The meeting was winding down. The debate had been spirited as the brigade’s senior leaders engaged with representatives from the inspector general’s office, exploring the ins and outs of the recent initial command inspection. This inspection, which takes place when a new officer takes command, is part of the overall command’s Organizational Inspection Program. The final topic that day concerned the specific areas requiring inspection—all of the administrative requirements put in place by a combination of higher-level commands, the Army, the Defense Department, and other authorities and oversight bodies. The positions of the participants were logical enough: the inspector general representatives and installation agencies they represented felt the list of inspectable areas was appropriate; the brigade leadership did not. The heated back and forth had nearly petered out when one of the inspector general office’s personnel offered the following challenge: “Well then, what areas would you cut out?”

“All of them,” was my immediate response. It was met with the sound of crickets.

Impossible? Probably. But what if it wasn’t?

The Fundamental Problem: Do We Need a Paradigm Shift?

The fundamental problem as I see it is found in the framing of the inspector general representative’s question. It is always a matter of what to cut, and never one of what is most important to keep in place. What if, however, we could tear it all down and build back from scratch? After all, if the default is to keep everything unless units can argue away specific requirements, then all the vested interests and proponents of those requirements need to do is dig in, defend their turf, and wait out the next movement cycle. All the while, new requirements accumulate, adding to already almost endless red tape.

In principle, it should not be a unit or organization responsibility—at any level—to figure out what ought to be cut from the litany of requirements and other demands. In fact, it is likely impossible, given the frequent need to collaborate and build consensus around the most minor of cuts, to ever make headway just by trimming away at the margins.

As a case in point, this was exactly the fate of a vaunted 2018 initiative to unburden commanders. Except for removing the TRiPs ticket requirement for every pass and leave request (a win—don’t get me wrong), little else of material value was eliminated. At the initiative’s end, commanders remained heavily burdened.

If we flip the script and cut everything instead, each requirement is forced to justify itself as if it was being introduced for the first time. The hackneyed requirements will have far less staying power in this scenario, especially those born of risk aversion from a different time or a knee-jerk overreaction to infrequent events. By tearing it all down, we might achieve the rightsizing of the administrative task load we so desperately need.

How to Look at the Problem

Tearing down our requirements list to nothing and then rebuilding it to the right size is no small undertaking. A framework to even start understanding the scope and nature of the problem is required. What follows is one way to establish that understanding and begin the rebuild approach. (Spoiler alert: we already do it.)

We can begin with those requirements originating wholly outside of the Army and Department of Defense’s control—those requirements mandated by Congress, directed by the commander-in-chief, or required by statue. This forms the base of the pyramid of requirements and reflects likely immoveable objects which cannot be discarded.

Next, we consider the requirements within DoD that the Army can influence but does not actively control. This consists of joint regulations and directives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These requirements, while not completely immovable, exist outside the Army’s control and would likely take significant political capital to adjust.

Beyond these two levels are the things that we, the Army, entirely control: the Army regulations, and requirements put in place by combatant commands, Army service component commands, four-star headquarters, and installations. This is where the Army’s decision space can and should be. Coincidentally, this is also the space where the effects of a teardown program can be most effective. Even if we can’t touch the bottom two tranches, there is more than enough unburdening opportunity available in the top three parts of the pyramid.

So, How Do We Cut?

Once we have categorized the requirements, how do we weigh the merits of each and build back correctly? Fortunately, the tool is already in our kit bag. Consider the force design update process, for which the Army uses what it calls Total Army Analysis. We can use a similar data-driven approach in support of a force administration update. The same procedures that rightsize (in terms of scope and capabilities) a new formation can be used to analyze the introduction (or in this case reintroduction) of administrative requirements.

The metrics of analysis should be (1) cost-return or (2) risk-reward. In cost-return analysis, the force administration update process will assess each task based on the balance between man-hour cost and the expected return of efficiency and productivity. In risk-reward analysis, the process will measure the risk if a task is left undone and compare this to the reward of adding that task. If the data would not support initial introduction, we should not reintroduce the task. The analysis can simultaneously keep a running tally on annual man-hours as the tasks add up. Such a tally of would ensure we actually have the time for things we claim we are doing, rather than lying to ourselves. Only then can a harmony of time and requirements be achieved.

Tear it Down, Then Build it Back

The key here is the structured reintroduction of the requirements. This requires a mindset shift from one of checking boxes to one under which we truly know everything that soldier time is spent on and the value of that time. Just like the gradual fielding of new equipment, the force might barely perceive controlling regulation changes. They will just receive formal permission to the stop doing the things for which the analysis does not support reintroducing—likely things units were assuming risk on by simply checking the box, anyway. But the rigor of the force administration update is key—conducting it with a force design update–style wargame for every potential requirement enables us to avoid the box-checking tradeoffs before they occur.

The desire for substantive change is out there as evidenced by Chief of Staff of the Army General Randy George’s initiative to “stop doing things that don’t support warfighting or building cohesive teams” as well as the secretary of the Army’s recent letter to the force. Efforts to implement this initiative are commendable, but to avoid a repeat of the failed efforts of 2018, a mindset change is in order. Whether it’s defining inspection areas for the Organizational Inspection Program like the discussion that opened this article, performing training mandated by Army regulations, or fulfilling any other requirement that grinds on Army units and leaders and distracts from the basics of training and leadership, the time to tear down and rebuild is now. If we can transform in contact with our adversaries, we can transform our administrative load while fending off the vested interests of requirements past. And we must move quickly—if we don’t drive the change for ourselves, we are at risk of having it be driven for us. But to ensure we start doing the right things, we might need to consider what it would be like to stop doing everything.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Dawe is the deputy commanding officer of the 194th Armored Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Andrew Clark, US Army