“We have only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.” Hitler’s famous declaration prior to invading the Soviet Union illustrates how reality can shatter prewar expectations. But coming on the heels of the German Army’s blitzkrieg into Paris and the sudden collapse of the French Army after six weeks of fighting, why would he doubt Germany’s ability to defeat Stalin’s forces given Russia’s humiliating withdrawal in World War I, the devastation of Stalin’s purges, and the Red Army’s poor performance in the 1939 Winter War against Finland? He evidently did not. Yet, despite massive early losses, the Soviet Union not only survived but would demolish Hitler’s army and emerge as one of the world’s two superpowers by the war’s end.

Similarly, Israel’s two-pronged war against Hamas and Hezbollah has produced outcomes few expected. Before the conflict, Israeli military leaders assessed Hezbollah as the greater strategic threat. The group fielded an estimated forty to fifty thousand active fighters, with another forty thousand in reserve, and possessed as many as two hundred thousand rockets, including long-range precision missiles capable of striking deep into Israel. Hezbollah also had extensive combat experience in Syria, where its fighters spent years battling rebel forces to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad. In contrast, Hamas had a smaller force of approximately twenty-five thousand fighters, an arsenal of between eighteen and thirty thousand mostly short-range rockets, and significantly less battlefield experience.

And yet, despite these disparities, Hezbollah suffered a rapid military defeat and accepted an unfavorable ceasefire, while Hamas held out in the face of a fifteen-month Israeli military campaign until Israel agreed to a ceasefire deal that effectively been on the table for the better part of a year. Given the sequenced and chaotic nature of Israel’s multi-front war against the two groups, it’s important to understand the key factors that contributed to Hezbollah’s defeat and Hamas’s comparatively greater ability to withstand intense Israeli military pressure.

The Crisis Unfolds: Key Moments in the War

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israeli military and civilian outposts, killing over 1,200 Israelis and capturing 251 hostages. The next day, Hezbollah joined the conflict, launching rocket and missile strikes on Israel’s northern border. By October 27, Israel had begun its ground invasion of Gaza, engaging in prolonged urban warfare against Hamas’s tunnel networks and decentralized command structure.

In July 2024, simmering tension along Israel’s northern border boiled over when a Hezbollah rocket strike killed Israeli children. This prompted Israeli air strikes and, by August 18, a ground incursion by the Israel Defense Forces into southern Lebanon. After suffering leadership losses, Hezbollah accepted a ceasefire on November 27, 2024.

Hamas, however, endured fifteen months of war. On January 19, 2025, Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire, but Hamas’s political and military infrastructure—although hollowed out by the deaths of a number of key leaders and many of its fighters—remained intact.

These outcomes defy what might, on the surface, have seemed to be obvious expectations. Why was Israel able to deal such a significant, even decisive, blow to Hezbollah but unable to break Hamas? The answer lies in four key factors.

Political Constraints

The first and most fundamental difference between Hezbollah and Hamas centers on their respective governance structures and political accountability. Hezbollah is unique among paramilitary organizations in that it holds official representation in the Lebanese legislature. Since the end of the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah has operated as both a political party and an armed force, giving it significant influence over Lebanon’s coalition government. However, this dual role also imposes constraints. As a participant in Lebanon’s parliamentary system, Hezbollah is subject to internal political pressures, particularly from other factions that prioritize national stability over confrontation with Israel.

Lebanon’s government is deeply fragmented, with power divided among Sunni, Shia, Christian, and Druze factions. This division forces Hezbollah to compete for influence and resources within a diverse political landscape. While Hezbollah enjoys strong support among Lebanese Shia, the broader population is not uniformly aligned with its militant ambitions. Following Israel’s intense bombing campaign and successful targeting of senior Hezbollah leaders, many Lebanese civilians—particularly those displaced by the fighting—demanded a ceasefire and a return to normalcy. Ultimately, these internal pressures, combined with Hezbollah’s military losses, compelled it to accept an unfavorable compromise with Israel.

The ceasefire agreement, based on UN Resolution 1701, forced Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River, ceding territory to the Lebanese Army and reducing its ability to threaten Israel with short-range rockets and mortars. While Hezbollah retained longer-range missile capabilities, its retreat effectively limited its ability to engage in sustained high-intensity conflict with Israel. Despite its battlefield strength, Hezbollah’s political obligations constrained its ability to wage an indefinite war, ultimately leading to its strategic setback.

By contrast, Hamas faced no such political constraints. Unlike Hezbollah, which must navigate Lebanon’s complex coalition politics, Hamas enjoys a monopoly on both political and military power in Gaza. Hamas initially came to power in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, winning a majority of seats in a surprise victory over the ruling Fatah party. Following a brief and violent power struggle, Hamas expelled Fatah from Gaza in 2007, establishing itself as the sole governing authority. Since then, Hamas has consolidated control, eliminating political rivals and integrating nearly all armed Palestinian factions in Gaza under its command structure.

