“They are coming on like a mob. Give them one fire and I’ll charge them.”
That was it. Lieutenant Colonel William Washington’s concise message was relayed to Lieutenant Colonel John Howard as the latter’s men flowed into their secondary fighting positions. With it, another timeless maxim of war was validating itself on a chilled January morning in 1781 at a road junction near Gaffney, South Carolina: simplicity aids success. The events that morning at the Battle of Cowpens were unfolding almost exactly as General Daniel Morgan had briefed his senior leaders just hours earlier. The militia members’ retreat through the main lines, the precise timing of their retrograde, and the coordinated turns and volleys—all were playing out as he described during his leader’s reconnaissance.
Morgan’s guidance to the militia had been simple, yet exact: twenty-four cartridges prepared. That was all each member was to carry. Twenty-four cartridges allowed Morgan to control their movement; it gave them the ability to engage the British for eight to twelve minutes, enough to do the initial damage he required with enough rounds left for protection as they bounded back. Morgan anticipated that his adversary, British Colonel Banastre Tarleton, as aggressive as ever, would advance at the double-quick, covering one hundred yards in about a minute. This would only give the militia members time to fire one to two volleys before executing their rear passage through the main line. Between the evening of January 16 and early the next morning, Morgan had conducted a reconnaissance of the road junction at Cowpens. The terrain was mostly flat, sparsely covered with trees, with the only significant feature being a small rivulet on the west side of the road along which British forces would advance. The depression through which the small stream ran rose gradually, forming a slight rise at the center of Morgan’s chosen battlefield. This terrain offered both tactical advantages and challenges. Morgan surely considered how it could delay or redirect Tarleton’s advance. He envisioned the sequence of events: how the rise on otherwise flat ground would influence the timing of volleys, and more critically, how that timing would affect his biggest concern, the geometry of the militia’s retrograde. The goal was to ensure that the retrograde didn’t interfere with the fire from his main line. As he surveyed the area, Morgan sought to answer the key question: At what point would the British transition from quick step to double-quick?
Battlefield calculus is a phrase often used by professional military officers to describe the process of quantifying the variables that form the equation of violence. This concept underscores a fundamental reality of warfare: the interplay of space and time. Historian Lawrence E. Babits, in his data-driven analysis, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens, describes Morgan’s vision turned premonition. Space and time converged as the British advanced within forty yards of his flank. The Continentals, following Morgan’s plan, bounded their flank-protecting line in sequence, retreating to secondary fighting positions while maintaining fire. The Virginia Continentals led this deliberate movement, covering approximately one hundred yards in a minute. This rapid, coordinated action left the British vulnerable as volleys were delivered deliberately rather than in sporadic waves. Morgan’s vision became reality, paving the way for Washington’s cavalry to strike the decisive blow. Washington saw the equation and his role in it clearly: Tarleton was exposed. His message to Howard was almost a formality; the reality was that Morgan had already made the decision when he chose this ground the night before. Washington’s cavalry charged.
Violence of action is inherently difficult. It demands more than just motivation or speeches. It requires an intimate understanding of the variables that make up its equation—variables like tempo, rates of fire, suppression, rates of march, timing of transitions, integration of fires, and the endurance of formations under stress. Behind it all is a science that must not be lost in platitudes. Large-scale combat operations will force us into discomfort, and the natural extension of that reality is this: Senior leaders must be ready to do more with less. The ability to anticipate, synchronize, and sustain violence of action under pressure is not instinctive.
General Morgan offers a timeless example. He did not just bring officership to the fight—he brought himself. Against today’s backdrop of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and staff automation, Morgan’s victory at Cowpens reminds us that there is no digital system, no staff process, and no intelligence feed that can replicate what a commander gains from physically being on the ground.
Tanner Port is a retired paratrooper and CW3 field artillery targeting officer. He is currently pursuing his PhD in history at Liberty University, where he continues to focus on the evolution of warfare. Tanner is a member of the Military Writers Guild and holds a master of arts in history from Southern New Hampshire University.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Master Sgt. Alexa Brumfield, US Army