Qassem Soleimani led an organization that, according to Pentagon estimates, killed about six hundred American service members in Iraq since 2003. Leaders of other groups similarly responsible for the deaths of Americans have met similar ends: Osama bin Laden, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and several members of the Haqqani family to name a few. The decision to kill the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force is part of a broader US policy to deter Iranian activities that threaten US interests and the forces that work to achieve those interests. Yet in this regard, the United States faces a fundamental misalignment of ends and means. US officials continue to demand that Iran halts its support to Shia proxies in the Middle East, its development of more advanced ballistic missiles, and its potential pursuit of nuclear weapons. At the same time, US actions do not link strategically to these objectives; in fact, many might actually embolden and strengthen the domestic political elements in Iran who want to expand those very activities. While Qassem Soleimani is not Franz Ferdinand and World War III is certainly not on the horizon, there’s a strong possibility that this strike, aimed at curtailing certain Iranian activities, will have the opposite effect.
The United States has no equivalent to Soleimani, so it is difficult for Americans to grasp his importance to Iran as a country and to Iranians as a population. This was a man who many analysts considered the second most powerful person in Iran after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and who enjoyed the support of eight in ten Iranians according to recent polling conducted through a University of Maryland project. For Americans, imagine if Dwight D. Eisenhower came back from the dead and was put in charge of the US military. From there, imagine that Iran killed him with a roadside bomb while he was visiting deployed service members in Iraq. In that scenario, it seems unlikely that American policymakers would opt to change US behavior more in line with Iranian desires—or that the American public would allow it. Not surprisingly, Iranian officials have threatened retaliation rather than acquiescence, and Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah and the various Popular Mobilization Forces have promised revenge.
American military operations in Iraq serve multiple purposes in line with US strategic interests: in the ongoing fight against the remnants of the Islamic State, as a bulwark against the continued expansion of Iranian influence across the Fertile Crescent, and to contribute to the stability of the region in general but especially for the trade of hydrocarbons. At the same time, Iraq relies on Iran, and those influenced by Iran, for its own internal political stability and security. After all, the Shia-dominated Popular Mobilization Forces number between 130,000 and 150,000 fighters, have their own political parties, and receive about $2 billion annually from the Iraqi government. As a mechanism for comparison, the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, which the United States views as its most politically and militarily reliable organization within Iraq, boasts about ten thousand fighters and receives about $225 million from the Iraqi government. High-profile members of the Iraqi government had already called for a review of its policy vis-à-vis American troop presence in the aftermath of US airstrikes against members of Kata’ib Hezbollah, Iran’s most zealous proxy in Iraq. Calls for the expulsion of American troops from Iraq have only intensified in the wake of Soleimani’s death, with the Iraqi parliament passing a non-binding resolution accordingly. It will be difficult for the United States to fight the remnants of the Islamic State and counter Iranian influence in Iraq without a physical presence in the country.
Over the past three years, the United States has embarked on a campaign of “maximum pressure” against Iran, and the targeted killing of Soleimani adds an overt military dimension to what has been primarily an economic and diplomatic affair. An integral part of this policy was the United States renouncing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and re-imposing sanctions against the Iranian economy and those who do business with Iran. The premise of this policy is simple: the pain will continue until Iran changes its behavior. Whereas the United States originally signed the “nuclear deal” with only Iran’s nuclear program in mind, the “maximum pressure” strategy is more ambitious and seeks to alter Iranian behavior more fundamentally. This includes things that Iran views as vital to its national security, namely its ballistic missile program and support to its proxies throughout the region. In reality, senior American officials have been fairly transparent regarding their desire to see “maximum pressure” result in regime change in Iran; the architect of this policy, Ambassador John Bolton, recently tweeted as much.
The economic and military pressure that the United States has exerted on Iran will lead to a change within the Iranian government, but not a change that is beneficial to the United States. Hassan Rouhani was first elected president of Iran with the promise of improving the lives of Iranians by making a deal with the rest of the world concerning its nuclear ambitions. He was then re-elected as he beseeched voters to trust that sanctions relief under the nuclear deal he brokered would improve both the Iranian economy and the daily lives of the Iranian people. All the while, his more hardline opponents warned against trusting the United States. To them, the nuclear deal was nothing more than a lie to weaken Iran, and the United States would not live up to its obligations. Regardless of whether the JCPOA was a good or bad deal for the United States, Rouhani’s opponents seemed to get the best of the domestic political argument. Now, economic tensions have spilled over to military ones, with the United States killing one of the most popular figures in Iran, whose death has invigorated those same hardline opponents of the current Iranian administration. Iran holds parliamentary elections in February 2020 and then presidential elections in 2021. It should disturb American policymakers that Hassan Rouhani’s approval rating is hovering around 40 percent, whereas former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who held office when Iranian activities in Iraq were responsible for the deaths of those six hundred American soldiers, has a favorability rating around 52 percent. If those numbers translate into electoral gains for hardliners in the coming elections, then any favorable change to Iranian foreign policy will be even more out of reach.
