In what ways do irregular warfare and counterinsurgency overlap? Is China engaged in irregular warfare against its adversaries? What are some of the failures of the wars and conflicts of the last twenty years and why did they occur? What do irregular warfare practitioners need to do to avoid the mistakes and to ensure they learn the hard-won lessons of the last twenty years?
In Episode 85 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, our guests address these and other issues confronting irregular warfare thinkers and practitioners as a retrospective episode with two leading experts on the subject. The episode features David Kilcullen and John Nagl and makes references to recent pieces of their written work, including Nagl’s “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” and Kilcullen’s Blood Year.
Our guests first delve into issues of defining the overlapping terms “irregular warfare” and “counterinsurgency,” and continue by discussing some of the struggles encountered in seeking to measuring success and failure over the past twenty years. They then discuss how challenges in understanding the human domain affected the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They wrap up the episode with their thoughts and suggestions for irregular warfare practitioners and thinkers who may not have significant direct experience in the wars of the last twenty years.
You can hear the full episode, hosted by Julia McClenon and co-hosted by Louis Tobergte, below. And be sure to subscribe to the Irregular Warfare Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app so you don’t miss an episode!
Image credit: Sgt. Curt Cashour, US Army
Thought No. One:
At the first paragraph of John Nagl's referenced article "Why America's Military Cannot Win America's Wars" above, GEN Douglas MacArthur is quoted as saying:
"Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the Nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be Duty, Honor, Country."
Yet with America's "wars" — in places such as Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. — (a) while there certainly was no victory, (b) the Nation WAS NOT, in fact, "destroyed" — and/or even damaged at all in any significant way it would seem.
From this such perspective, thus, maybe we should not — and/or even cannot — characterize engagements such as Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc., as "wars" and/or as "irregular wars?"
(Irregular "war", thus and accordingly, to now become "irregular engagements" — or something like that?)
Thought No. 2 (which may be related to my Thought No. 1):
Although John Nagl and David Kilcullen take the time to define what they believe "irregular war" and/or "irregular warfare" looks like, these folks did not seem to take the time (unless I missed it) to define what "winning America's Wars/winning America "irregular wars" (or non-wars if you agree with my Thought No. 1 above) looks like.
This being a very critical oversight/a very critical mistake. Why?
Because if "winning America's wars"/"winning America's irregular wars" (etc.) looks like/can be defined, for example, as causing the enemy state and its societies to become organized, order, oriented, etc., more along modern western political, economic, social and/or value lines — and thereby providing that these states and their societies might better provide for the political, economic, social and/or value wants, needs and desires of the U.S./the West — then:
a. "Winning," from this such perspective, must be understood as a task that will take generations? And, thus,
b. Will be a task that will require a generational commitment by the people of the U.S?
In my initial comment above, I suggested that "winning America's wars"/"winning America's irregular wars" (or engagements) this might be defined as something like (a) organizing, ordering and orienting outlying states and societies more along modern Western political, economic, social and/or value lines and, thereby, (b) providing that these such outlying states and societies might be made to better provide for the political, economic, social and/or value wants, needs and desires of U.S./Western states and societies.
Given this such suggested political objective of the U.S./the West/this such suggested definition of "winning America's wars"/"winning America's irregular wars (etc.), would it not be better to consider this type of warfare (etc.) as being more "revolutionary" in nature?
In this regard, consider the following from David Kilcullen's "Counterinsurgency Redux:"
“Politically, in many cases today, the counter-insurgent (the U.S./the West and our partners and allies) represents revolutionary change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier – a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counter-insurgency. Pakistan’s campaign in Waziristan since 2003 exemplifies this. The enemy includes al-Qaeda-linked extremists and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture against twenty-first-century encroachment. The problem of weaning these fighters away from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernisation, does somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counter-insurgency. But it also echoes colonial campaigns, and includes entirely new elements arising from the effects of globalisation.” (Item in parenthesis above is mine.)
And this from Robert Egnell in “Learning From Today’s Crisis of Counterinsurgency:”
“Dhofar, El Savador and the Philippines are all campaigns driven by fundamentally conservative concerns. When we are looking to Syria right now, (however) it is not just about maintaining order or even the regime, but about larger political change. In Afghanistan and Iraq too, we represented revolutionary change. So, perhaps we should read Mao and Che Guevara instead of Thompson in order to find the appropriate lessons of how to achieve large-scale societal change through limited means? That is what we are after, in the end. And in this coming era, where we are pivoting away from large-scale interventions and state-building projects, but not from our fairly grand political ambitions, it may be worth exploring how insurgents do more with little; how they approach irregular warfare, and reach their objectives indirectly.” (Item in parenthesis above, this, likewise, is mine.)
Bottom line:
From the perspective provided by David Kilcullen and Robert Egnell above — (a) winning (or not winning) America's revolutionary wars in other states and societies, (b) THIS should be the proper topic — the proper title — of a twenty-year retrospective relating to our efforts in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.?