Hamas’s absolute political dominance allowed it to pursue a strategy of total war without facing internal opposition. While Hezbollah had to balance its military campaign with domestic political considerations, Hamas was free to fight without fear of political backlash. Palestinian civilians suffered deeply from the Israeli campaign after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, but with no organized alternative to Hamas’s political authority, there was no means of opposing the group. The destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure and the humanitarian toll of the conflict did not translate into pressure for Hamas to negotiate; instead, it solidified Hamas’s grip on power. Without competing factions demanding a ceasefire, Hamas could continue fighting indefinitely as long as it maintained a steady supply of manpower and munitions.

Intelligence Penetration

A second major reason for Israel’s success against Hezbollah was its deep intelligence penetration of the group’s military and leadership networks. Israeli intelligence agencies, particularly Mossad, infiltrated Hezbollah’s ranks long before the war, gaining access to critical information about its command structure, logistics, and operational plans. This allowed Israel to strike with precision, eliminating Hezbollah’s key leaders and disrupting its ability to coordinate large-scale operations. Additionally, Israel’s strikes against Fuad Shukr, the senior military commander of Hezbollah, and Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s secretary-general, all suggest a high level of intelligence penetration by Israel. These senior leaders were likely well aware of Israel’s human and signals intelligence collections against them and took several measures to avoid targeting. This included limiting communications, shifting locations of meetings, and meeting in fortified command bunkers. Despite these steps, Israel successfully targeted the two senior leaders and many others, which gradually broke down Hezbollah’s command and control of its fighters.

One of the most devastating intelligence operations was Israel’s infiltration of Hezbollah’s communication networks. Hezbollah, aware of Israel’s electronic surveillance capabilities, attempted to counter this by banning mobile phones and relying on encrypted pagers and radios. However, Mossad outmaneuvered the organization. In a highly sophisticated operation, Israel created a front company posing as a legitimate supplier of communication devices. When war broke out, Israel remotely detonated these devices, reportedly injuring thousands of Hezbollah personnel, including key commanders. This single operation crippled Hezbollah’s ability to command and control its forces in the early stages of the conflict.

Israel’s ability to penetrate Hezbollah’s networks can be largely attributed to Lebanon’s unique political and social landscape. Unlike Gaza, which is a closed and highly controlled enclave ruled exclusively by Hamas, Lebanon is an open, heterogeneous society with numerous religious sects and political factions. The country’s fragmented governance, rampant corruption, and economic instability made it easier for Israeli intelligence to cultivate assets. Lebanon’s porous borders, particularly with Syria and Israel, may have allowed greater movement of intelligence operatives. All these factors made Hezbollah vulnerable to infiltration in ways that Hamas was not.

In contrast, Gaza is one of the most insular and controlled territories in the world. Hamas dominates every aspect of life, from governance to security, allowing it to tightly regulate movement within the enclave. The territory is largely sealed off from outside influence, with strict controls on who can enter or leave. Foreigners, including journalists, aid workers, and diplomats, operate under heavy Hamas surveillance, which likely made it exceedingly difficult for Israeli intelligence to insert operatives or cultivate assets. Furthermore, Hamas spent decades identifying and eliminating suspected Israeli informants. The result is a far more hostile environment for intelligence operations compared to Lebanon.

Hamas’s Self-Sustaining War Economy vs. Hezbollah’s Reliance on Iran

The third major reason for Hamas’s ability to endure prolonged conflict while Hezbollah faltered was the stark difference in their sustainment strategies. Hamas developed an innovative and largely self-sufficient logistics system that allowed it to continue fighting without relying on external resupply. In contrast, Hezbollah depended heavily on Iranian weapons shipments, which Israel systematically targeted and disrupted throughout the war.

Hamas’s self-sufficient sustainment strategy revolved around three key factors: domestic weapons production, battlefield scavenging, and an extensive tunnel network that enabled continuous operations. Over the years, Hamas invested heavily in indigenous weapons manufacturing, allowing it to produce antitank rockets, mortars, improvised explosive devices, and even longer-range rockets without depending on foreign suppliers. This local arms industry enabled Hamas to sustain combat operations even as Israel targeted its prewar stockpiles.

Additionally, Hamas exploited the battlefield as a source of resupply. After every engagement with Israeli forces, Hamas fighters combed the wreckage for small arms, ammunition, and unexploded ordnance. During recent prisoner exchanges, Hamas publicly displayed captured Israeli rifles and other military gear—evidence of its systematic battlefield scavenging efforts.