There is no doubt that Soleimani was directly responsible for the deaths of Americans. But while his demise therefore signifies that justice has been done, justice does not take strategic considerations into account. On the contrary, foreign policy is meant to achieve optimal results for the country, and this decision may do quite the opposite. Now Iran has responded with what Iranians surely feel is just: a ballistic missile attack targeting American military bases in Iraq. With the IRGC in control of Iran’s ballistic missiles, this response could very well have been a way for the IRGC to avenge Soleimani’s death directly without the inherent complications of using proxies who are often difficult to constrain. It also allowed Iran to message its response publicly along with an immediate announcement of de-escalation afterwards. For Iran, the long game is removing US soldiers from Iraq and Syria. A somewhat measured response to the death of Soleimani furthers those ends by answering internal demands for action and signaling resolve to its proxy forces and regional partners, while avoiding getting into a direct conflict with the United States that it would surely lose. On the US side, the targeted killing of Soleimani has jeopardized the American position in Iraq and will surely embolden the more extreme elements of Iranian politics who will use the entire campaign of “maximum pressure” to galvanize support at the polls. Soleimani’s death isn’t a bad thing, but the effects it may have on US strategic interests aren’t particularly good.
Maj. Alex Deep is a Special Forces officer assigned to Fort Bragg, NC. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Strategic Studies and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and previously taught courses in International Relations and the Politics of the Middle East at the United States Military Academy. He has deployed multiple times in support of combat operations in Afghanistan and Syria, and returned from his most recent deployment in November 2019.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Maryam Kamyab, Mohammad Mohsenifar – Merhnews.com (via Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International)
As this OpEd also appeared in the Small Wars Journal, this response also appears:
In case you haven’t heard, Iran is not a democracy – just ask the many citizens in Iran’s jails. Soleimani’s “enjoy(ing) the support of 8 out of 10 Iranians” had nothing to do with his position as the head “terrorist,” I’m sure.
I’m sorry, but if I were of Eisenhower’s family, I’d be severely offended to see Ike being compared to one of the leading terrorists in the world. Soleimani had no education or military training and Ike never would have signed a letter threatening the use of the military to remove a sitting president. Presuming that the citizens of Iran actually mourn Soleimani (and not being forced into these public displays) is a far stretch, just as thinking the Viet Cong were actually welcomed by the South Vietnamese in 1971.
The JPOA was a sham, Iran continued its drive towards nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that it has pursued for decades. The previous administration’s billion-dollar payoffs were turned into supporting terrorism, not in helping their own people (and their citizens know it).
To get even more fundamental, Soleimani being responsible for the death of 600 American service personnel is more than enough to permanently remove him – another American family won’t have to be told their loved one isn’t coming home. Is there really any other country that would have stood for this so long and, more importantly, why did we?
Major Deep's analysis of the current situation, and Iran's likely response at this point, seems entirely correct.
However, I doubt all of the possible "strategic considerations" have been evaluated. First and foremost, Iran doesn't have the resources necessary for aggressive new missile and nuclear weapons programs. While that fact won't have any immediate effects, such a huge disconnect between resources and probable military spending could very well put the regime into an untenable situation.
While the current regime has demonstrated an eagerness to brutally suppress dissent, they obviously don't have the level of control exercised in North Korea.
Hence one could assert, with apparently equal validity, Iran's next moves could only hasten the current regime's collapse. Let's hope so.
Your assessment utterly and completely discounts the value of re-establishing deterrence as a valid strategic goal and outcome.
You seem to think strategy can only be focused on trying to shift Iran to voluntarily "play nice"
As a strategic outcome, COERCING Iran to desist with the worst of it's activities is an acceptable, and far more plausible goal.
Until recently, Iran has had NO reason to feel threatened by American deterrence.
Now, EVERY senior leader within Iran's military and intelligence apparatus will have to wonder weather they may be the target of an American missile if they set foot outside Iran.
That alone will curtail, dramatically, Iran's ability to export terror.
Furthermore, this was not just about "Justice", and in fact it played very little part. Soleimani was intricately involved as puppet master within Iran's government. He truly was "irreplaceable". The capabilities lost with his death will have a dramatic impact on Iran's ability to export terror for some time, and may never be replaced. That is a "Strategic Outcome".
Like many others, you are projecting your dislike of the President into knee-jerk condemnation of foreign policy, you are LOOKING for a reason it must be wrong, rather than looking at what it will honestly do.
