The doctor had just completed his rounds at Womack Army Medical Center at Fort Bragg. He was visibly upset, causing a colleague to ask him what was wrong. “We’re out of fentanyl lollipops and fentanyl patches again,” he said. “Our producer’s facility was raided by the FBI.”
Of course, this fictional scenario hasn’t happened because fentanyl hasn’t been reclassified from a controlled substance to a weapon of war—yet. Concern over the rising number of overdose deaths in the United States—nearly seventy-four thousand in 2022—has caused calls for action, any action, that might reverse this trend. In 2017, President Donald Trump declared the opioid crisis a public health emergency. More recently, the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community noted that there had been more than fifty-two thousand overdose deaths in fiscal year 2024—a significant decrease since 2022 but still a clear sign that fentanyl production and global distribution “endanger the health and safety of millions of Americans and contribute to regional instability.” If a toxic chemical such as fentanyl is causing so many deaths, does it qualify as a weapon of mass destruction? Would changing its designation from a prescription drug to an unconventional weapon bring in additional resources and partners and reduce the number of deaths?
Some evidently believe so. A bill introduced this year in Congress would require the Department of Homeland Security to treat fentanyl as a WMD. And in a recent MWI research publication, Nicholas Dockery argues that the lethality of fentanyl analogues—as low as a two-milligram dose—“make it a clear candidate for WMD classification under federal law.” He believes that this would open up interagency coordination and resources to address the opioid crisis by “fundamentally alter[ing] how the United States and its allies address the fentanyl crisis.” This measure could “strengthen international partnerships in the fight against synthetic opioids” and “provide the legal and strategic framework necessary to treat the fentanyl epidemic as a global security threat.” That all sounds great—except that it ignores the fact that countering WMD policy and strategy is one of the most neglected and underresourced defense issues in contemporary times. Ask employees of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency if they’re feeling any love from the national security community.
There are both legal and policy challenges in trying to regulate fentanyl analogues as chemical weapons and WMD. Let’s look at the legal aspects of the argument. The low lethal dose and high number of overdoses do not make fentanyl a chemical weapon under federal law. There are several federal laws that define what a WMD is, so that is a point of confusion in and of itself. The most applicable statue is 18 USC 2332a, which notes that a person who unlawfully uses, threatens, or attempts or conspires to use a WMD against any US person or property can face a significant prison term or even the death penalty. This includes any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of a toxic or poisonous chemical. There is no limitation as to the amount of chemical or the amount of people injured, as one might expect from a mass-casualty event. This is usually the go-to law when the FBI investigates a terrorist WMD incident.
Other WMD definitions exist for guiding the Proliferation Security Initiative (50 USC 2902), implementing the US government’s Domestic Preparedness Program (50 USC 2302), and implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (19 USC 229). The common thread that these laws all have is the word “weapon.” In general, a weapon must be a device, instrument, material, or substance that is used to cause or capable of causing death or seriously bodily damage. It does not include devices that are not designed or redesigned for use as a weapon. A fentanyl-laced pill is not, under any circumstance, a weapon. No one is forcing an individual to take illicit drugs for anything other than pleasure or physiological need. If a drug user has an accidental overdose, it is most likely that the person took the drugs voluntarily and assumed the risk of the effects.
The United Nations defined the term “WMD” to guide nation-states as to the acceptability of production and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Its greatest utility is to the arms control community, which evaluates and litigates as to where WMD programs may exist or whether nation-states have employed WMD. For a system to be considered a WMD, I would suggest that first of all, it must be a weapon that is capable of causing death. It must be capable of causing mass casualties in a single moment at a single location. Last, the international community must agree on the list of prohibited weapon systems. These ought to be simple requirements.
From a policy perspective, how would classifying fentanyl as a WMD enhance what the federal government seeks to achieve? Currently, we can see that the Drug Enforcement Administration has a huge role in drug interdiction and enforcement, the State Department has a role in eradication and interdiction of illegal drugs, and the Department of Defense has a role in counterdrug operations. These functions have existed for years and are significantly resourced. Are they not working to the degree that the counter-WMD community needs to assist them? What authorities are lacking?
