“Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus.” For diplomats and military leaders, this saying speaks to the apparent futility of interagency cooperation, with the two departments separated by seemingly intractable differences in character and organization. Yet, both diplomacy and military force have their own unique limitations that necessitate collaboration, difficult as it often proves to be. One important constraint of military force is that military operations should be transitory. Setting exit criteria is critical for US military planners, especially with a security handover to a local partner. To this end, interagency cooperation between the Defense Department, State Department, and other agencies is essential.
Unlike a military presence, diplomatic contingents are permanent and can further US foreign policy goals long after conflicts have ended. Civilian agencies are vital in transitioning from combat operations to stability and reconstruction. One of many examples is the work by the State Department and USAID—the US Agency for International Development—during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on civil reconstruction efforts through the two organizations’ Joint Strategic Plans. If Defense Department goals include transitioning to civil authority, US civilian agencies must be part of the plan. Nonetheless, current models of interagency cooperation can experience tension, as was the case recently during the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) campaign in Iraq. Learning from examples like this can help integrate agencies in future conflict zones.
Policy Planning Methods and Means
As distinct instruments of foreign policy, the State and Defense Departments have separate strategies: campaign plans for the Defense Department, and integrated country strategies for the State Department. Both are nested with the US National Security Strategy published by the executive branch and detail the strategic goals for each organization, as well as the means to achieve them. They also serve as the declarations of US foreign policy and defense objectives for these agencies when published. Campaign plans and integrated country strategies can act as both public affairs initiatives and internal planning documents. As such, these are a useful starting point for collaborating with outside agencies.
However, the two strategies differ significantly in formulation and composition. In addition to the National Security Strategy, campaign plans also take inspiration from the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Under the Defense Department, each geographic combatant command is responsible for developing an individual combatant command campaign plan, tailored to each region’s unique threats, state and nonstate actors, and other considerations. Within combatant command campaign plans are further campaign plans for specific combat operations—like CJTF-OIR, the counter-ISIS campaign encompassing Iraq and Syria. Campaign plans are not necessarily limited to one specific country, unlike the State Department’s integrated country strategies, which are the four-year strategies for individual countries (integrated mission strategies are the equivalent State Department plans for international organizations). Like campaign plans, they are informed by the National Security Strategy, but with the additional input of Joint Strategic Plans with USAID and regional or functional bureau strategies. Campaign plans are generally more conditions-based than integrated country strategies. While campaign plans specify transitions between operational phases tied to military objectives, an integrated country strategy focuses more on long-term conditions within a country over a given four years.
Comparing integrated country strategies and campaign plans reveals initial limitations to interagency cooperation. The State and Defense Departments both nest their policy planning within executive branch guidance from the National Security Strategy, yet threat responses can be isolated from external influence. Agencies risk planning in a vacuum when it comes to global threats or regional instability. Integrated country strategies and campaign plans are end products of extensive internal planning, meaning agency plans harmonize only after experiencing friction in practice. Although some coordination bodies exist, such as the Office of State-Defense Integration, each department retains parallel funding, logistics, and command structures when responding to immediate global crises. This continues to play out in conflict zones today, most notably in the counter-ISIS campaign in Iraq.
Intertwining State and Defense in Iraq
The 2014 military intervention in Iraq was radically different from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), which began with the US-led invasion in 2003. During OIF, coalition forces occupied large swaths of military bases and infrastructure deemed mission essential. However, nearly all of these facilities were transferred to the nascent Iraqi security forces during the OIF drawdown in 2011. Some facilities were parceled up between different entities, like the massive Victory Base Complex, the former headquarters for Multinational Force–Iraq in western Baghdad. Victory Base Complex had portions demilitarized near the Baghdad International Airport and others transferred to Iraqi security forces’ control, while part of the complex was also turned over to the State Department (becoming the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center). Between 2011 and 2014, the enduring physical US presence in Iraq was thus largely limited to the State Department’s embassy and consulates. This, combined with the Iraqi abandonment of most military bases in northern Iraq during the ISIS offensive in 2014, meant that when the CJTF-OIR mission began, there was minimal military infrastructure in Iraq for personnel to fall in on.
These operational constraints required the United States to share facilities with local partners as the counter-ISIS campaign ramped up. US and coalition forces joined with Iraqi security forces at Forward Operating Base Union III in Baghdad and al-Asad Air Base in Anbar Governorate, or with the Peshmerga at Erbil Air Base in Iraqi Kurdistan. This was a significant change from the massive complexes of OIF operated solely by the US military. When US forces moved to occupy Union III in Baghdad’s International Zone, they found another unlikely partner—the State Department. Union III was in the heart of Baghdad’s city center, close to the diplomatic quarter and foreign embassies. As the home to both CJTF-OIR headquarters and the Joint Operations Command–Iraq, it was important to keep Union III operational despite logistical isolation in a dense urban environment.
One solution was its proximity to the Baghdad embassy complex. Originally constructed during OIF, this complex remains the largest embassy in the world and features extensive force protection, often being compared to a city within a city. More importantly for CJTF-OIR planners, the embassy complex also provided a logistical lifeline; not only did it have internal power generation and wastewater management facilities, but it also had existing service support contracts for basic life support. Considering the difficulties of establishing LOGPAC (logistics package) services at Union III (i.e., using Army organic sustainment networks to provide life support), CJTF-OIR planners opted to share contracted life support services with the Baghdad embassy complex through an interagency agreement. Interagency cooperation was not just limited to contracting support. The Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center near the airport was a key sustainment and transportation hub for US personnel in the greater Baghdad area. In addition to being the closest aircraft landing strip to the international zone, it also hosted a Role 3 hospital staffed by US military personnel. This increased integration between the US Mission in Iraq (the formal term encompassing all State Department operations in Iraq) and CJTF-OIR initially proved valuable, but problems would develop after the Israel-Hamas conflict began.