SF folks look at the world differently than most and that accounts for why their opinions aren't always greeted with enthusiasm. I agree with much of what Maj. Deep states, but I suggest he falls victim to confirmation bias in his analysis. He suggests that any war with Iran is unwinnable and that is more likely than not, but far from a given. Previous American administrations have demonstrated an amazing ability to snatch defeat from the mouth of victory over the past seventy years, but maybe that's just a by product of a civilian controlled military in a republican democracy. Where Maj. Deep diverges from probability is his assumption that America has to win wars….when actually what it really has to do is not lose wars. While that appears antithetical to traditional American values, the idea of not needing a win and avoiding a loss, is the smart play when your side is so far ahead of your opponents that they can't surpass you, it may not "sit well" with the competitive nature of Americans, but it's the smart play. The US eliminated a key figure in the Iranian command structure, per Maj. Deep, and in doing so have disrupted any number of undisclosed operations against the US and its allies. That benefit matched against any hypothetical outcome is truly "the bird in hand" being worth multiple ones in a bush. The killing of Gen. Soleimani not only has immediate benefits, but may also have future benefits as his successor will have to plan differently and feel he has to rethink operational plans…and anytime you can make the other side change plans it's a good thing.
With all due respect this the author's service… and I do have a lot of respect.. there are a few other elements that need to be considered:
On his supposed %82 approval rating, and the stability of the regime… I quote Politico, "While Soleimani enjoyed peculiarly deep personal veneration across Iran and his military pedigree dated back to the war with Iraq in the 1980s, that doesn’t buy the leadership wide affection for its repressive police state and security apparatus. The Revolutionary Guards are often viewed by many ordinary Iranians as a leading part of their country’s malaise. The guards are not only used as shock troops willing to open fire on protesters, but are also seen as the epitome of the country’s cronyism and rampant corruption.
The big unknown for Khamenei — and frankly for everyone — is to what extent most Iranians would back their leader in a regional showdown sparked by a revenge strike for Soleimani. Patriotism runs deep in Iran, but in recent years protesters have also become far more cynical about Tehran’s foreign adventurism when the domestic economy is creaking. Their fundamental questions are about why there is money for escapades in Iraq, but not for them."
On the JCPOA, I quote myself often, "I am certainly no Trumper, but the one thing I agree with him on almost entirely is the JCPOA. Iran has never been in compliance since day 1, and the archive Mossad stole proves it. As well, they had already slowed their bomb making program in order to advance their delivery mechanism, and the JCPOA removed the restrictions on their ballistic missile program in 8 years, yet the deal was sold as supposedly 'nuclear only.' FAIL. I had been in favor of negotiating, but for a better deal with real long term controls and safe guards. Iran’s Clause 14 problem: The requirement for Iran to “address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear program,” which is specified in Clause 14 of the JCPOA agreement, was not optional but a clear condition for the deal to take effect. Under the provisions of the deal, Iran was obligated to answer outstanding questions, and only once the IAEA certified Iran’s compliance with this requirement, in December of 2015, could the deal move ahead. A further breach based on the captured archive:Clause T82 of the JCPOA’s Annex I (about nuclear-related measures) states that Iran will not engage in “activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” These include “designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.” Of course not declaring at all, as well as retaining the nuke archive for later use, clearly violates the terms of the deal. Extensive analysis has been done on the archive Mossad stole by former UN weapons inspectors David Albright, and Olli Heinonen*, with some help from Andrea Stricker… at The Institute for Science and International Security. Their reports on the metallurgy, among others… show the situation to be quite alarming.
What if we were to begin our discussions of this topic by asking ourselves, in the Middle East and elsewhere, (a) "what is the overall goal of U.S. foreign policy and strategy?" and, thus, (b) what is the "kind of war" that we are embarked upon; this, to achieve this such strategic goal?
David Kilcullen, in his "Counterinsurgency Redux" (see the second and third paragraph under his major subjection therein entitled "Countemporary Insurgency"), tells us that the "kind of war" the U.S./the West is embarked upon is that of "revolutionary warfare;" this, with our opponents being engaged, accordingly, in "resistance warfare."
Given that, as per Mao,
a. "The purpose revolutionary warfare is to "destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new structure." And that, as per Mao accordingly,
b. "Any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological."
Given this such "goal and methods" perspective, thus to ask ourselves whether such things as (a) the U.S. pursuing regime change in Iran now, (b) the killing of Soleimani, (c) the U.S. renouncing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," and/or (d) the U.S. imposing sanctions against the Iranian economy and those who do business with Iran; whether these — individually and/or collectively — make "strategic sense" or no?
(Note: Sir Adam Roberts, in his "Transformative Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights," also acknowledges [a] the "transformative" U.S. foreign policy goal that I identify above and [b] the "revolutionary warfare" methods that we have used to pursue this such foreign policy goal since World War II. From the beginning of his such paper:
"Within the existing framework of international law, is it legitimate for an occupying power, in the name of creating the conditions for a more democratic and peaceful state, to introduce fundamental changes in the constitutional, social, economic, and legal order within an occupied territory? … These questions have arisen in various conflicts and occupations since 1945—including the tragic situation in Iraq since the United States–led invasion of March–April 2003.")