Let’s say that the White House issued an executive order to direct government agencies to treat illicitly trafficked fentanyl as a WMD. Forget for a moment about all of the work necessary to allow the US public health system to continue to use fentanyls in legal medical manners. Exactly which fentanyl compounds would be included on the prohibited list for the purposes of inspections and seizures? Does it include alfentanil, carfentanil, remifentanil, sufentanil, butyryl fentanyl, furanyl fentanyl, acryl fentanyl, or one of the many other fentanyl analogues? If you’re going to outlaw a specific chemical, you have to provide specific guidelines for the executive agencies to plan their actions against it. Are all fentanyl analogues to be listed on the banned list?
There are certainly parallels between counterproliferation, countering terrorism, and countering illicit drug operations. From a security viewpoint, they all have characteristics of a network of suppliers and customers—networks that can be disrupted with focused military operations—and particular key individuals who can be targeted. These missions all come out of the same major executive agencies but rely on specific policy definitions to guide their resourcing and objectives. There are no military, intelligence, or law enforcement tools in the counter-WMD toolbox that would increase the emphasis on international drug enforcement. Dockery’s argument is based on the assumption that the public’s concern over WMD is higher than it is regarding fentanyl overdoses. While international and public opinion on nuclear weapons remains one of high concern, there is no similar outcry over the erosion of the arms control regime addressing chemical weapons.
When we examine the opioid crisis, we need to consider the medical principle of first, do no harm. The Defense Department’s funding for countering WMD, not including theater and national missile defense, runs about $6 billion a year. The Department of Homeland Security spends less than a half billion a year on countering WMD programs. At State, there is another billion dollars for counterproliferation programs. The Department of Energy has $2.5 billion for nonproliferation. In round numbers, the US government counter-WMD budget probably runs at about $10 billion. This has been pretty much a flat-line budget for years. The Fiscal Year 2025 federal drug control budget was $44.5 billion across the interagency. Are we now suggesting that the limited tools and resources of the counter-WMD community are absolutely necessary to help fight the opioid crisis? What specific resources would open up to the counterdrug community that do not currently exist? It’s hard to follow the logic here.
There’s no question that the number of deaths caused by fentanyl overdoses is a national tragedy. It is, however, not one caused by a weapon of war, and the legal definitions of WMD do not support identifying fentanyl analogues as a WMD. Even if the US government focused on the most used fentanyl analogues, criminal organizations could merely switch to another version to get around federal regulations. If the counter-WMD community and international partners view fentanyl trafficking as similar to WMD proliferation, does that mean that the counter-WMD community will continue to be fully resourced to focus on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons? Unless there are additional funds coming to the counter-WMD community, the resulting actions would decrease the US military’s preparedness for military combat that involves real WMD.
Between 2009 and 2012, Defense Department leaders responsible for overseeing the department’s chemical and biological defense program redefined emerging infectious diseases as WMD, resulting in the movement of research and development funds from service-validated requirements to global biosurveillance and medical countermeasures for natural diseases. There were no additional funds that came with the policy change, and as a result, nearly two dozen defense programs were cut or eliminated with little to no benefit to the military’s global health security efforts. On the other hand, there is a clear and consistent record of addressing illicit drug trafficking, criminal prosecutions, and treatment regimes within existing law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic offices.
This is not a fight that the US government will win based on broadening legal definitions to increase emphasis on the national crisis du jour. We should consider the downsides of labeling persistent public problems as national security threats to automatically elevate their priority for resources. Congress needs to exercise its oversight role and resource the law enforcement and public health communities to accomplish their clearly defined agendas. Classifying fentanyl as a WMD will not alter how the United States and its allies address the opioid crisis at all. In fact, it will hurt the counter-WMD community more than it will help efforts to counter illicit fentanyl trafficking.
Al Mauroni is a retired civil servant with forty years’ experience in counter-WMD policy and programs, and is the author of the book BIOCRISIS: Defining Biological Threats in U.S. Policy. His last government position was as the director of the US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies between 2013 and 2024.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: CBP Photography