Unprovoked. Brutal. Illegal. Reckless and ruthless. Inhumane and cynical. These are the ways Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its conduct of the ongoing war have been characterized by Western leaders, media, and institutions. But that is not the way the war is perceived by many in Russia, to whom Russian forces are brave heroes engaged in a fight against aggression from the West and protecting the Russian nation, its place in the world, and its very identity. It almost seems as if Russians are watching an entirely different war than the one that has earned their government such international condemnation.
This episode of the MWI Podcast features a conversation with a guest who argues that is exactly what is happening. Dr. Jade McGlynn is a Leverhulme postdoctoral fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and the author of two recently published books. Memory Makers: The Politics of the Past in Putin’s Russia explores how Russian history is used, politically, to shape Russians’ understanding of the world and Russia’s interactions with it. Russia’s War builds on that research and looks specifically at how a complex set of layers—history, identity, narrative, and more—shapes the way many Russians conceptualize the war in Ukraine.
During the discussion, she describes these layers, how they have developed and are woven together, and what impact that has on Russians’ understanding of—and feelings about—the war in Ukraine. You can listen to the full episode below, or find it on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, TuneIn, or your favorite podcast app. While you’re there, be sure to subscribe. And if you’re enjoying the MWI Podcast, please take a moment to give it a rating or leave a review.
Image credit: Messir
Putin "loses;" this, if the Russian people come to be ever-more attracted to and ever-more influenced by Western ideas, Western values and Western-leaning states and societies, etc. (As to this latter, consider Ukraine?)
Thus, THIS, is what makes this — first and foremost — "Putin's war."
However, in order for Putin to "win" his such war against the West, Putin understands that he will need support of the Russian people.
In order to gain the support of the Russian people, Putin understands that — logically — he must cause the people of Russia to (a) concentrate more on what is "Russian" (and, thus, what he suggests is "good") and (b) concentrate less on what is Western (and, thus, what he says is "bad").
If Putin is able to do this, then, THIS — might we agree — is how (a) Putin's war against the West, how this becomes Russia's war against the West?
(Note: If one were to substitute Xi for Putin above, substitute the Chinese people for the Russian people above, substitute Taiwan for Ukraine above, and substitute what is Chinese for what is Russian above, etc., then might we, indeed, be able to describe [a] what is really Xi's war against the West and [b] how Xi is trying to make this China's war against the West?)
In my initial comment above, I suggested that "… in order for Putin to "win" his war against the West, Putin understands that he will need (the) support of the Russian people."
Question:
Is it possible that Putin also understands that — in order to win his war against the West — he will also need the support of certain U.S./Western and indeed other people? As to that such questioned possibility, consider the specific efforts that Putin has made in this regard, as described immediately below:
"Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past."
(See "The American Interest" article "The Reality of Russian Soft Power" by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
“Compounding it all, Russia’s dictator has achieved all of this while creating sympathy in elements of the Right that mirrors the sympathy the Soviet Union achieved in elements of the Left. In other words, Putin is expanding Russian power and influence while mounting a cultural critique that resonates with some American audiences, casting himself as a defender of Christian civilization against Islam and the godless, decadent West.”
(See the “National Review” item entitled: “How Russia Wins” by David French.)
"During the Cold War, the USSR was perceived by American conservatives as an 'evil empire,' as a source of destructive cultural influences, while the United States was perceived as a force that was preventing the world from the triumph of godless communism and anarchy. … The USSR, by contrast, positioned itself as a vanguard of emancipation, as a fighter for the progressive transformation of humanity (away from religion and toward atheism), and against the reactionary forces of the West.
Today positions have changed dramatically; now it is the United States or the ruling liberal establishment that in the conservative narrative has become the new or neo-USSR, spreading subversive ideas about family or the nature of authority around the world, while Russia has become almost a beacon of hope, 'the last bastion of Christian values' that helps keep the world from sliding into a liberal dystopia. Russia’s self-identity has changed accordingly; now it is Russia who actively resists destructive, revolutionary experiments with fundamental human institutions, experiments inspired by new revolutionary neo-communists from the United States. Hence the cautious hopes that the U.S. Christian right have for contemporary Russia: They are projecting on Russia their fantasies of another West that has not been infected by the virus of cultural liberalism."
(See the December 18, 2019, Georgetown University, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs article "Global Culture Wars from the Perspective of Russian and American Actors: Some Preliminary Conclusions," by Dmitry Uzlaner. Look to the paragraph beginning with "Russia and the United States as screens for each other’s projections.")
Question:
From the perspective that I provide above (ex: "Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past.") is not Putin appealing — via not only Russian but indeed other history, etc., also — to the fact (?) that:
a. Not only is Russia being threatened today by the U.S./the West's post-Cold War "revolutionary change" initiatives, but, indeed,
b. The U.S./the West itself — and indeed the other countries throughout the world — are today being threatened by these such U.S./Western post-Cold War "revolutionary change" initiatives also?
(In this manner, thus, for Putin to make his war against the West — not only Russia's war against the West — but, indeed, the world's war against the West?)
To sum up my thoughts above:
Re: Putin's war against the West, Putin understands that he will need to gain:
a. Not only the support of the Russian people (thus, to make his war against the West Russia's war against the West),
b. But also the support of certain population groups in the West itself and, indeed, the support of certain population groups in the world as a whole (thus, to make this not only Russia's war against the West but also the West's war against the West and indeed the world's war against the West).
In order to achieve my item "a" above, Putin knows that he will need to use and exploit certain aspects of Russian history and identity.
In order to achieve my item "b" above, Putin knows he will need to use and exploit those who value such things as "cultural conservatism" (and, thus, group security?) over such things as "liberalism" (and, thus, national security?).
Question:
As to Vladimir Putin's "battle plan" — that I attempt to explain above — what do we think of Putin's chances of "winning?"