Most critically, Hamas turned Israel’s bombing campaign into a resource for its war effort. The thousands of unexploded bombs and artillery shells dropped on Gaza provided Hamas with a virtually endless supply of explosive material, which its engineers repurposed into new weapons. Far from being crippled by Israeli air strikes, Hamas leveraged them to sustain its operations.

By contrast, Hezbollah’s sustainment model was more vulnerable to external disruption. Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah relied heavily on Iranian weapons shipments, which were transported via air and overland through Syria. From the outset of the war, Israel targeted these supply lines with precision strikes, destroying key munitions depots and cutting Hezbollah off from critical resupply. Israeli air strikes inside Syria targeted Iranian weapons storage sites and convoys en route to Lebanon, while Israeli fighter jets prevented suspected Iranian arms shipments from reaching Beirut’s airport.

These sustained attacks placed Hezbollah under mounting logistical strain. While the organization had stockpiled significant weapons reserves before the war, Israeli airpower steadily eroded these supplies. Estimates suggest that by October 2024, Hezbollah had lost between one-half to two-thirds of its total munitions stockpile. Unlike Hamas, which could repurpose Israeli ordnance into new weapons, Hezbollah had no equivalent means of regenerating its arsenal.

Furthermore, while Hezbollah possessed some domestic weapons manufacturing capabilities, it relied on Iran for sophisticated systems such as precision-guided missiles and advanced antitank weapons. When Israel severed Hezbollah’s supply lines, these high-tech capabilities dwindled, forcing Hezbollah to rely on less effective alternatives.

Hostage Leverage

A fourth key reason for Hamas’s ability to endure a prolonged war while Hezbollah was forced into an early ceasefire was its capture of 251 hostages during the October 7 attacks. This single act gave Hamas strategic leverage that Hezbollah never possessed, fundamentally altering the political and military dynamics of the conflict.

By seizing hundreds of Israelis, Hamas forced Israel into difficult military and political decisions. Unlike Hezbollah, which relied solely on military force and indirect deterrence through Iran, Hamas’s hostages gave it direct influence over Israeli decision-making. Israel had to balance its offensive objectives with efforts to recover captives alive, constraining its operational freedom.

Hamas used the hostages as both human shields and a psychological weapon against Israeli society. Periodic proof-of-life videos kept pressure on Israel to negotiate with Hamas. This prolonged Hamas’s survival, including by leading to a temporary ceasefire in November 2023 that delayed Israel’s ability to achieve its military objectives. Hezbollah, by contrast, faced unrelenting Israeli airpower without interruption, accelerating its defeat.

The hostage strategy proved more strategically valuable than Hezbollah’s firepower. While Hezbollah was dismantled militarily, Hamas leveraged hostages to prolong the war, force diplomatic engagements, and extract concessions from Israel. Hamas’s hostage strategy ultimately prolonged its survival in a way Hezbollah could not replicate, proving that political, psychological, and diplomatic leverage can be just as important as battlefield firepower.

Conclusion: Clausewitz’s Trinity and the Perils of Assumption in War

“The blow to the Israeli home front will be so horrible that it will cause a deep demoralization.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued this dire warning against launching a ground invasion into Lebanon to his cabinet shortly after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, fearing the heavy cost of fighting Hezbollah. His prediction, however, would prove wrong. The rapid defeat of Hezbollah—once considered Israel’s most formidable adversary—contrasted starkly with Hamas’s endurance in Gaza, a strategic paradox as shocking as the German Army’s early victories in World War II followed by its ultimate downfall. The reversal of expectations in Israel’s war with Hamas and Hezbollah highlights the unpredictability of war and the dangers of relying on prebattle assumptions.

The unexpected divergence in these two conflicts underscores Clausewitz’s trinity—the dynamic interaction between government, military, and people in shaping war’s outcome. Hezbollah, despite its superior arsenal and battlefield experience, was constrained by Lebanon’s fractured political system and pressure from displaced civilians, forcing it into an early ceasefire. Hamas, by contrast, wielded absolute control over both governance and military affairs in Gaza, allowing it to fight indefinitely without internal opposition. Hamas’s capture of 251 hostages ultimately proved more strategically powerful than much of Hezbollah’s arsenal, as public pressure within Israel compelled the government to negotiate their release, influencing the course of the war.

For military professionals, this war highlights the dangers of assumption in war. Hamas’s ability to conduct a devastating Israeli campaign in Gaza and survive fifteen months of total war should challenge our assumptions about the capabilities of adversaries and their ability to endure sustained conflict. The next October 7 will not likely look like the last one. The ability to identify flawed assumptions and adapt in real time will define success or failure in future conflicts in the Middle East and beyond.

Major Harrison (Brandon) Morgan is a US Army Middle East and North Africa foreign area officer. He previously served as a Modern War Institute nonresident fellow.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit