military forces operating in cities.
Liam Collins, PhD was the founding director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and a distinguished military fellow with the Middle East institute. He is a retired Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America, with multiple combat operations in Fallujah in 2004. He is coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare and author of Leadership & Innovation During Crisis: Lessons from the Iraq War.
John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.