The Modern War Institute and Army Cyber Institute are proud to announce the Competition in Cyber Project (C2P). C2P’s purpose is to provide a forum to support increased conversation between military and cyber professionals, cultivating the incorporation of cyber and information competencies into the context of modern military strategy, national security strategy, and competitive strategy. C2P also provides academic, private sector, and military leaders an opportunity to characterize the threats facing the United States and its allies in cyberspace, in the information environment, and in conventional and irregular spaces. C2P’s scholarly content production is designed and curated to merge practitioner perspectives with academic research to contribute substantive dialogue on topics relevant to cyberspace, the information environment, and competition.
The need for this conversation has never been greater. Our adversaries have embraced cyber as a key component of their competitive strategies. Cyber operations ranging from malign influence campaigns to cyber-physical attacks on critical infrastructure have enabled the Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean governments to impose largely asymmetric costs on their targets. Our competitors and adversaries work tirelessly to outpace the United States: China is stealing large data sets and intellectual property as well as prioritizing artificial intelligence (AI) development, and Russia is conducting relentless and sophisticated cyberattacks against US critical and information systems. The middle powers of Iran and North Korea are also launching attacks on US systems and democracy. The United States must develop and execute a strategy to meet and ultimately surpass our adversaries’ capabilities in cyberspace and the information domain to retain a dominant position, both in the current era of competition and in future battlefields.
But the US government—and specifically the US military—cannot modernize alone. Our interconnectedness requires partnerships across the government and private sectors to pool resources and foster collaboration. Our competitive edge continues to be our human capital, a direct benefit of our American ideals. We must continue to invest in our human capital and develop technological expertise at pace with, or ahead of, our adversaries. Technological advances in the cyber and AI fields will be critical in future military modernization and will revolutionize how the military recruits, trains, equips, deploys, defends, and sustains its forces around the globe. Continued cooperation across the US government and private sector are critical to this effort. C2P hopes to facilitate improved communication between the public and private sector in order to assist in this public-private partnership effort.
Finally, C2P is intended to serve as a platform for informed contributions to the ongoing efforts to synthesize and integrate the modern cyberspace and information warfare competencies within the anticipated needs of competition and conflict over the next few decades. We look forward to engaging on these important discussions and doing our part to articulate, advocate, and advance cyber and information security awareness in the context of modern great power competition.
Come join us in this evolving and important conversation. We look forward to hearing from you!
Capt. Maggie Smith, PhD, is a US Army cyber officer currently assigned to the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy, where she is a scientific researcher and an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences. She is the director of the Competition in Cyberspace Project.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: J.M. Eddins Jr., US Air Force
Although some of the below originated as a comment in response to the current Modern War Institute Blog "Space Wars" thread, this response — now significantly modified and added to — may be of some use also re: the above "Cyberspace" project. Here is this (now significantly added to and modified) comment/response:
Part I:
If “war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” then the question becomes:
a. What is our (the U.S./the West's) "will" — for example — re: Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea and the Islamists? And:
b. What is their (Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea and the Islamists) "will" — for example — re: the U.S./the West?
Across the board here:
a. Post-the Cold War, our "will" became to transform these states and societies (Russia, etc.,) so that they might become, like the U.S./the West, market-democracies. In this regard, consider the following:
“Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement — enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies. During the Cold War, even children understood America’s security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob. Today, at great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the ‘blue areas’ of market democracies. The difference, of course, is that we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression.”
(As all know now, after 9/11, these "use of force," etc., gloves would come off. As to the quoted items above, see then-National Security Advisor Anthony Lake’s 1993 “From Containment to Enlargement" document — which served as a precursor/an introduction to then-President Bill Clinton’s signature “Engagement and Enlargement” national security strategy. Herein, take special note of the "grand "revolutionary"/"global change" nature of this post-Cold War initiative.)
b. Based on the "threat" that I describe immediately above, the "will" of such diverse entities as Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea and the Islamists, these became: To prevent their states and societies from becoming market-democracies.
Part II:
Much as, post-the Cold War, the U.S./the West sought to transform the outlying states and societies of the world more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines, it also sought to transform the states and societies of the U.S./the West itself — in this case — so that same might be made to better interact with, better provide for and better benefit from such things as capitalism, globalization and the global economy.
As with the "foreign" "global change" initiative noted in my Part I above, this "at home" change initiative had its opponents also; domestic opponents who, like their foreign opponents above, (a) much preferred the status quo (wherein, they retained significant power, influence and control) and, thus, (b) were prepared to do everything in their power to retain (or, in the case of too much change already, to regain) same.
Part III:
Thus, today, certain of our "at home opponents of change" — and certain of our "abroad opponents of change" — these folks seem to have (a) found "common cause" and, thus, (b) became "natural allies" of one another, for example, as described below:
"Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past."
(See "The American Interest" article "The Reality of Russian Soft Power" by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
“Compounding it all, Russia’s dictator has achieved all of this while creating sympathy in elements of the Right that mirrors the sympathy the Soviet Union achieved in elements of the Left. In other words, Putin is expanding Russian power and influence while mounting a cultural critique that resonates with some American audiences, casting himself as a defender of Christian civilization against Islam and the godless, decadent West.”
(See the “National Review” item entitled: “How Russia Wins” by David French.)
Part IV: A Chinese example of this "resistance to Western change" phenomenon, that I describe at my Part I above, may prove useful here. In this regard, consider the following:
“One such trap is the myth of neoliberalism. Neoliberal thought originated in developed capitalist countries of the West. Since the 1980s, and especially after the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it has spread throughout the world through the 'Washington Consensus.' Neoliberalism’s core value and concept is 'freedom.' Neoliberalism holds that 'individual freedom' is the highest-value demand and advocates freedom as a 'universal value.' Individual freedom constitutes the fundamental yardstick for measuring all social activities, and individual freedom and personal interests become the reasons used to explain all individual or social behaviors and historical events. Taking individual freedom as its ultimate value, neoliberalism’s position in the economic field is embodied in the 'three changes' [三化]: privatization, marketization, and liberalization. First, neoliberal economists advocate the 'myth of private property rights.' They promote privatization for two main reasons: (1) private ownership can guarantee individual freedom, and individual ownership of the means of production gives individuals the opportunity to accumulate wealth and have the conditions for free choice, and (2) private ownership can stimulate individual proactivity, initiative, and creativity in economic activities, thereby increasing efficiency. …
The neoliberal trend of thought has severely affected China’s dominant ideology and has had a serious impact on China’s Reform and Opening policy and economic foundation. [Neoliberalism] not only endangers China’s ideological security but also endangers the state’s economic security. The values of the supremacy of the individual and freedom have a negative impact on dominant Chinese values such as collectivism, equity, and justice. The theory of privatization challenges the current Chinese concept of socialist ownership and impacts the economic foundation of public ownership. Both the theory of market omnipotence and trade liberalization are in fact opposed to the role of the government and government supervision and advocate ‘de-nationalization.’ These principles have had a [negative] impact on the Party’s leadership and the socialist state system.”
(See the Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS) paper entitled “Ideological Security as National Security” by Jude Blanchette. Therein, note that much of this is a translation of a May 2019 article “Ideological Security in the Framework of the Overall National Security Outlook” by Tang Aijun, Associate Professor, School of Marxism, Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, Socialism Studies.)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
Hopefully — with regard to the above COMPETITION IN CYBERSPACE PROJECT — the information that I have provided above — regarding the "pro-change" political objectives of the U.S./the West post-the Cold War — and the "no-change" (and/or, in some cases, "reverse change?") political objectives of the U.S./the West's both at home and abroad opponents — hopefully this information will prove useful to everyone involved in this project.