Challenges During the Ongoing Militia Campaign
The aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas in Israel impacted US military and diplomatic presence throughout the region. Following the Hamas attacks, Iranian-aligned militia groups began a sustained campaign of attacks on US personnel stationed at facilities throughout Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. This campaign consisted of persistent rocket, missile, and drone attacks, including one-way attack unmanned aircraft systems. In the first few months, US facilities targeted in Iraq included al-Asad Air Base, Erbil Air Base, and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center. Attacks were indiscriminate in targeting both US military facilities and US diplomatic compounds.
The deteriorating security situation prompted different responses from the US military and diplomatic contingents. The US Mission in Iraq evacuated a significant number of personnel deemed nonessential across its embassies and consulates to minimize risk. This amounted to nearly 23 percent of the overall mission staff, but more significantly was a 47 percent overall reduction in those providing service support—decreases that an inspector general report found to be “stressing Mission Iraq’s ability to maintain adequate life support provisions,” including preventative maintenance and emergency services. US embassy operations carried on due to the simultaneous drawdown in nonservice support staff, thereby reducing the mission’s footprint and support requirements.
The nonessential personnel evacuation also included contractor support to military personnel on Union III. However, unlike the US Mission in Iraq, CJTF-OIR responded to the increased threat level by augmenting personnel in theater and elevating force posture. The Defense Department announced the deployment of additional Patriot missile battalions and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery capabilities into the theater. At the same time that the State Department was seeking to limit its footprint in Iraq, the Defense Department was increasing its own. The timing of the drawdown particularly impacted base operations systems through degraded maintenance capabilities and life support services. Additionally, the strained logistics system slowed or prevented the distribution of material from the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund to Iraqi partners. Although the evacuation of nonessential personnel was a State Department decision, it hamstrung its military partners in the Baghdad area until services were restored some months later. The critical omission here was failing to account for differences in risk threshold between the State and Defense Departments. By tethering contract support but retaining their respective threat mitigation strategies, both parties set themselves up for failure in an environment where joint cooperation is key to success.
Takeaways for Interagency Policy Planning
Policy planners need to recognize several factors to improve interagency cooperation in conflict zones. First, they must acknowledge that foreign adversaries will often not make a distinction between US diplomatic and military sites, and may target both. The recent anti-US campaign by Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq illustrates this. US foreign policy stances on regional conflicts can increase the risk to US personnel abroad—in this case, perceived support for Israel during the war against Hamas was the trigger for the militias’ campaign. Diplomatic compounds proved as likely and vulnerable a target as regional military bases. Policy planners must be proactive when faced with similar regional threats. Increased force posture should require not only augmenting security at diplomatic compounds but also State and Defense Department coordination on countermeasures. Asymmetric threats like Iranian-aligned militias demand a multilayered response with military actions and diplomatic initiatives to cease hostilities. Using the subsequent airstrikes on the militia leaders as an example, the military’s State Department counterparts are crucial to minimizing political blowback from military actions, given their role as interlocutors with foreign governments. Acting in isolation from each other only lessens the efficacy of any threat response.
Secondly, interagency logistical cooperation in conflict zones should limit its scope and scale for two reasons: divergent risk thresholds and different sustainment needs. Shared contracted support may be useful for solving short-term logistical problems, but when security situations deteriorate, the State Department will evacuate personnel long before the US military would choose to. These nonessential staff drawdowns have occurred twice in Iraq since CJTF-OIR began: in 2019 before the storming of the US embassy and in 2023 after the Israel-Hamas War began. When logistics support provided by the State Department to the US military is removed, this can create unplanned gaps in sustainment coverage. Bidding for new service support contracts is a lengthy process, and emergency LOGPAC is not a long-term solution. To maintain consistent sustainment coverage, US military planners need to prioritize organic logistics support. This avoids complications from differing risk thresholds. By providing more planning certainty through organic sustainment, US military forces can also tailor that support to operational needs without the limitations imposed by an interagency agreement.
Lastly, long-term policy planning in conflict zones requires greater integration between the State and Defense Departments. CJTF-OIR has been a prolonged combat operation: 2024 marks its tenth anniversary. Campaign plans and integrated country strategies are multiyear planning tools, and as such, need to adjust to the reality on the ground. This is particularly important in Iraq as the overall military mission shifts from counter-ISIS combat operations to an advise-and-assist role with local partners. Stability operations dictate cooperation with civil authorities, something the State Department is uniquely qualified to do. Both the State and Defense Departments would benefit from enhanced collaboration in the realm of policy planning to synchronize theater-wide goals, resource allocation, and coordinating engagement with civil authorities. Interagency cooperation is imperative for success in conflict zones and beyond, provided policy planners can work together.
Captain John F. Govern is an Army officer with service in the infantry and military intelligence branches. In 2023, he deployed to Iraq in support of CJTF-OIR with the 10th Mountain Division. He is currently serving as a squadron S2 in the 2d Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.