As the US Army modernizes and prepares for the challenges of tomorrow’s battlefield, it naturally seeks lessons from the war in Ukraine—lessons on everything from maneuver to drones to command post survivability and beyond. To not seek out these lessons would be a wasted opportunity—after all, the ongoing conflict is the largest land war in Europe since World War II. And in fact, Ukraine offers a glimpse into the future of warfare, but what it reveals are some striking parallels with that last major war in Europe. One of the areas in which this is most true is engineer reconnaissance. If the conduct of the war in Ukraine over the past three years is any indication—and there is little reason to expect otherwise—modern warfighters should prepare for the largest obstacle belts seen since World War II.
Russia’s Deep and Layered Defensive Lines
Current Russian defensive tactics in Ukraine—and the toll these tactics have taken on Ukrainian engineers—illustrate the complexities of large-scale combat operations. Russian obstacle belts are layered with dragon’s teeth, mines, wire obstacles, antitank and antivehicle ditches, infantry entrenchments, and protected artillery and vehicle positions. These obstacles aim to attrit attacking Ukrainian forces and retain captured land. The need for engineer reconnaissance is paramount in this evolved battlefield. Attacking forces require real-time intelligence before assaulting heavily defended positions.
Ukraine’s Response
Outnumbered and lacking both firepower and air superiority, the Ukrainian military has adapted its methods for attacking fortified positions. In August 2024, Ukrainian forces succeeded in conducting a breach of Russia’s defensive lines near the Russian town of Novyi Put by identifying and attacking weak points in the Russian defensive line. Extensive intelligence analysis, likely provided by drones, supplemented their limited forces. Ukrainian commanders understand that sending soldiers toward heavily defended positions without a clear understanding of the enemy defense is a waste of combat power. This lesson was hard learned during breach operations supporting the 2023 summer counteroffensive.
A study by the Royal United Services Institute indicates that many failures in the 2023 summer counteroffensive could have been prevented with adequate engineer reconnaissance. The study identified that Ukrainian engineers were poorly trained and equipped for large-scale breaches. Using US-provided mine-clearing line charges and Soviet UR-77 mine-clearing vehicles, the Ukrainians failed to grasp the depth of the emplaced minefields, often lacking enough line charges to complete lanes through the obstacle belts. Additionally, engineers lacked sufficient mine plows and demining vehicles, leaving military vehicles stuck in breach lanes and vulnerable to antitank guided missiles. Due to heavy losses in engineer combat power, the Ukrainian military resorted to dismounted clearance of minefields. Most of this explosive hazard clearance took place at night, straining Ukrainian logistical capabilities.
The US Army must learn from the Ukrainian military’s experience and appreciate the necessity of tactical engineer reconnaissance. To apply engineer expertise effectively before executing such operations, the Army should forward-deploy engineers to assess enemy obstacles, avenues of approach, potential bypass routes, and weak points in obstacle belts—ultimately to enable commanders to estimate the combat power necessary to maneuver forces through enemy defenses.
Engineer Reconnaissance in US Army Doctrine
Doctrinally, the US Army offers a foundation for understanding engineer reconnaissance in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-34.81. The publication outlines the who, what, and why of engineer reconnaissance. Yet the publication falls short in key areas. First, greater attention to should be paid to the role of tactical reconnaissance, which sits on a spectrum with technical reconnaissance on the other end. Tactical reconnaissance is essential for mobility, countermobility, and survivability to support maneuver commanders during large-scale combat operations. Mobility support must include identifying route status and condition, crossing-site reconnaissance, identifying complex or restrictive terrain, and obstacle reconnaissance. Countermobility operations should emphasize reconnaissance for engagement area development to provide commanders with ground-to-map intelligence on feasibility and logistical requirements. Reconnaissance for survivability must focus on terrain, enabling leaders and soldiers to understand its impact on both friendly and enemy operations.
Second, changes in Army force structure must drive changes in the way engineer reconnaissance capabilities are organized and assigned. The Army’s engineer reconnaissance manual outlines the capabilities and limitations of the engineer reconnaissance team (ERT). ERTs have generally been task-organized, with a cavalry squadron assigned tactical control. However, due to Army restructuring, this relationship is no longer possible. ERTs should now be task-organized to their parent engineer battalion or a supported maneuver battalion where engineer subject matter expertise resides through either the operations cell or task force engineer.
Lastly, leaders must dedicate training to develop subject matter expertise necessary to conduct tactical reconnaissance. For example, an engineer reconnaissance team on ground must understand the indicators that drive the intelligence reported. These may include subtle disturbances in soil representing heavy equipment operations, berm and antitank ditch characteristics, signs of enemy minefields, and other obstacle characteristics that assist in determining obstacle intent. Understanding these details and reporting accurate intelligence directly drives planning of the friendly attacking force and gives the commander an understanding of enemy fortifications.
Logistical support is crucial for extended operations, but ERTs can be sustained by the higher headquarters with which they have a command and support relationship. Geographic dislocation increases the risk assumed by the commander, but a tactical loss of a team or squad is more acceptable than a failed breach. Adequate structuring of ERTs at the tactical level increases the likelihood of operational success.
Concept Integration
The mission of engineer reconnaissance is to support maneuver warfare, with the goal of informing the maneuver commander and enabling decision-making. Integration is crucial in shaping how engineer reconnaissance supports maneuver commanders.
At combat training centers, ERTs often function as ad hoc organizations used as strike teams or to supplement scouting operations. This underutilization stems from a knowledge gap within the Army. With limited doctrinal reference, leaders rely on best practices and observations from training rotations at combat training centers. Integration begins with the commander’s dialogue and advocating for the capability to higher headquarters. Staffs must then incorporate this capability.
A brigade engineer must understand the ERT capability as well as the engineer commander to utilize it effectively. The brigade engineer’s participation in the targeting working group and recommendation of engineer-specific targets provide the ERT with a purpose in the overall maneuver plan. Depending on the operation phase, the brigade engineer will recommend targets aligned with obstacle intelligence or engagement area development intelligence, which ultimately feeds into the higher headquarters information collection plan.
Integration with the maneuver company or platoon must begin with a mutual understanding of the higher headquarters’ intent to collect intelligence on engineer-specific priority intelligence requirements. This requires subordinate maneuver commanders to understand their role in supporting the engineers in executing the brigade’s intent. Engineer reconnaissance reports are fed through the supporting maneuver command channels up to the higher headquarters. The integration of ERTs and understanding their mission to support the overall maneuver plan is crucial for informing senior commanders’ decision-making and affecting subordinate maneuver commanders’ execution.
Reconnaissance extends beyond understanding the enemy’s maneuver plan, composition, and disposition. It involves numerous branch plans to comprehend the holistic operational picture through constant surveillance and analysis. Real-time lessons from the war in Ukraine and past US Army battles highlight that information on the modern battlefield is critical. Engineer reconnaissance supports the overall maneuver plan by informing commanders on how to best utilize limited combat power and counter enemy engineer efforts.
Captain Adam Martin currently serves as team chief and OC/T (observer, coach, trainer) assigned to the 3-364th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 189th Infantry Brigade (CATB). His previous assignment was as a sapper company commander and he has served in infantry and Stryker brigade combat teams.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image: A soldier assigned to the 317th Brigade Engineering Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, operates the Anduril Ghost X medium-range reconnaissance drone during exercise Combined Resolve 25-1 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels Training Area, Hohenfels, Germany, January 14, 2025. (Credit: Spc. Thomas Dixon, US Army)