An important debate (though not necessarily a new one) has been brought to the forefront by two recent articles. In the first, Maj. John Spencer and Dr. Lionel Beehner argue that declining physical fitness in our nation is adversely—and dangerously—affecting our military readiness, and in turn, our national security. This is not a new argument; the authors echo a case made more than fifty years ago by John F. Kennedy just prior to his inauguration as president. In a subsequent response article, Maj. Jahara Matisek disagrees. He concludes that despite obesity rates that continue to grow in America, we have more than enough physically fit potential recruits in the country, and that the real problem is a chronically underperforming educational system that risks America being left without the cognitive fitness necessary to win the types of wars the United States will most likely find itself fighting in the future. I agree wholeheartedly that an intellectually fit society is critical to our military’s future success on the ever-changing battlefield. However, in presenting that argument, Matisek pushes the importance of physical fitness to the periphery, and implicitly understates the vital role physical fitness will continue to play in securing victory in our nation’s future wars.
In the summer of 2012, in east-central Afghanistan’s Wardak Province—in the middle of the type of small war Matisek says the US military is most likely to fight in the near future—a young combat engineer officer that I later had the honor of serving with was woken in the middle of the night by his commander telling him that he needed to get his route clearance platoon ready to roll out. The platoon needed to relieve a route clearance patrol that was no longer combat-effective. That lieutenant and his platoon promptly prepared for the mission and departed the combat outpost. They wouldn’t return for over fifty hours.
In those fifty hours the platoon endured multiple engagements. They were engaged by improvised explosive devices and direct fire from insurgent forces. For fifty hours that platoon leader had to fight, he had to walk over rugged terrain at an average altitude of 8,000 feet, and his platoon couldn’t stop to sleep except for a four-hour halt at a small COP. In those fifty hours the platoon leader and his platoon sergeant had to manage communications with their platoon, the infantry company securing their peripheries, and rotary- and fixed-wing assets making precision attacks against the ground enemy they were fighting, and had to provide reports to their company and battalion headquarters. The level of both cognitive and physical stress placed on the platoon’s soldiers is immeasurable—which is why it is incredibly dangerous to suggest that one aspect or the other of the human machine is more important.
Yes, I just equated human beings to machines—machines with two components, physical and cognitive. And just like any mechanical machine—a vehicle, for instance—the human machine needs to run regularly to keep its components from deteriorating and potentially breaking when called upon. For the human machine’s physical component, this means the body needs to be tested to find its limits, on occasion, and efforts need to be undertaken to extend those limits, so that when the fifty-hour mission comes the machine can continue to operate without failing. And make no mistake: in war, those missions and others that stress the body will come.
It is vital for our society to produce intelligent soldiers, something Matisek rightly concludes is vital to maintaining operational dominance. But he also writes that “this dominance will require cognitive fitness being held in higher regard in military culture, which would require substantial reductions in physical fitness standards.” We place ourselves on a slippery slope if we decide that this erosion of physical standards is an acceptable cost.
The chief of staff of the Army approves an annual publication of common “Warrior Tasks,” along with associated “Key Tasks”—derived from STP 21-1-SMCT, “Warrior Skills Level 1”—that all soldiers are expected to be able to perform, regardless of their military occupational specialty. There are presently fourteen Warrior Tasks and four “battle drills” specified as common for the entire US Army. Navigating from one point on the ground to another while dismounted requires an obvious level of fitness, especially if it’s done under combat conditions where slow may equal dead. Performing hand-to-hand combat will save the life of a support soldier should our enemies breach the defenses protecting them. Protecting yourself from a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack with the JSLIST protective suit puts a strain on your body—it is bulky, hot, and uncomfortable—but it’s a strain that any soldier needs to overcome in order to continue doing his or her job. Even for those military jobs that require the comparatively highest cognitive abilities, being able to complete these physical tasks is a necessity. Moreover, if we are to expect that our soldiers can perform their duties under all conditions, be they combat or non-combat jobs, we cannot ignore that cognitive and physical fitness are inextricably linked—especially when the body is placed in austere conditions. Instead of sacrificing high physical standards to invite smart people into the military, the smarter approach is to increase the level of fitness for those smart people to keep them resilient, healthy, and durable.
For the United States to be successful in the battle field of the future we absolutely need to invest in our human capital. Increased emphasis on STEM, social sciences, and psychology is important to the missions of our military. The ability to “grow our own” skilled workers and intellectual brainpower, which Matisek suggests we’re struggling to do, is critical. We cannot however, favor the development of these brilliant minds over that of their bodies. A machine functions when all of its components are maintained and in sync, and it must be “put in the red” often enough to ensure that when adverse conditions develop—and they will—the machine can continue to perform.
Image credit: Senior Airman Rylan Albright
Nick,
I don’t think anyone will disagree with your last paragraph. I suppose we all understand that fit soldiers fight and live longer, and that smart, informed, educated soldiers are better able to solve the problems of war. The question raised by the two articles you cite therefore amounts to:
Which weakness, physical fitness or educational, presents the greater threat to America’s ability to win wars?
I am solidly convinced that it is intellectual weakness which is the more serious challenge for the US military. I do appreciate the importance of physical fitness. Its not either / or. But the weakest aspect of the current US recruit pool is its education, not its waistline.
Americans today are less fit than most populations, but their armed forces are still, on average, at least as fit as most peer militaries. Because by and large, fitness can be acquired and maintained.
Education and cultural attitudes to intellect are not so quickly changed. Americans today have one of the worst education systems in the rich world and, as Maj Matisek observes, are even being overtaken by developing nations. Furthermore, American culture is rather anti-intellectual. Compared to European or Asian cultures, teachers and scholars are not especially respected or valued. In schools, athletic performance is more highly valued than academic performance. I attended a high school in New Jersey with three football fields but basically no library.
What this means is that the US recruit pool includes many kids who, even if they hold some formal qualifications, are largely uninformed, don’t read, can’t do math, have little knowledge of history or foreign cultures, are weak in STEM and social science skills, and worst of all, see no problem with all that. It’s a problem that cannot be solved in a few weeks of boot camp. It will take generations.
In the meantime, US servicemen and women are being sent to places they have never heard of, to fight using tools they barely understand, against enemies they absolutely don’t understand, for reasons they can’t understand. Until that changes, America will not win many wars.
Excellent article and a valuable addition to the dialogue. I couldn’t agree more and I would go further to say that those who argue physical fitness isn’t a core competency for soldiers on today’s battlefield may not have had the experience required to understand the necessity of physical fitness in combat on the ground. I agree with the importance Matisek places on intellectual fitness, but completely reject the notion that one has to come at the expense of the other. One only has to look at the examples set by warrior scholars like Generals McChrystal, Petraeus, Votel, Miller and countless other senior combat leaders from the previous decade to see true models of physical and intellectual fitness and how one strengthens the other.
There are plenty of non-deployable positions that will never see enemy contact (physical or digital) that could be filled by DA civilians or contractors. You dont have to worry about physical requirements, annual training on warrior tasks, or training on battle drills. Generally, these DACs or contractors also have more experience in their field of work. Therefore, the training timeline for a DAC is generally shorter than a new Soldier.
Obviously there are some legal and procedural restrictions for this type of replacement. However, replacing Soldiers with DACs in non-deployable positions where they won’t meet enemy contact allows more Soldiers to be assigned to forward or deployable units.